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Introduction
The higher education sector is generally considered to be an important contributor to economic
prosperity. Higher education brings forth human capital and knowledge, which are
indispensable ingredients for the process of economic growth (cf. Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995;
Romer, 2001). Modern societies have an urgent need for highly skilled labour, not only to push
ahead the technological frontier by creative researchers but also to adopt and diffuse existing
knowledge.
While this crucial role of higher education for economic growth is widely recognised, the way
in which countries organise their higher education system differs vastly. Traditionally, the
higher education sector is strongly intertwined with the public sector through an extensive
system of regulation and financial support (direct and indirect). Apart from this very general
common feature, countries differ in policies with respect to student selection, tuition fees,
student support programs, public funding of teaching and research, and so forth. This country-
specific nature of higher education reflects the fact that the university system is often deeply
embedded into a nation’s history and culture. Only recently some countries have begun to revisit
the role of government. This development was spurred by the tightening of fiscal constraints on
public outlays in most OECD countries, which forced governments to rethink their task in
(virtually) all sectors they are involved in.
The Netherlands forms no exception. There is an ongoing debate on the function of higher
education in the society at large, and the role of the various stakeholders in the higher education
sector, including the government, the higher education institutions, students and the private
sector. The current debates in the Netherlands concern a wide range of issues.
• First of all, within the perspective of the “knowledge economy” it is claimed that there is a sheer
need for highly skilled graduates who are employable in a broad spectrum of jobs. On the other
hand, there is an ongoing concern that too few students attend programs in engineering or
natural sciences. This calls for a discussion on private and social returns to education, and on
the appropriateness and efficiency of government policies to influence the mix of graduates.
• A second category of issues is concerned with access to higher education. In this perspective, we
particularly mention the continuous debates on the level of tuition fees, changes in the student
support system and the way to assign student slots for programs with restricted capacity;
• A third issue addresses the relation between diversity and transparency in the higher education
sector. To improve transparency on the international higher education market, institutions are
reforming their study programs towards the Bachelor-Master model. This should also contribute
to international labour mobility, as the range of qualifications offered become more transparent
to foreign employers. However, in competing for students, higher education institutions are
trying to distinguish themselves by means of differentiation – in terms of programs, duration,
modes of delivery (applying new technologies), target groups and the academic quality of their
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1  Douglas North, Nobel Laureate in 1993, defines institutions as follows: “Institutions are the humanly devised
constraints that structure human interaction. They are made up of formal constraints (e.g. rules, laws,
constitutions), informal constraints (e.g., norms of behavior, conventions, self-imposed codes of conduct), and
their enforcement characteristics. Together they define the incentive structure of societies and specifically
economies.” (pp. 360, 1994).
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programs. Related to this is the issue of quality assurance, including the accreditation of
programs (or higher education institutions);
• Fourth, and finally, there is a growing tendency to include market-type mechanisms as a
coordinating device in the higher education system. Providers are supposed to become more
competitive and accountable. For instance, the funding of education and research is increasingly
becoming performance-based. In addition, in a period when public funds are not keeping up
with growing student numbers, the higher education institutions become increasingly inclined
to look for additional sources of revenue. This has resulted in more contract activities and
increased public-private cooperation.
This book aims to provide a helicopter view on options to organise higher education systems. It
is, however, impossible to elaborate on all the above-mentioned issues in this study. Therefore,
we have to limit ourselves – both in terms of the perspective we take and the issues we look at –
even though we realise that many of the issues are interrelated. To that end, particular attention
is paid to the institutional setting in which the higher education sector is operating.1 Often, this
means a close inspection of the incentive structure. It would be too narrow, though, to merely
focus on high-powered economic or financial incentives. Financial incentives may have adverse
and unintended effects when people are intrinsically motivated in their work, as these incentives
could trigger a shift toward activities that generate measurable output while important other
activities that generate hard-to-measure output are crowded out.
Since the Dutch experience with alternative arrangements in the higher education system is
limited, we shall look across the borders and try to learn from experiences in other countries.
Again, the organisation of the higher education system should be seen in the context of the
specific institutional setting: systems of higher education successful in one country may fail in
another. A critical evaluation thus requires a more profound understanding of the specific
institutional structure in those countries.
Organisation of the study
The structure of this study is the following. In Chapter 1 we describe the most eye-catching
characteristics of the Dutch higher education sector. Chapter 2 is a refresher on the economics
of higher education. Chapter 3 is about private contributions to higher education in conjunction
with the issue of accessibility. The Australian Higher Education Contribution Scheme – allowing
students to take out loans to pay for tuition while repayment of debt is income-contingent – is
Introduction
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examined in greater detail. Chapter 4 discusses decentralisation in the higher education sector
by examining the US system in which most institutes have considerable freedom in deciding on
their own tuition fees and admission criteria. In Chapter 5 we look at funding of education and
explore in greater detail the Danish taximeter-model in which the financial flows are directly
linked to student performance. Chapter 6 deals with research funding, and concentrates on the
UK system in which research assessments influence the allocation of public funds for academic
research. In Chapter 7 we study the impact of university-industry ties on academic research by
examining the US, where some interesting initiatives have been undertaken to promote a
fruitful exchange of knowledge between universities and the private sector. Finally, Chapter 8
presents food for thought for Dutch policymakers: what lessons can be learned from our
international comparison?
Higher Education Reform: Getting the Incentives Right
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The Dutch higher education system
1  HBO-institutes are officially called universities of professional education. We use both names.
2  More precisely, people who completed an undergraduate WO-program may use the title Drs. (Doctorandus), Ir.
(Ingenieur) or Mr. (Meester).
3  The Bologna-declaration can be downloaded from the web at www.unige.ch/cre.
4  In 2000, the Education Council (Onderwijsraad) advised the Minister of Education on the implementation of a
Bachelor-Master system in higher education. The report Invoering Bachelor-Master Systeem in het Hoger Onderwijs is
available from the Internet at www.onderwijsraad.nl (in Dutch).
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1 The Dutch higher education system
Erik Canton and Ben Jongbloed
In this chapter we describe the most important features of the Dutch higher education sector.
We pay particular attention to those characteristics playing a prominent role in the remaining
discussion.
1.1 Binary system
The Dutch higher education sector includes two different levels of education, viz. professional
training (HBO, Hoger BeroepsOnderwijs) and academic training at universities (WO,
Wetenschappelijk Onderwijs).1 HBO-institutes offer 4-year programs at the Bachelor-level, and
universities offer 4-year (for some disciplines 5-year) Master- and 4-year Ph.D.-programs.2
Universities prepare students for independent scientific work in an academic or professional
setting. HBO-programs prepare students to practise a profession and to enable them “to
function self-consciously in the society at large”.
In the wake of the Bologna-agreement3, the Dutch government is preparing a plan to reform
the degree structure in the binary system along the lines of the two-cycle Bachelor-Master
system used in Anglo-Saxon countries.4 As it stands, the plan entails the following important
changes:
• Introduction of a two-cycle Bachelor-Master structure both at the HBO-institutes and the
universities;
• The undergraduate Bachelor-program at universities of professional education takes four years
and proposals for the length of the graduate Master-program should come from the universities
of professional education themselves. Probably, the vocational Master-program will not be
eligible for public financial support;
• A logical choice on the length of the Bachelor- and Master-programs at universities would be a
3+1 or 3+2 year structure. But differentiation in the length of the Master-program should be
allowed. It is not yet clear to what extent Master-programs will be financially supported by the
government;
Higher Education Reform: Getting the Incentives Right
5  In addition, the WHW also applies to the academic hospitals, the Open University, the Royal Netherlands
Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW), and the Royal Library.
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• In order to reflect the difference between HBO- and university-degrees, HBO-institutions will
confer the Professional Bachelor degree and Professional Master degree, while universities will
offer the following degrees: Bachelor of Arts (B.A.), Bachelor of Science (B.Sc.), Master of Arts
(M.A.), Master of Science (M.Sc.), Master of Philosophy (M.Phil.) and Philosophical Doctor
(Ph.D.).
1.2 Formal tasks
The Dutch Higher Education and Research Act (Wet op het hoger onderwijs en wetenschappelijk
onderzoek, WHW), which came into force on the 1st of August 1993, regulates the role and
activities of universities and HBO institutions.5 Previous legislation assigned a central role to
government, with an emphasis on regulation and planning. The new Act, which has its origins
in the 1985 policy document “Autonomy and Quality in Higher Education”, propagates the
philosophy of steering from a distance and institutional autonomy. Detailed ex ante control by
the government has been replaced by ex post control of a more general nature.
According to the WHW, the formal tasks of universities are:
• To provide academic education (both undergraduate and graduate training);
• To carry out scientific research;
• To disseminate knowledge to society.
The tasks of HBO-institutions are:
• To offer professional training;
• To carry out research relating to the education-programs.
The Open University is mentioned separately in the WHW. This institution provides vocational-
and university-training in the form of distance learning.
1.3 Types of institutions
The WHW distinguishes between funded institutions (bekostigde instellingen) and designated
institutions (aangewezen instellingen). An important distinction between funded and designated
institutions is that funded institutions are eligible for financial support from the government, in
contrast to the designated institutions. The funded institutions are listed by name in the WHW.
The designated institutions are allowed by the Minister of Education to offer recognised training
programs. In principle this designation is of unlimited duration, but the Minister could revoke
the designation. Regular full-time students at funded and designated institutions are eligible for
The Dutch higher education system
6  It should be noted that the market for professional training has become more concentrated through scale
increases (in 1985, there were 432 universities of professional education).
7  External candidates (extraneï in Dutch) take examinations without having attended the institution as a regular
student.
8  Recognition is not the same as accreditation. At this moment, there is no accreditation system in use but the
Ministry is considering to transform the current system of quality assurance into a system based on accreditation.
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student support. Finally, there are some privately funded institutions that offer higher vocational
training programs but where students are not eligible for public support.
There are 13 funded universities, and one designated university (University of Nijenrode) in
the Netherlands. And there are 66 universities of professional education of which four are
designated.6 Most institutions eligible for government support are funded by the Ministry of
Education, but some receive their funding from the Ministry of Agriculture.
Funded and designated higher education institutions cannot freely decide on their location.
They can only offer education in the city where they are established, unless permission is
granted to deviate from this rule. Both the funded and the designated institutions have to fulfil
requirements with respect to quality, registration, education, examinations and dissertations,
and entry level. In addition, the funded institutions also have to obey rules in connection with
planning and funding, personnel, the position and legal status of students and external
candidates7, and management structure. Rules in relation to titles (e.g. Drs., Ir. or Mr.) do not
differ between both types of institutions. By-and-large, the designated institutions have (slightly)
more autonomy.
The Minister of Education decides on recognition of training programs. Recognised
programs are listed in the Centraal Register Opleidingen Hoger Onderwijs (CROHO). Private
schools can only receive the status of designated institution when their programs are
recognised.8
1.4 Funding structure
The public higher education sector receives financial resources from three pillars:
• The first flow of funds contains public core funding and revenues from tuition fees;
• The second flow of funds consists of project-based public payments allocated by the Dutch
research council (NWO, Nederlandse Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek) and the Royal
Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW);
• The third flow of funds comprises income from contract activities.
Higher Education Reform: Getting the Incentives Right
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With respect to the core funding flow, the WHW distinguishes between funding of teaching and
funding of research activities at universities. Teaching funds depend on the number of students
and study performance. The public contribution to research activity is influenced by social and
scientific needs, the profile of the university, and the quality of research. Public contributions
are lump-sum amounts, so that institutions have the freedom to relocate their funds between
various activities.
Several components of the core funding flows of universities are performance-based: core
funding of teaching is partly connected to the number of graduates (50%) and the number of
first-year students (13%), and core funding of research is partly connected to the number of
Ph.D. dissertations and designer certificates. But the largest part of the core funds for research is
predetermined. A more detailed description of the funding models for WO- and HBO-
institutions is included in the Annex “Public funding of higher education in the Netherlands,
performance-based models”.
 Table 1.1 shows the relative sizes of these flows in international perspective. From this small
sub-set of countries, the picture emerges that core funding is relatively important in the
Netherlands, while revenues from tuition fees and the second and third flow are relatively small
(at least in the WO-sector).
Note that tuition fee payments refer to gross private contributions to educational costs. As
students are often eligible for financial support from the government, net private contributions
can be (substantially) lower. More on this in Section 1.7.
In connection with the second flow of funds, NWO acts as an intermediary in granting funds for
separate research proposals submitted by individual researchers or research teams. Projects are
funded on a competitive basis. Table 1.1 shows that project-based research council funds
represent about 3% of university income.
Table 1.1 Composition of revenues of the higher education sector, international comparison
                    First flow (%) Second flow (%) Third flow (%) Total (%)
Core Tuition fees
Australia (‘97) 48.2 14.7 5.6 31.5 100
Denmark (‘97) 63.9 - 18.8 17.3 100
the Netherlands (‘97)
WO 72.1 5.5 3.4 19.0 100
HBO 69.1 17.1 - 13.8 100
UK (‘97) 38.5 11.5 4.8 45.3 100
US (‘95/‘96)
public 35.0 18.3 12.3 34.5 100
private 2.5 41.4 14.2 41.8 100
Note: WO stands for Wetenschappelijk Onderwijs, and HBO for Hoger Beroepsonderwijs.
Source: Jongbloed and Vossensteyn (1999), and own calculations.
The Dutch higher education system
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The third flow of funds concerns contract research and contract teaching carried out for
government, non-profit organisations, private companies, charitable boards, and the European
Community. For universities, this supplementary source of income has been growing fast since
the early 1980s. It now represents about 19% of university income for teaching and research
(excluding income from other services provided by universities). For the HBO-sector it is
difficult to obtain figures for income from contract activities. Surveys reveal that it nowadays lies
in the neighbourhood of 14% of their income.
1.5 Public expenditures on higher education
In Figures 1.1-1.3 we plot public outlays on higher education for the post-war period. Figure 1.1
shows real expenditures (in billions Dfl.), distinguished into HBO-level and WO-level. Total
public expenditures have risen rapidly, especially during the sixties and seventies. Since the early
eighties there is a clear change in this development. Real public expenditures on WO-training
declined, and real public outlays on HBO-training were frozen. Figure 1.2 presents public
expenses on HBO- and WO-training as a fraction of GDP. Relative outlays on university-training
have sharply declined since the mid seventies, while relative public expenditures on HBO-
training have slightly decreased since the early eighties. By-and-large, public expenditures on
higher education have not kept up with GDP since the late 1970s.
Figure 1.1  Real public expenditures on HBO and WO (billion Dfl., CPI is 1 in 1950)
Source: Public expenditures on HBO and WO are obtained from CBS (1992), CBS-Statline, and OCenW (1999); The series for the
Consumer Price Index is from CPB (1998) and CPB (2000).
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Figure 1.2  Public expenditures on HBO and WO (% of GDP)
Source: Public expenditures on HBO and WO are obtained from CBS (1992), CBS-Statline, and OCenW (1999); Data on GDP are
from CBS-Statline.
Figure 1.3  Real public expenditures on HBO and WO per student (thousand Dfl., CPI is 1 in 1950)
Source: Public expenditures on HBO and WO are obtained from CBS (1992), CBS-Statline, and OCenW (1999); Enrollment series
are collected from CBS (1992) and CBS-Statline; The series for the Consumer Price Index is from CPB (1998) and CPB (2000).
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9  We consider tertiary education and higher education as identical, see OECD (1998, pp. 425).
10  About 40% of Dutch students attends a program in social sciences, against 25% in the EU; 11% of Dutch
students is enrolled in engineering and architecture, while this is 15% in the EU (data from Eurostat).
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Figure 1.3 shows the historical development of the average public expenditures per HBO- and
WO-student. The inclusion of research expenditures is largely responsible for the substantial
cost differences between a HBO- and a WO-student. A trend break occurred around 1975. Public
expenditures per WO-student declined thereafter, but slightly recovered in recent years. And
public expenditures per HBO-student slightly declined. This consolidation of public spending
was supported by efficiency gains from the exploitation of economies of scale in the HBO-sector
(see footnote 6).
To put these data in international perspective, we present figures on expenditures per student in
a number of OECD economies in Table 1.2. These expenditures amount to an average of
$10,893 per student in tertiary education for 29 OECD countries.9 University-level training is
more expensive than non-university forms of tertiary education. Average expenditures per
student in the Netherlands is somewhat below the OECD average. This may partly be explained
by the relative over-representation of (less expensive) students in humanities and social sciences
in the Netherlands.10 The second part of the table shows expenditures per student relative to
GDP per capita. Again, the Netherlands are slightly below the OECD average and the US are on
top with 59%.
1.6 Tuition fee policies
Tuition fees for regular full-time students are centrally determined by the Minister of Education
and are uniform for all subjects in HBO and WO (in Dutch: wettelijk collegegeld). The tariff for
Table 1.2 Expenditures on tertiary education, international comparison
Expenditure per student (US $ converted
using PPPs), 1997
Expenditure per student relative to GDP per
capita (%), 1997
Tertiary education Tertiary education
All Vocational
training
Scientific
training
All Vocational
training
Scientific
training
Australia 11,240 7,852 12,024 51 36 55
Denmark 7,294 - - 29 - -
the Netherlands 9,989 6,862 10,028 45 31 45
UK 8,169 - - - - -
US 17,466 - - 59 - -
OECD 10,893 6,765 8,252 49 34 47
Source: OECD (2000, pp. 94, 95).
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regular students amounts to Dfl.2,874 (1,304) in 2000/01. Table 1.3 shows that tuition fees
have increased in recent years. The last two rows in the table show the tuition fee ratio, i.e.
tuition fees as a percentage of the total direct cost of a higher education program. Relative
private contributions have been fairly stable around 19% of average direct costs in the WO-
sector, whereas the tuition fee ratio has gradually increased for HBO-programs.
From September 1996 on, tuition fees for part-time students, students who have not
completed their studies within the nominal length of study plus 2 years (6 or 7 years), and
external candidates can be set by the institutes themselves (in Dutch: instellingscollegegeld). To see
whether the institutions make use of this possibility for tuition fee differentiation, we plot the
prices charged to part-time students at the 13 funded universities in Figure 1.4. Tuition price for
part-time students is relatively high at Erasmus University Rotterdam and Delft University of
Technology. These observations bring us to the conclusion that most universities make some
use of the room for tuition fee differentiation. However, as shown by Jongbloed and Koelman
(1999), HBO-institutions hardly use the possibility to set tuition fees beyond the minimum rates
set by the government.
Table 1.3 Tuition fees for regular full-time students, 1994-2001
1994/95 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 1999/00 2000/01
Nominal fee (Dfl.) 2,150 2,250 2,400 2,575 2,750 2,816 2,874
Real fee (Dfl.) 2,150 2,217 2,333 2,452 2,567 2,572 2,561
Tuition fee ratio, WO 19% 18% 18% 19% 19% 19%
HBO 18% 19% 20% 21% 22% 22%
Note: The final two rows display tuition prices as a percentage of the average direct educational costs of a training program.
Source: The CPI is set at 1 in 1994; inflation data are from CPB (1998, 2000); Tuition fees and average direct educational costs are from OCenW
(2000, 2001) and the homepage of OCenW (www.minocw.nl).
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11  More specifically, students must meet the following performance requirements. In the first year, students must
pass 50% of the exams, that is 21 out of 42 study points. If they meet this requirement, all initial loans become a
grant. The initial loans students receive in the second, third, and fourth (and in some cases fifth) years, can be
turned into a grant if they complete their study within ten years. Note that voluntary loans (cf. third provision)
cannot be transferred into a gift.
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Figure 1.4  Tuition fee differentiation for part-time students at Dutch public universities
Note: Tuition fees (in Dfl.) refer to the academic year 1999/2000; Abbreviations have the following meaning: Universiteit Leiden
(UL), Katholieke Universiteit Brabant (KUB), Katholieke Universiteit Nijmegen (KUN), Technische Universiteit Eindhoven (TUE),
Universiteit Twente (UT), Universiteit Maastricht (UM), Rijksuniversiteit Groningen (RUG), Universiteit van Amsterdam (UvA),
Vrije Universiteit (VU), Universiteit Utrecht (UU), Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam (EUR), Technische Universiteit Delft (TUD).
Source: Homepages of the universities.
1.7 Student support system
In 1986, a system of family allowances, tax facilities and means-tested grants was replaced by
one system of direct financial student support through the introduction of the Student Finance
Act. Although this system has gone through a large number of reforms, it still consists of the
following three basic provisions:
• All regular full-time students at funded and designated institutions receive a basic grant for the
nominal duration of a higher education program (4 or 5 years). As of the academic year
1996/97, the basic grant is called the “performance-related grant” because students receive it
initially as a loan. If students show satisfactory academic performance, the loan becomes a
grant.11 The amount of the basic grant depends on the housing conditions of students. As of
January 2001, the basic grant amounts to Dfl.147 (67) per month for students who live with
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their parents and Dfl.454 (206) for students who live on their own. Students are free to take
out less than the maximum grant to reduce the debt in case they do not meet the performance
requirement;
• Students can apply for a supplementary grant when parental income is below some threshold
(means-tested). This grant can only be received for the nominal duration of study (4 or 5 years).
The supplementary grant is also subject to the performance requirements applying to the basic
grant. Depending on parental income, the maximum amount of the supplementary grant is
Dfl.431 (196) per month for students who live with their parents and Dfl.467 (212) for
students who live on their own. Students are eligible for the maximum grant when parental
income is below approximately Dfl.52,000 (23,597);12
• Finally, students can voluntarily take up an interest-bearing student loan of at most Dfl.504
(229) per month. The loans are not means-tested.13
Apart from the basic provisions, students are allowed to earn an additional annual net income of
at most Dfl.19,500 (8,849). Student support is reduced when they earn more. This
arrangement also comprises a subsidy-element, as other groups receiving financial support from
the government are not allowed to earn additional income.
Finally, students eligible for student support also receive a public transport pass, entitling
students to free public transport either on working days or in the weekends (the days public
transport is not for free, the transport pass entitles them to a 40% discount on all fares).
In a worst-case scenario, students could end up with a debt of approximately Dfl.90,000
(40,840). After a grace period of 2 years, debts must be repaid within a period of 15 years with
a minimum monthly installment of Dfl.100. If graduates have difficulties in repaying their
monthly installments, they can ask for an annual means test. Based on that, monthly
repayments can be reduced (even to zero). Any remaining debt after 15 years is acquitted. Loans
are interest-bearing. As of January 2001, the interest rate is 5.18%.
1.8 Admission policies
There are some uniform requirements (set by the government) to enter higher education in the
Netherlands. These admission criteria refer to the secondary school diploma: level (HAVO for
HBO and VWO for university-training) and – sometimes – subjects chosen. 
For university programs, an exception to this rule holds for medicine, dentistry, and
veterinary science, where numbers are capped (a numerus clausus applies). For those subjects a
lottery is used to ration places upon final exam scores. This lottery system, first adopted in the
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1970s, has been heavily debated because in some occasions very talented students were not
admitted. The ultimate question therefore is: should merit replace luck in gaining entrance to
numerus clausus programs? As a result, a new selection system was implemented in 1999. The
main difference with the old system is that all candidates with high grades in the final secondary
education exams gain direct admission to the program of their choice. The other applicants will
have to revert to the weighted lottery procedure. More recently, other changes in this weighted
lottery procedure have been proposed. In particular, a small number of universities and HBO-
institutions have been allowed to experiment with setting their own entrance criteria: they can
allocate a small percentage of available places in study programs with a numerus clausus to
applicants that pass specific entrance tests. In Chapter 4, we will return to this issue by looking
at student selection within the US higher education system.
While there is hardly any selection of students at the moment of entrance, institutions have
the possibility to give a negative advice on whether or not to continue at the end of the first year
of registration. This advice can be binding at the discretion of the institution, implying that a
student with a negative advice is no longer allowed to register for the program in question. This
selection mechanism is actively used at Leiden University, where first-year students who pass
less than 50% of their exams receive a negative advice. It is not known to what extent other
Dutch higher education institutions make use of this selection opportunity, but anecdotal
evidence suggests that HBO-institutions also make use of the instrument of binding advice.
1.9 Quality control
To assess the quality of teaching and research activities, the universities and HBO-institutions
have set up a system of quality control. This quality control is carried out by the institutions
themselves, in collaboration with external experts, through their representative bodies (VSNU
and HBO-raad).
The quality of teaching in individual subject areas is assessed every six years in the
university-sector and every four years in the HBO-sector. The assessments are based upon self-
evaluations conducted by the faculties, reviewed by a committee of academic and professional
peers that visit all institutions. On behalf of the Ministry of Education, the Inspectorate for
Higher Education oversees the quality control system. To follow any actions taken as a result of
the quality assurance reports, the inspectorate visits each institution. It has a role in ensuring
that institutional quality control mechanisms are in place. If the Ministry feels that
unsatisfactory actions have been taken by the institutions, it may withdraw its funding, although
this rarely happens. Institutions (so far!) are not ranked, nor does something like an unofficial
pecking order exist – at least not to the relatively uninformed outsider like a prospective student.
The quality assurance reports of individual faculties are public. The reports are used by the
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institutions and individual faculties (e.g. for public relations), and by students and parents to
obtain information about particular programs or institutions.
Research at Dutch universities is also subject to quality assessments through peer review.
The review considers international benchmarks and the review panel usually has at least one
international member (although, as is the case for teaching assessments, in practice this
individual may come from across immediate borders). Although there are no direct financial
rewards associated with a positive research evaluation, the ratings often do influence the internal
budgeting process of universities.
1.10 Enrollment
In Figure 1.5 we plot student enrollment in Dutch higher education. Student participation in
HBO-education has shown a gradual increase from about 2% of the age group 18-24 (26,000
students) in 1950 to approximately 16% (233,000 students) in 1996. Participation in university
training has risen from 3% (29,000 students) in 1950 to 11% (166,000 students) in 1996. Note
that student enrollment in university education was relatively stable since the early nineties,
whereas HBO-participation has grown rapidly over the last ten years.
To further investigate the gradual expansion of the higher education sector in terms of
student participation, we look at the gender-composition of the student population. Figure 1.6
shows the female/male-ratio for Dutch HBO- and WO-students over the past fifty years. The
historical pattern of the participation of women in higher education differs between vocational
and university training programs. Female participation in HBO has been larger than in WO. In
1950, the female/male-ratio was about 57% in HBO-education, compared with only 18% in
university-training. By 1996, female enrollment was equal to male enrollment in HBO-training,
and approximately 86% of male participation in WO. From these observations we conclude that
the increase in student enrollment is largely generated by the catch-up of female participation
rates to the level of male enrollment rates in higher education.
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Figure 1.5  Student enrollment in HBO and WO (% of age group 18-24)
Source: The enrollment series are from CBS (1992) and CBS-Statline; The number of people in the 18-24 age cohort is available
from CBS (1998).
Figure 1.6  Female/male-ratio in HBO and WO
Source: CBS (1992) and CBS-Statline.
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Participation rates in tertiary education for the countries in this study are listed in Table 1.4 In
the Netherlands we observe that 11% of the age group 17-34 participates in higher education, an
intermediate position in international perspective. The enrollment rate is highest for the US, but
systems of higher education are not perfectly comparable among countries so that we cannot
draw any a priori conclusions regarding access to tertiary education. In fact, the level of some of
the US colleges is comparable with intermediate vocational education in the Netherlands (MBO,
Middelbaar Beroepsonderwijs). The 70% completion rate (the fraction of students completing
their studies) in the Netherlands is of intermediate size.
Table 1.4 Participation in tertiary education, international comparison
Net enrollment in tertiary education, age 17-34 (%) Completion rate
(%)
All Non-university University
Australia 14.9 5.1 9.9 65
Denmark 6.9 1.1 5.8 67
the Netherlands 10.7 - 10.7 70
UK 9.4 2 7.3 81
US 16.2 6 10.2 63
Source: OECD (1998, pp. 185 & 198).
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Annex: Public funding of higher education in the Netherlands, performance-
based models
Funding of universities
As of the year 2000, the Dutch university sector receives government funding according to the
so-called prestatiebekostigingsmodel (PBM).
The PBM is a distribution model. The Minister determines the macro-budget for the
university sector, and subsequently decides about the distribution of the macro-budget to the
individual institutions. The two most important components of the macro-budget are:14
• Teaching component
a. component for basic teaching facility (37%);
b. component for certificates (50%);
c. component for first-year students (13%);
d. component for workplace veterinary medicine and workplace dentistry.
• Research component
a. component for basic research facility;
b. component for dissertations and designer certificates (ontwerperscertificaten);
c. component for research centers (onderzoekscholen);
d. component for excellent research centers (toponderzoekscholen);
e. component for strategic considerations.
In 2000 the total budget of the Ministry of Education available for universities is Dfl.4,084.2
million. The Minister decides on the distribution towards teaching and research. The teaching
component amounts to Dfl.1,461.6 million, and the research component amounts to
Dfl.2,622.6 million.
• Teaching component
From the total amount available for teaching the component for workplace (Dfl.51.4 million) is
subtracted. The remaining budget (Dfl.1,410.2 million) is distributed as follows:
- 37% for basic teaching facility, i.e. Dfl.521.9 million;
- 50% for certificates, i.e. Dfl.705.1 million;
- 13% for first-year students, i.e. Dfl.183.2 million.
Next we describe how these amounts are distributed to the individual universities. To avoid large
fluctuations in financial flows, funding is based on two-year averages of number of certificates
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and number of first-year students. A weight is applied to account for differences in costs of
training programs. There is a low and a high tariff-group. Put loosely, alpha and gamma-studies
belong in the low category and bèta, technical and medical studies in the high tariff group. The
ratio used in the cost calculation is 1 : 1.5.
The component for basic teaching facility is distributed according to fixed amounts per
university. This component is meant to guarantee teaching capacity independent of the number
of students. In addition, it serves as an additional stabilising factor in the financial flows. This
component has a historical base. Also the component for workplaces (veterinary science and
dentistry) is allocated by means of fixed amounts per university.
The next table shows the distribution of teaching funds across Dutch universities according
to this prestatiebekostigingsmodel.
• Research component
The government budget for public research comprises 5 parts. The component for basic
research facility is based on a fixed amount per university. The component for Ph.D. and
designer certificates is calculated from the number of Ph.D. dissertations and designer
certificates per university (based on two-year averages). Two tariff groups are considered for
Table 1.5 Funding of teaching, WO-sector (1999)
TEACHING
mlj. Dfl.
Component for
basic teaching
facility
Component for
certificates
Component for
first-year
students
Component for
workplace
Total
UL 46.1 58.6 14 0 118.7
UU 72.1 100.8 23.6 35.5 232
RUG 50.9 84.4 19.2 0 154.4
EUR 29.2 51.9 15.3 0 96.5
UM 26.3 38.5 15.5 0 80.4
UVA 62.4 93.1 22.1 6.6 184.2
VU 41.3 59.9 16.8 6.1 124
KUN 41.4 65.6 13.7 3.1 123.8
KUB 16.4 31.5 8.7 0 56.6
TUD 68.3 57 17.7 0 142.9
TUE 37.4 32.2 8.9 0 78.5
UT 30.2 31.6 7.9 0 69.7
Total 521.9 705.1 183.2 51.4 1,461.6
37% of
1,461.6-51.4
50% of
1,461.6-51.4
13% of
1,461.6-51.4
Note: Abbreviations have the following meaning: Universiteit Leiden (UL), Universiteit Utrecht (UU), Rijksuniversiteit Groningen (RUG),
Erasmusuniversiteit Rotterdam (EUR), Universiteit Maastricht (UM), Universiteit van Amsterdam (UVA), Vrije Universiteit (VU), Katholieke
Universiteit Nijmegen (KUN), Katholieke Universiteit Brabant (KUB), Technische Universiteit Delft (TUD), Technische Universiteit Eindhoven
(TUE), Universiteit Twente (UT).
Source: OCenW, www.minocw.nl/begrotin/finschema/hfd2.htm.
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Ph.D. dissertations, a low tariff group (alpha and gamma) and a high tariff group (bèta,
technical, medical). The ratio in the funding of low tariff dissertations, high tariff dissertations,
and designers is 3 : 6 : 5. The component for research centers is allocated to the universities
proportional to the sum of the component for basic research facility, the component for Ph.D.
and designer certificates and the strategic consideration component (SOC, component strategische
overwegingen) of the previous year. The component for excellent research centers is allocated by
the Minister after consultation of NWO. The strategic consideration component is allocated on
the basis of fixed amounts per university. This component is adjusted in order to implement
PBM not involving additional expenditure for the universities. The next table shows the
distribution of research funds across Dutch universities according to the
prestatiebekostigingsmodel.
So the most important part of research funding is represented by the strategic research
component. The name of this component is derived from the fact that the government seeks to
fund “strategic” research, i.e. research relevant to society. This is where the quality criterion is
coming to the fore. Although the Ministry of Education and the universities agreed that quality
and social relevance are to play an important role in allocating this component, the universities
took the view that a reshuffling of research funds would be a major intrusion on the university’s
autonomy. So far, the universities have been successful in avoiding any relocations. Therefore,
this part of research funding is still mainly based on historical allocations (though over the years
some additional allocations were made to relatively new or expanding universities). Thus, unlike
teaching, most of the funds for research are not distributed on the basis of output.
Table 1.6 Funding of research, WO-sector (1999)
RESEARCH
mlj. Dfl.
Component
for basic
research
facility
Component
for Ph.D. and
designer
certificates
Component
for research
centers
Component
for excellent
research
centers
SOC Total
UL 34.6 34.9 9.2 8.9 150.8 238.3
UU 56 47.2 12.8 14.2 213.2 343.5
RUG 43.4 30.9 9.7 12.3 156.7 253
EUR 28.5 19.7 5.3 4.8 78.9 137.2
UM 20.2 13.6 3.8 3.1 75.3 116.1
UVA 52.7 41 11.9 12 186.3 303.9
VU 33 21.6 8 7.6 134.9 205.1
KUN 32.6 25.3 8.1 6.5 127.7 200.1
KUB 18 4 2.3 1.8 29.8 56
TUD 37 35.2 14.8 12.8 300.1 399.9
TUE 18.6 28 8 11 140 205.7
UT 18.7 23.3 6.2 5 110.7 163.9
Total 393.4 324.8 100 100 1,704.5 2,622.6
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From the 1998 budget on, an additional feature was introduced in the research funding model.
A two-part compartment for strengthening the system of so-called research schools in the
Netherlands was added to the three already existing research budget compartments. It was called
the breadth and depth strategy. Through the first part of this compartment (the breadth
compartment), universities were encouraged to continue on the road towards establishing
research schools. So far, more than 100 research schools have been established. The aim of
research schools is twofold:
• To have a structure in which researchers from different universities concentrate their research
activities on certain (sub-) disciplinary fields;
• To locate the training of new researchers (Ph.D. students) in this structure. This strategy, based
on arguments of scale and synergy, seeks to strengthen and improve the quality and profile of
university research in general.
The second part in the research school compartment (the depth compartment) was targeted at
supporting those research schools which are considered to be among – or show potential to
become part of – the best research institutes in the world in particular research areas. The
underlying strategy for this component is to reward excellence.
The funds in connection with the breadth as well as the depth components were to be
transferred from the strategic research component (i.e. the historic allocations described earlier).
NWO, the Dutch research council, was to decide what research schools qualify for the depth
support. Six research schools, all of them in natural sciences, were selected in 1998 as top
research schools and qualified for additional support. This selection met with a lot of criticism,
especially from the social sciences. The present (liberal) Minister of Education has abolished the
depth strategy and decided to take another approach that was not targeted at large-scale research
schools, but also to smaller scale groups, predominantly from the social sciences and
humanities.
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owv 
A×NBA  U×NBU
Ja  Ju
Funding of universities of professional education15
The funding model for the HBO-sector is also a distribution model with a fixed macro-budget.
The allocation of the available budget to the institutions is based on the number of “education-
demanding students” (in Dutch: onderwijsvragende studenten). The number of education-
demanding students is calculated from:
where:
owv number of education-demanding students;
A number of students and external candidates who receive a degree;
NBA normative length of stay for students who complete their study;
U number of students and external candidates who drop out;
NBU normative length of stay for students who drop out;
Ja number of years that students who complete their study have been registered at the
institution;
Ju number of years that students who drop out have been registered at the institution;
The Minister uses NBA=4.5 (years) as the normative funding period of people who complete
their study, and NBU=1.35 as the normative funding period of drop-outs.
The total amount of funding is then calculated from multiplying the number of education-
demanding students by a fixed reimbursement per student (for 2001 Dfl.9,850 for “p-programs”
(practicum-georiënteerd, e.g. technical studies) and Dfl.7,615 for “g-programs” (gamma-
georiënteerd, e.g. economics)).
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1  Cf. Kodde and Ritzen (1984), Huijsman et al. (1986), and Oosterbeek and Webbink (1995).
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2 Economics of higher education
Erik Canton and Richard Venniker
This chapter is a short introduction to the economics of higher education. We discuss important
economic concepts and mechanisms on the market for higher education services. We do so by
looking at a sequence of questions:
• Why do people attend higher education (Section 2.1)?
• Why should government support higher education (Section 2.2)?
• How to organise public funding of higher education – student support versus institutional
funding (Section 2.3)?
• Public or private provision of higher education (Section 2.4)?
• Should the higher education market be deregulated (Section 2.5)?
• Why combine education and research in universities (Section 2.6)?
• Why should government support research (Section 2.7)?
• How to organise public funding of research (Section 2.8)?
• Does government failure reduce the desirability of government intervention (Section 2.9)?
2.1 Why do people attend higher education?
Students participate in higher education for two basic reasons: consumption and investment.
Under the consumption motive, higher education generates immediate benefits related to
students’ curiosity and the pleasure to learn. Under the investment motive, students incur the
costs of education (both time and money) in order to enlarge their future expected income. The
available empirical evidence for the Netherlands suggests that the investment motive is the most
important factor behind the decision to attend higher education.1
Two mechanisms may account for the positive effect of education on income. The first
operates through the effect of education on knowledge and skills, or human capital. The second
operates through the informational role of education. These mechanisms are known in the
literature as the human capital model and the signalling model.
2.1.1 The human capital approach
The human capital approach (cf. Schultz (1961), Becker (1964)) stresses that education enhances
the knowledge and skills embodied in people, thus raising their human capital. More human
capital, in turn, implies higher salaries and a smaller chance of ending up unemployed. Human
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Admission tests may be a much cheaper instrument to solve the information problem.
36
capital also generates non-monetary benefits related to job satisfaction, personal development,
and participation in social life.
2.1.2 The signalling approach
An alternative view holds that education primarily serves to reveal the innate ability of people.
Innate ability is considered to be the main determinant of people’s productivity. If it cannot be
observed directly, people can provide information about their productivity by investing in
education. So education helps to alleviate the information problem on the labour market.
Consequently, education may be a beneficial investment for individuals, even if it does not
increase their productive capacity. This signalling (or screening) effect has been put forward by
Arrow (1973) and Spence (1973).2
What do the data say about the importance of the human capital versus the screening
hypothesis? Hartog (1983) compares earnings of people who attended a higher education
program but did not obtain a degree to earnings of people who completed the program. He
finds a significant negative effect of the graduation gap, i.e. the number of years short of
graduation for those who did not complete their studies. Quantitatively, the effect of a year of
nongraduation is in the same order of magnitude as the earnings gain of an additional year of
tertiary education. This finding gives support to the human capital augmenting view of
education, and is in contrast with the prediction of the screening hypothesis. Other evidence
supporting the human capital model is presented in Groot and Oosterbeek (1994). However,
according to Temple (2000) and Weiss (1995) the overall importance of signalling remains
controversial and the results of natural experiments to test the correlation between earnings and
schooling are not necessarily inconsistent with the signalling view of education.
2.1.3 How high are the financial and non-financial returns to higher education?
• Private rates of return
In order to estimate the profitability of higher education investments, the benefits should be set
against the direct and indirect costs of education. The major direct costs are tuition fees and
study materials like books. The indirect costs consist of forgone earnings. If students wouldn’t
have taken up a college education, they probably would have entered the labour market. The
income they would have earned on the labour market should be counted as costs of education.
Without further adjustments, this overstates the real costs to students. In many countries
students receive education-related subsidies. And most students take up small jobs during their
study, although probably at lower wages than they would have earned in full-time jobs. Both
Economics of higher education
3  In addition, the consumption value of education should be taken into account.
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5  These results do not support the claim of declining marginal returns to schooling at the tertiary level.
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these incomes should be subtracted from the forgone earnings to arrive at the real costs to
students.3
Estimates for rates of return to years of education in the Netherlands vary from 3% to 8.6%
(Table 2 in Hartog et al., 1999). International estimates of the returns to an extra year of
education lie somewhere in between 5% and 15%, depending on the time and country.4 These
findings are mostly based on ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions. Two problems stand out.
First, if schooling is measured with error, the regression coefficient is underestimated (see Card
(2000) for a formal proof). Second, selection effects give rise to an upward bias in the regression
coefficient. When the model does not control for ability, the effect from schooling on income is
overestimated. The general view holds that the downward bias due to measurement error is in
the same order of magnitude as the upward bias from selection effects, so that the OLS-estimate
is a reasonable approximation of the “true” returns to schooling (cf. Krueger and Lindahl, 2000).
By-and-large, it is warranted to conclude that education yields a substantial private financial
return.
Most studies on rates of return to schooling do not explicitly distinguish between primary,
secondary and tertiary education. What is known about the private financial returns to higher
education? Ashworth (1997) obtains estimates of the average returns to higher education for the
UK in the range of 9-21%, depending on assumptions with respect to economic growth,
graduate unemployment and the type of student support. More recently, Blundell et al. (2000)
estimate a rate of return to an undergraduate degree of around 17% for men and 37% for
women (also for the UK).5 For the Netherlands, the private returns to an extra year of higher
education are about 5.5% (HBO) and 10% (WO), cf. Canton (2001a).
• Non-financial returns
Non-financial returns to higher education add to the already substantial financial returns. Non-
financial returns refer to non-wage labour market remuneration, intra-family productivity, child
quality (level of education and cognitive development, health), own and spouse’s health,
consumer choice efficiency, labour market search efficiency, marital choice efficiency,
attainment of desired family size, charitable giving and savings (cf. Wolfe and Haveman, 2000).
These non-financial returns are far harder to measure. Wolfe and Haveman (2000) survey the
literature on this issue, and conclude that non-market returns to schooling are substantial:
conservative estimates of the value of non-labour market influences are in the same order of
magnitude as estimates of the annual financial rate of return to schooling.
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By-and-large, higher education is a very profitable investment for individuals. And given that
education also yields non-financial benefits, the presented rates of return to schooling should be
interpreted as conservative estimates.
2.2 Why public support of higher education?
Governments all over the world intervene heavily in the higher education sector. The public
sector supports both students and institutions, and regulates the activities of higher education
institutions, which are frequently even publicly owned. In the previous section we have seen that
higher education is a profitable investment from an individual’s viewpoint. Why then should the
government intervene in the higher education market? The basic arguments for government
intervention in private markets are market failures and income redistribution. The market
failures that are relevant for the higher education sector are:
• Human capital spillovers;
• Capital market constraints;
• Risk / insurance market imperfections;
• Imperfect information / transparency problems.
In this section, we will summarise the empirical evidence of these market failures. In addition,
two other reasons for government intervention are considered, namely the connection between
higher education and income redistribution, and the impact of tax distortions.
2.2.1 Human capital spillovers
People do not reap the full benefits of their educational investment: the benefits partly accrue to
others. Higher educated individuals may increase the productivity of co-workers6, may enhance
social cohesion, and are less likely to engage in socially wasteful criminal activities. As a result,
the total returns to educational investments for society (i.e. the social returns) may exceed the
sum of all private returns. Rational self-interested individuals do not take these external benefits
into account in their own investment decisions. When social returns exceed private returns,
investment in higher education tends to be too low from a social perspective. However, in the
current situation the government already provides substantial financial support to the higher
education sector. And current subsidies to higher education may in fact be so high that
individuals invest beyond the socially optimal level (i.e. private returns exceed social returns to
schooling).
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Do the private and social returns to higher education differ, and, if so, by how much?7 Empirical
evidence is scarce. The tentative conclusions for education in general are the following. Blundell
et al. (1999, pp. 15) write: “The very few available estimates of the rates of return to education at
the aggregate level do not, however, suggest that allowing for an externality effect adds very
much to private rates of return based on earnings differences”. Acemoglu and Angrist (1999)
estimate private and social returns to (compulsory) schooling in the US, and conclude that their
analysis “offers little evidence for sizeable social returns to education” (pp. 22).
Two studies – background reports to a government-commissioned study on the future of the
higher education sector in the UK – have focussed especially on higher education (Gemmell
(1997), and Steel and Sausman (1997)). They do not find strong evidence for the existence of
externalities related to higher education. In particular, Gemmell (1997, Section 3.51) writes:
“The most likely source of reliable evidence is likely to come from comparing macro and micro
estimates of rates of return to higher education. Present evidence is very limited; again it is
suggestive of a small externality effect, at best, associated with higher education but a greater
weight of evidence is required before firm conclusions can be stated.”
Finally, it should be noted that private and social returns to schooling may differ for other
reasons than human capital spillovers. For instance, Temple (2000) mentions signalling and
rent-seeking activities (think of lawyers) as explanations for why the social return could be lower
than the private return, and more efficient matching between workers and jobs as a reason why
the social return may exceed the private rate of return.
2.2.2 Capital market constraints
Students may need to borrow money in order to finance their study. But student loans are
hardly provided by private banks. Two factors account for this reluctance to offer study loans by
commercial banks:
• There is no asset market for human capital, hence human capital cannot serve as collateral;
• Individual characteristics and individual behaviour that influence the return on human capital
investments are hard to monitor by banks. Students who are more likely to default (irrespective
of their behaviour) are more inclined to apply for student loans, while students with very low
default risks are induced to refrain from applying for loans because they do not want to pay the
risk premium (the adverse selection problem). This raises the average default risk of the
students that still want to apply for loans, which drives up the risk premium on student loans
and induces even more relatively low-risk students to refrain from loans, and so forth. It may
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even lead to the situation where banks are unwilling to lend against commercial interest rates.
In addition to this adverse selection problem, the fact that individual behaviour is difficult to
monitor could lead to moral hazard in the sense that students reduce their efforts in order to
relieve the debt obligation.
How relevant are capital market imperfections in practice? When liquidity constraints are
important, one would expect that parental income has a positive impact on the enrollment
decision. However, Oosterbeek and Webbink (1995) conclude from Dutch data that the effect of
parental income on enrollment is not significant. Other authors have reached similar
conclusions (cf. Shea, 2000).
This does not imply that the government has no role in alleviating credit market problems.
In fact, the observation that liquidity constraints do not seem to be very important in the current
situation could indicate that government intervention is effective. A widely-used government
instrument is to lower the price of educational services through subsidies, which weaken the
liquidity constraints and the need to borrow. This policy is not very efficient: rich students also
benefit from these subsidies, while the poorest students may still not be able to finance their
study.
A more efficient type of public action is to provide student loans or to stand surety for
student loans at commercial banks. One possible objection is that students with unfavourable
social backgrounds are less willing to incur debts. Income-contingent repayments will alleviate
this problem (but also introduce other issues like a distortion of the labour supply decision and
post-graduate education).
2.2.3 Risk
Investing in higher education involves two types of risk:
• Students may be unsure about the effect of higher education on their human capital (due to
uncertainty about their own ability and about the quality of the educational services);
• Students may be unsure about the effects of higher human capital on their prospective income
and employment opportunities (due to uncertainty about the future (composition of the)
demand for labour).
The first risk is primarily idiosyncratic: pooling of the risk, resulting in a less risky portfolio of
educational investments, is possible in principle. The sum of the individual investments is not
risky for society as a whole. The second risk is a form of aggregate risk, so that risk-sharing is
more difficult; its effect on individual decisions can only be limited by shifting risk from more to
less risk-averse individuals (which is also possible for the first type of risk).
Both pooling (reduction of risk) and shifting of risk will induce risk-averse people to increase
their investment. But markets fail to provide such insurance, due to the moral hazard and
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adverse selection problems mentioned before with regard to the capital market failure. The
resulting under-investment in education is generally expected to be particularly severe among
poorer families, who have to finance their education through loans and are afraid to be left with
large debts they can’t repay.
Many governments provide partial insurance by providing income-contingent student loans.
As stated above, this distorts future choices that have an impact on earnings, like the labour
supply decision, the choice of jobs and choices for further education. The graduate tax, which
has been proposed as an alternative to student loans, also provides partial insurance. With
graduate taxes, students receive funds and in return the government gets a claim on their future
income through a special income tax for graduates. This system introduces solidarity between
successful and unsuccessful students. It has some possible drawbacks, however: taxes are based
on total income instead of the income that can be attributed to the graduate degree, it distorts
future labour supply and education choices, and it is subject to tax evasion (cf. Oosterbeek,
1995).
2.2.4 Imperfect information and transparency
The quality of educational programs is difficult to measure. It cannot be observed in advance,
but it can be observed (at least partially) by the students during study and afterwards: to put it
differently, education is an experience good. In principle, this introduces the possibility that
providers of education collect tuition fees and subsequently provide insufficient quality.
The relevance is likely to be limited, since colleges and universities have been and will be in
the market for a long period. This provides room for the reputation mechanism to do its work.
Higher education institutes will weigh the potential short-term benefits of lowering the quality
of their education programs against the negative longer-term effect on their reputation.8
The question is how much of the educational quality remains unobserved by the students
and their future employers, even during study and after graduation. The reputation mechanism
will not work for this part of the quality. Given the importance that governments attach to the
quality of education, the slightest doubts about the effectiveness of the reputation mechanism
might be enough to warrant a role for the government. Possible instruments are the certification
/ accreditation of studies and institutions (possibly also entry restrictions), public provision of
information, and public provision of higher education.
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2.2.5 Income redistribution
Higher education subsidies may be used to bring about a more equal income distribution.
Subsidies on higher education raise the supply of highly educated people, which exerts a
downward pressure on their wages. Similarly, the wages of lower qualified people are pressed
upwards because of a decline in their supply (cf. Teulings, 2000; Goldin and Margo, 1992). The
strength of this mechanism depends on the price elasticity of student demand for education, the
wage elasticity of labour supply (of both highly educated and lower educated labour), the wage
elasticity of labour demand, and the substitution elasticity between higher and lower educated
workers.
Even when a flatter income distribution results, the overall redistribution through higher
education subsidies need not be from high incomes to low incomes. This is due to the fact that
the subsidies are financed by general taxes, while the beneficiaries (the individuals entering
higher education (even the marginal ones)) have better income prospects than the ones that do
not enter higher education. So a reduction in gross wages of educated workers relative to
employees with less education not necessarily implies a reduction in the private return to
schooling (private returns are based on net wages). Targeting subsidies to the marginal students
who would not have taken a higher education program without the subsidies enhances
efficiency: subsidising students who would have entered higher education anyway is wasteful.
Targeting seems hardly possible, however, as it is difficult to identify the marginal student.
2.2.6 Tax distortions
A final argument for public contributions to higher education has to do with correction for
income tax distortions. In most countries, government expenditures are financed partly by the
revenues from (progressive) income taxes. These income taxes distort a number of private
decisions. A familiar one is the distortionary effect on the labour supply decision. But income
taxes are also likely to affect the education decision, e.g. when income taxes are progressive, or
when income taxes are proportional but education expenditures are not tax-deductible. In these
cases, public subsidies to higher education may correct for distortions induced by the income tax
(cf. Van Ewijk and Tang, 2000).
2.3 How to fund higher education?
After having dealt with the question why the government should support higher education, we
now take up the issue how to arrange this public funding. Governments finance higher
education through two channels: student support and funding of the higher education
institutions. This section discusses both funding channels in more detail.
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2.3.1 Student support
Student support decreases the cost of education to students, and may thereby increase the
demand for education. The effectiveness of student grants depends on the elasticity of the
demand for higher education: how much does the demand for education increase in response to
a decline in the private cost of education? The available empirical evidence suggests that
students’ price responsiveness is low. For instance, Oosterbeek and Webbink (1995) write:
“from the insignificance of the effects of forgone earnings and parental income we must
conclude that the demand for higher education is completely inelastic” (pp. 377). However, the
demand elasticity may differ between students and there is some evidence for the US that
students from poor families are more responsive to price changes (cf. Dynarski, 1999). When
the elasticity of demand differs between students depending on observable characteristics,
student support may be targeted to specific student groups (e.g. need-based grants).
Increased demand for higher education is not necessarily translated one-for-one into more
accumulation of human capital. Students may use the grants simply to finance a few years of
leisure, without actively participating in higher education. This moral hazard would prevail
especially in the presence of large information asymmetries about student effort. Fortunately,
student effort can be measured to a fair degree. To improve the efficiency of student support in
enhancing the human capital of students, grants may be made contingent on such measures
(e.g. minimum number of study points per year). The maximum number of years for which
students are in principle entitled to public support may also be limited.9
Student support may also be in kind, like cheaper public transport for students. This is
warranted when the government likes to influence the expenditure pattern of students (possibly
because of paternalistic motives).
2.3.2 Funding of higher education institutions
Part of the subsidies to higher education are channelled directly to colleges and universities.10
Institute funding is often not (only) linked to student enrollment, but also to (a proxy for)
educational production. So two issues stand out:
• Funding channel: customer or producer subsidisation?
• Funding conditions.
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First we look at the funding channel. Often, both the students and the institutions receive
government funding. A reason for governments to subsidise institutions may be that they
regard themselves as better informed about the performance of universities and colleges than
the students. But this presumption has always been questionable, and is likely to become less
valid due to the increasing diversity in consumer tastes. Another possible reason is that
governments regard themselves as better informed about what are good choices for society.
When governments like to stimulate demand for certain studies, this might be done most
efficiently by directly subsidising the institutes delivering these studies, so it is argued. But this
argument is not convincing, as student support systems can be adapted to take account of
different degrees of subsidisation across disciplines. So the economic rationale behind the
distinction between student and institute support is not clear.
Second, funding conditions impact on the efficiency of institutional funding. In practice,
“hybrid” funding systems are often used. In the Netherlands, for instance, direct funds for
universities consist of a fixed component, and a variable component depending partly on the
number of completed degrees and partly on the number of first-year students (see Chapter 1 for
more information). The fixed component serves to guarantee capacity independent of student
enrollment. The performance-based component should promote efficiency in educational
production. A more elaborate discussion on the pros and cons of output-based funding will
follow in Chapter 5.
2.4 Public versus private provision of higher education
In many countries, especially in Europe, colleges and universities are predominantly public
institutes. The major explanations are that public institutes do not have a profit motive, and that
(part of the) decision authority rests with the central government instead of the individual
agencies (think of general remuneration rules for civil servants, tuition fee regulation). What
economic arguments can justify the choice for public provision, instead of merely public
funding?
Public provision replaces the profit motive of private providers. When educational
production is imperfectly observable (and hence non-contractible), profit maximisation may bear
a cost in terms of reduced quantity and / or quality of the delivered services. Several factors may
reduce the strength of this argument, however. Profit maximisation generally also implies
strong incentives to innovate. Only when innovation is relatively unimportant in higher
education, this would support public provision. Furthermore, when quality can be assessed by
students, and hence consumer choice is effective, competition between suppliers and reputation
mechanisms mitigate the problem of quality or quantity reduction. Many private providers,
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moreover, have a non-profit status as well (in the US, but also in the Netherlands11). Public
provision should then only be introduced when it is believed that too few non-profit institutes
are operating in the market for higher education (and subsidies do not help to increase this
number). An additional argument for public provision is that it enhances government control
over the production process (cf. Poterba, 1995). The question, however, is whether public
provision is more efficient in doing so than regulation of private providers of higher education.
Counterarguments to public provision exist as well. Prominent ones are that government
production is cost-inefficient (although empirical evidence is not very strong), objectives of
public institutions are not clear and may also result in over-provision of services or provision of
the wrong services. These government failures will be discussed more extensively in Section 2.9.
2.5 Should the higher education sector be deregulated?
The market for higher education will become more and more international due to globalization
and the ongoing European integration process. Students and staff become more mobile, and
educated people will more often spend some time working abroad. Implementation of the
Bologna Declaration (see Chapter 1) is an important step towards the creation of a European
market for higher education programs. Moreover, ICT-developments, the advent of distance
learning, and the advance towards the “virtual university” might have a major impact on the
higher education system.
These trends and developments strengthen the necessity for the higher education sector to
focus on market conditions, and to compete for students, teachers, researchers and research
funds. So it can be expected that competition between higher education institutions will
intensify. This encourages institutions to improve their quality (or reduce their price). To do so,
and to compete successfully on the international higher education market, institutions need to
have the instruments to improve on their performance. As government regulation limits the
room for manoeuvre of the institutions, this brings us to the question whether the higher
education sector should be deregulated.
Government intervention in the form of regulation can refer to conditions of employment,
curriculum requirements, restrictions on commercial activities, tuition fee policies and
admission criteria. For example, in some countries tuition prices and admission criteria to enter
higher education are regulated by the public sector. What would happen when tuition price and
student selection policies were deregulated? To answer this question, we should look at the
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13  According to the model of Rothschild and White (1995), the price of education to a student actually consists of
two components: a price for the product education, and a price for each student’s input. The first price may vary
between institutes of higher education, the latter price may vary between individual students.
14  The same holds for combining different fields and disciplines within institutions (cf. Nerlove, 1972).
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production technology of education. The educational process is frequently described as a
customer-input technology: students are both consumers and producers of education.12
Interactions among students (the peer effect) and between students and staff are important
ingredients to the educational process, and determine a large part of the quality of the training
program (cf. Rothschild and White, 1995, Lazear, 1999). This notion of a customer-input
technology has two major implications:
• It provides a theoretical justification for selection of students. Universities can reach a higher
quality-level by selecting the best students (or the best mix of students);
• It gives a rationale for price discrimination among students, e.g. by selectively providing grants.
Students who generate positive spillovers should pay lower net tuition fees than students who
generate no (or even negative) spillovers. In this way, universities and colleges internalise these
“classroom-externalities”.13
It should be noted that student selection and tuition fee differentiation not necessarily call for
deregulation, but the general view holds that the information advantage of higher education
institutions warrants the delegation of decision authority to these institutions.
In the current Dutch practice, the set of instruments available to the higher education sector
to improve its performance is limited: there are few possibilities for student selection or price
discrimination among students. In Chapter 4 we will discuss the issue of deregulation in more
detail, and we shall look at the US experience with respect to student selection and tuition fee
differentiation.
2.6 Why combine education and research in universities?
Education and research are often combined within single higher education institutes. This
suggests the presence of efficiency gains from joint production: fewer resources are needed to
produce a given amount of the two services if they are produced together rather than
separately.14 In economic terms: there are economies of scope. These complementarities
between education and research may depend on the program level. Nerlove (1972) considers
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graduate training and research to be inextricably intertwined, whereas benefits from joint
production of undergraduate training and research are less obvious.
Empirical evidence about the importance of complementarities is scarce.15 A recent example
is Koshal and Koshal (1999), studying whether there are economies of scale and economies of
scope in higher education.16 For a sample of 158 private and 171 public universities in the US,
they find that institutions can reap benefits from joint production: their estimation results
suggest economies of scope for research activities in the range of 5-26% for public institutions
and in the range of 23-117% for private universities (unfortunately, the authors do not provide an
explanation for this large difference between public and private institutions). This joint
production of education and research activity has a number of consequences:
• The incentives on both activities should be balanced. Rearranging the incentive structure could
change the allocation of time and money between the activities. When one of the activities is
harder to measure than the other, combining the tasks may divert efforts toward the better
observable activity;
• Subsidies on one activity probably affect the price of the other activity. For example: it is possible
that subsidies to university research will raise the price of undergraduate education. But it might
also lower this price. The direction of the effect depends on two factors: the elasticity of
substitution between research and education, and the supply elasticity of the resources used in
higher education (most importantly researchers);
• When there are good reasons for public production of (academic) research, it may be more
efficient – in light of the gains from joint production – also to provide higher education in the
public domain.
2.7 Why and when should research be publicly funded?
Governments spend large amounts of money on academic research. They do so for two basic
reasons:
• To support the formulation and implementation of government policy;
• To correct an insufficient level of private investments in research.
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First, government policy makes intensive use of the insights of research, with a special focus on
the social sciences and the humanities, although the natural sciences are relevant as well.
Second, private firms invest in research in search for innovations. Frequently, however,
others than the investor benefit from the research findings without paying for it.17 Investors will
not take account of these benefits to others, and may consequently give up investment
opportunities that are beneficial to society. Even stronger, when the others are competitors in
the same market, the spillovers lower the private returns.
Two characteristics of knowledge account for the presence of spillovers: use by one individual
does not reduce the availability to others (knowledge is non-rival), and access to knowledge is
frequently hard to prevent (knowledge is imperfectly excludable). Excludability of knowledge is
partly influenced by the possibilities of and efforts by inventors to protect the use of knowledge.
Well-known possibilities are secrecy, patents and licensing agreements, and exploitation of first
mover advantages. When governments consider private research efforts to be too low, they can
strengthen private incentives to invest in research by extending the possibilities to protect the
results from research efforts, e.g. by extending the scope or length of patents.
These possibilities are most relevant for applied research and development, which are
relatively close to the process of commercialisation. Private appropriation of the benefits of basic
research results – which require subsequent research before commercial applications are
possible – is much harder to achieve. On top of that, the outcomes of basic research are highly
uncertain. Strengthening intellectual property rights, or subsidies for private research
endeavours, are therefore not likely to be efficient stimulators of basic research. Moreover, the
wide potential applicability of basic research findings makes excludability less desirable, and
wide dissemination more attractive. This may even apply for basic research that is currently
carried out by private firms. Actual examples concern the investments in basic research by large
pharmaceutical companies, as well as by the more recent and much smaller biotechnology
firms. In these cases, monopoly pricing of the products that follow from the research efforts
(prescription drugs for wide-spread diseases like cancer and aids, or materials and techniques
that are crucial for further academic research, like Polymerase Chain Reaction) may be very
undesirable.
When wide and open dissemination is deemed to be very important, a possible way out is to
publicly finance the production of knowledge and freely disseminate the results.18 In principle,
optimal dissemination of existing knowledge (no matter how basic) occurs when it is priced at
the cost of transmitting it (e.g. the labour costs of the researcher explaining the research
findings, or the costs of publication, cf. Cornet and Vollaard, 2000). This is basically what
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happens in academic research. Academic researchers are driven by priority of discovery: the first
to openly reveal some findings receives the credit for these findings (think of the Nobel prize or
attaching researchers’ names to findings), and the financial benefits attached to it through the
academic reward system (tenure, promotion). This induces academic researchers to be
productive and disclose their research findings quickly. The latter feature stands in sharp
contrast with researchers in commercial firms, who are urged to keep their findings secret (cf.
Dasgupta and David, 1994).
The difficult question remains how large the subsidies to academic research, and to the
various scientific disciplines, should be. Obviously, this depends on the returns to society and
the risk characteristics of the research. Theory is ahead of measurement here. One of the most
influential attempts is Mansfield (1991). Based on appraisals of R&D-managers in large firms he
arrives at a social rate of return of academic research of 28%. The fact that a study with so many
reservations made by the author himself has been so influential is illustrative for the poor state
of knowledge about the returns to academic research. The importance of academic research for
innovation differs between industries, and consequently between academic disciplines (see
SPRU (2000), Figure 2). Moreover, the way in which academic research contributes to
innovation differs between industries as well: through codified knowledge, through students,
and through a number of other channels.
2.8 How to organise public funding of research?
As mentioned above, basic research with a strong public good character should be financed by
the government. The question how to design such a finance system then becomes urgent. In
practice, two funding methods are often used, namely input-based and output-based funding.19
While performance-based funding may help to stimulate research output, some potential
drawbacks have to be kept in mind. Most importantly, output-based funding requires that
research production can be measured. This is a rather controversial issue, as opinions differ on
the question what should be measured. Any proposed indicator of research output will have its
drawbacks. When high-powered incentives are applied to imperfectly measurable research
production, problems could arise with the unmeasured part of research production. For
instance, output-funding could induce researchers to substitute creative, innovative but hard-to-
publish research for more conventional types of research which may be easier to publish.
Therefore, a hybrid funding structure combining low- and high-powered incentives may be the
optimal choice. Another risk of output-based funding is that underperforming institutions may
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get worse, as the better students and staff members will be the first to move to another
university. Such a downward trend could reinforce itself, ultimately leading to the closing down
of the institution. Finally, higher education institutions also serve a regional function, and could
be an important vehicle for knowledge spillovers to the local economy. So even when research
does not meet national or international standards, it may serve an important regional function.
Output- or performance-based funding aims to improve research productivity. An interesting
example in the literature on the design of output-based research funding systems is Lazear
(1997). At the heart of the analysis is the idea that the rules concerning the allocation of research
grants determine the implicit incentives for researchers. Lazear studies the incentives present in
the current US system and evaluates their economic efficiency. A number of interesting
conclusions emerge from his analysis:
• A limited number of large grants is better than a larger number of small grants, as in the former
case talented researchers are motivated to submit ambitious research proposals;
• When past performance plays a role in the assessment of research proposals, young researchers
have an incentive to bring their projects to a successful end but more experienced researchers
may reduce their efforts. An efficiency-gain can be reached by making research grants age-
contingent. By assigning larger grants to senior researchers, their tendency to reduce efforts is
combatted;
• Assigning grants ex post has the advantage that researchers have a direct interest to finish the
project, but could lead to avoidance of more risky research projects. It might be better to assign
grants ex ante, and to encourage the completion of projects by making the assignment of future
grants contingent on past performance.
2.9 Incentives and inefficiencies in the public sector
In the previous sections we have discussed possible rationales for government intervention in
the higher education market. However, while government policies improve matters in some
cases, in other cases the outcome may not be better or even be worse than under a free market
regime. Government policies may not be effective in achieving their goals, or they may create
offsetting problems in other directions. The major reasons for these government failures are
limited information, bureaucracy (X-inefficiency, limited incentives for innovation) and the
limitations imposed by the political process (cf. Stiglitz, 1988).
First, limited information influences the potential to target subsidies, impedes accreditation
and information provision by the government, impedes efficient delivery of student loans and
insurance, and impedes efficient choice of research areas and projects. This could lead to
wasteful government spending.
Second, bureaucracy involves the absence of the disciplining threat of bankruptcy and (to
some extent) competition, and typically provides low-powered individual incentives (restrictions
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on salary structure, tenure). Note, however, that there may be good reasons for these low-
powered incentives related to the nature of public services (cf. Dixit, 1999). An example is the
tenure system. The system of tenure – a strong guarantee of permanent employment after a
demanding probationary period – has been hotly debated (cf. McPherson and Schapiro, 1999). It
has been attacked for lowering incentives to provide effort after tenure has been achieved, or – as
McPherson and Schapiro (pp. 85, 1999) put it – “entrenching a lazy professoriate, more
interested in attending faraway conferences and producing unreadable research than in teaching
or developing practical insights...”. On the other hand, proponents point at the following positive
effects of tenure: academic freedom, honest evaluation of the work of students and peers, honest
evaluation by current faculty of new tenure candidates, and good mentorship of new faculty by
experienced researchers. Furthermore, although there seems to be a general consensus about
the relative inefficiency of public producers and some empirical studies do indeed confirm this
consensus view, the issue is far from settled.20
Finally, in democratic nations governments are elected. Assuming that governments like to
be re-elected, the supposed effects of government policies on different groups in society – and
particularly the powerful groups – influences the policy agenda (see Poterba, 1996). This power
of vested interests could erect substantial barriers to change (cf. Nahuis et al., 2000).
The quick review of the economics of education provided in this chapter should help to gain
insight into the various mechanisms at work in the higher education sector. In the next chapters
we will elaborately discuss some interesting higher education systems and how they work in
practice.
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3 Tuition fees and accessibility: the Australian HECS
Hans Vossensteyn and Erik Canton
3.1 Background
To what extent do higher tuition fees have an effect on the accessibility of higher education? In
answering this question, the Australian experience with the reintroduction of tuition fees
through the Higher Education Contribution Scheme (HECS) in 1989 is of particular interest.
Under this HECS-system, students have to contribute approximately a quarter of the average
costs of the training program, either by paying up-front or by taking out a loan and defer
repayment through the tax mechanism until after graduation. The most important motivation
for the introduction of the HECS was the sheer need to attract additional resources to enable
further expansion of the higher education system, as the government encountered budgetary
problems. But an important condition was that such private contributions should not hamper
access to higher education for people from disadvantaged backgrounds.
Also in other countries the costs of higher education have gradually shifted from
governments, or taxpayers, to the students and their parents (Johnstone, 1999). This gradual
shift towards private contributions is heavily debated. Both in policy circles and in the academic
debate the question “how much students should contribute to their own education” has received
ample attention. This question may have become even more urgent in recent years, with OECD
countries witnessing an increased fiscal pressure in combination with often sharply rising
participation rates in higher education (Barr, 1998a).
From the Dutch perspective, the debate on tuition fees is of particular interest, because
tuition fees form an increasing source of revenues for higher education institutions. Moreover,
the differentiation of the higher education system in terms of students, programs, duration of
courses and life-long learning opportunities will put more emphasis on pricing strategies, their
aims and effects.
In the public debate, it is often argued that higher tuition fees translate into lower
enrollment rates in higher education. In principle, this need not be a problem. Tuition fees
could promote self-selection among students so that only people with sufficient academic
competences go to higher education. Talent or innate ability is unevenly distributed among
society. People invest in higher education up to the point where the marginal cost of their
investment is equal to the marginal private benefit in terms of higher lifetime income. The
effect of public subsidisation is that less talented individuals would calculate a positive net
present value of participating in higher education. So when there is no student selection, public
support to higher education could lead to a reduction of the average quality of the student
population.
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Also, in the real world there is imperfect insurance against future income uncertainty, and
people tend to be risk-averse. A rise in tuition fees could then go along with a reduction in
human capital investment by risk-averse individuals (private returns to schooling are reduced).
And to the extent that talented people decide not to go to college or university because of the
risky investment, tuition fee increases could be harmful. The central issue in this chapter is
whether tuition fees endanger access to higher education and, if they do, how governments can
prevent that potential students (from particular groups) might get excluded from participation.
In Section 3.2 we first discuss the relevant economic theory and recapitulate the arguments
that have been put forward in debates on tuition fees as well as some results on the relationship
between tuition fees and accessibility that have been found in the literature. The Australian
HECS is described in more detail in Section 3.3, and an evaluation of the HECS is presented in
Section 3.4.
3.2 Private contributions and economic theory
3.2.1 Why private contributions?
Private contributions to higher education can be made in several ways, such as through forgone
earnings, expenditures on books and payments of tuition fees which cover (part of) the direct
costs of education. In this chapter we concentrate on tuition fees. Three basic reasons have been
put forward in the literature to legitimate tuition fees:
• Small difference between private and social returns to schooling;
• Equity considerations;
• Reduction of moral hazard / adverse selection.
First of all, no clear evidence for the presence of human capital spillovers is found in the data.
Estimates on the private and social returns to higher education are typically in the same order of
magnitude (see Chapter 2 for a more elaborate discussion). And when the difference between
private and social rates of return to schooling is small, there is no strong case for government
intervention to change the current level of participation in higher education.
The second argument that justifies tuition fees has to do with equity. Public subsidies to
higher education have a regressive income effect. The average taxpayer funds a service from
which only a fraction of the population directly benefits. As students have a higher expected
lifetime income than the average taxpayer, government support to students imply an income
transfer to tomorrow’s well-off. To mitigate such regressive income effects, it is equitable to ask
for a private contribution to the costs of higher education (see, for instance, Oosterbeek, 1998).
We should add that this is a rather controversial issue, and some people claim the opposite:
education helps to reduce income disparities in the economy, and to that end government
should support education (cf. Teulings, 2000).
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Third, tuition fees can help to ensure that the decision to enter higher education is taken
seriously. The individual investment encourages and motivates students to work hard (moral
hazard is reduced). In addition, if students have to pay a price themselves, they probably will
demand value-for-money. On top of that, higher education institutions will compete by offering
an attractive price-quality package (Eurydice, 1999). And tuition fees could help to filter out the
people who do not belong in a higher education program, so it helps to reduce the adverse
selection problem. This effect operates on the borderline between economics and psychology
(therefore, being economists, we shall refrain from a detailed treatment of this issue).
All in all, sharing the costs between society and the individual participants in higher education is
both efficient and equitable. However, to prevent potential students from under-investment in
higher education, governments should safeguard accessibility (we shall come back to the
question how to protect access to higher education in greater detail below).
3.2.2 The impact of tuition fees
Tuition fees are expected to have a negative influence on the decision to attend higher education,
as they lower the net present value from the educational investment. But measuring the effects
of tuition fees is difficult. It is hard to single out the pure effects of tuition fees from all other
variables influencing the enrollment decision. In addition, it is almost impossible to identify
potential students who did not attend college for the sake of tuition fees. Finally, cases of
introducing tuition fees at institutions or in particular countries do not happen so frequently.
The major results of the rich literature on this issue will be discussed here. Leslie and
Brinkman (1987) and Heller (1997) review a number of American studies of the 1970s to the
1990s. Their major conclusion is that students are responsive to prices and that – ceteris
paribus – for every $100 increase in tuition price one would expect the participation rate to drop
by about 0.7%-point. For an average weighted tuition fee of $3,420 and a national higher
education participation rate of 0.33 in 1982/83 (cf. Leslie and Brinkman, 1987), this corresponds
to a price elasticity of -0.73. Others (Manski and Wise, 1983; Moore et al., 1991; Gladieux and
Hauptman, 1995) add that particularly low-income students are more sensitive to tuition price
levels than higher income students. McPherson and Schapiro (1997, 1998) stress that, though
enrollment rates for all racial groups have risen, the gap between the enrollment rates of Whites
and other racial groups has widened. This variation in price sensitivity among different racial
groups is also shown by Heller (1997).
In addition, Kane (1995) shows that increases in net costs over time are related to decreases
in enrollment rates for lower-income students in the US. Next to that, evidence shows that
increases in net cost did not inhibit enrollment for more affluent students. However, middle-
income students also seem to have reached a price threshold, particularly in the private sector
institutions (Breneman, 1994; Campaigne and Hossler, 1998). Based on these findings,
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1  The high tuition – high aid strategy comes down to a situation in which richer students pay a substantial part of
the costs of education which is partly used for providing discounts to poorer students (pooling of risk among
students). However, in practice there have been considerable increases in net tuition for low-income students,
leading to a growing gap between enrollment rates for high-income and low-income students and to an increased
concentration of low-income students at the least costly institutions and programs.
2  An additional explanation could be expected skill-biased technical change, increasing the future returns to
schooling. Also, Bils and Klenow (2000) show that the expected rate of economic growth has a strong impact on
the expected returns to schooling.
3  It should be noted that the econometric specification in Sterken (1995) is disputable.
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McPherson and Schapiro (1997) conclude that policies that call for cross-subsidisation among
students, such as the high tuition – high aid strategies, make sense from the viewpoint of
economic efficiency (although targeted student support by the government would be a better
policy instrument).1
Leslie and Brinkman (1987) address the quandary that participation rates have not gone
down in the US while tuition fees increased. They explain this phenomenon by noting that
tuition prices did not increase so much in real terms, and that financial support ameliorated
access. In addition they note that demand is known to be affected not only by price but by the
money income of the buyer, by tastes and preferences, and by the value of the good from a
consumption or an investment perspective.2
In the Dutch situation Sterken (1995) finds a long-term enrollment elasticity of -0.5, so a
permanent increase of the tuition price by 1% would correspond to a reduction in student
enrollment of 0.5%, which is a rather strong effect.3 In contrast, Huijsman et al. (1986) find
students’ higher education demand fairly insensitive to the tuition fee level: they obtain an
elasticity of -0.003. Oosterbeek and Webbink (1995) also find a very low elasticity (close to zero).
In addition, a recent study by SEO (2000) shows that students hardly seem to respond to
financial incentives. Changes in tuition fees or grants have a very small impact on participation.
All in all, in the literature it is found that the price elasticity of higher education is not large,
especially not for students from more affluent backgrounds. However, students from socio-
economic disadvantaged backgrounds seem to be negatively affected by price increases, even
when they are compensated through student support.
After this quick scan of the literature on the impact of tuition fees on student enrollment, we
now turn to the Australian experiences with tuition fees in their Higher Education Contribution
Scheme.
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3.3 The Higher Education Contribution Scheme in Australia
The Australian Higher Education Contribution Scheme (HECS) provides an outstanding
experience for analysing the effects of introducing or raising tuition fees. First of all, the
introduction of the HECS meant a sudden demand for private contributions in a situation where
the individual participants in higher education did not pay any contributions at all. Second, the
level of tuition fees to be paid was substantial, around 23% of the average costs of higher
education programs in 1989 (when the HECS was introduced). A third argument for choosing
the Australian case is that the government tried to limit the negative influences of charging
tuition fees on participation in higher education. In particular, they offered a deferred
repayment scheme through the tax system for those who could not or did not want to pay the
tuition fees up-front. This is a rather novel system, and it has received ample international
attention. When studying the impact of tuition price on accessibility, the choice for Australia is
therefore a natural one. In the following sub-section we discuss the history and rationale of the
HECS. Next we address the features of the tuition fee system and how tuition fees can be paid.
In addition, we elaborate on the developments in tuition fee policies since 1989. Finally we
evaluate the HECS.
3.3.1 History and rationale
Table 3.1 summarises the most important historical developments in Australia with respect to
tuition fees in higher education.
As can be seen from Table 3.1, tuition fees were not new in Australia when HECS was
introduced in 1989. The major arguments put forward in the discussion about whether or not to
reintroduce tuition fees can be summarised as follows:
• Particularly during the late 1960s, the 1970s and the late 1980s there has been a rapid growth in
the demand for higher education (Karmel, 1999). This development indicated the transition
from an elite system to a mass and eventually a universal tertiary education system. Though the
Table 3.1 Some important historical developments in Australian higher education, tuition fee policies
1854 Inception of Australian higher education sector, foundation of University of Sydney.
1854-1974 Tuition prices are charged to students.
1974-1985 Abolishment of tuition fees, Australian higher education is funded virtually exclusively from federal government
sources.
1985 Higher education fees appear again, initially in the form of a “Higher Education Administration Charge” ($A250
per student).
1986 Introduction of fees for certain Australian postgraduate students.
1989 Introduction of Higher Education Contribution Scheme.
1997 Differentiation of tuition fees into three tariff bands.
1998 Institutions are allowed to admit (a limited number of) students on a cost-covering basis.
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increase in student numbers can partially be explained by demographics, the most important
contributing factor is an increase in access;
• This growth was expected to continue because, as with other industrialised countries, traditional
manufacturing industries were being replaced by the so-called “knowledge processing sector”.
As such, it was and still is expected that society would need more higher education graduates (cf.
West, 1998);
• Public funds were regarded too limited to enable the desired expansion of the higher education
sector (Meek and Wood, 1997). Until the mid 1970s, public funding for higher education grew
rapidly. But since the oil shocks of the 1970s, the social service and health burden on the
national treasury was rising dramatically (Karmel, 1999). In addition, a general change toward a
smaller government and restrained levels of taxation has led to an end of the expansion in the
public support for higher education (Harman, 1989);
• There has been a longstanding debate on the appropriate balance between public and private
financing of higher education in Australia. In this debate, more and more stakeholders got
convinced that on the one hand the clear private benefits from obtaining a degree justify some
private contributions to the costs of education. On the other hand, the private contributions
should not impede access to higher education, particularly not for students from disadvantaged
backgrounds (Chapman, 1997);
• Finally, it was expected that reintroduction of tuition price would not have an important effect
on the demand for higher education. This view was supported by the observation that the
abolishment of tuition fees in 1974 has had little impact on improving access of lower socio-
economic status (SES) students.
Regardless of the strong arguments in favour of tuition fees, the introduction of the HECS fees
was heavily criticised, both by student unions and political interest groups. However, next to the
arguments used to defend the HECS, Minister Dawkins offered the HECS-proposal as part of a
larger package of reforms for the funding of higher education. The Minister’s statement that
public funding of universities was only going to be increased if HECS was put into effect, was
the final trigger to have parliament accepting the HECS-proposal. If HECS was not accepted,
higher education funding would have been frozen. Most members in parliament did not want to
refrain universities from increased funding, which was perceived to be absolutely necessary.
3.3.2 The Higher Education Contribution Scheme
When tuition fees were reintroduced in 1989, the Australian government established a system
aimed at raising the revenues of higher education institutions, without erecting financial
barriers to participation in higher education. Since then, students in Australia generally have
been required to contribute to the cost of higher education. In the following, we describe the
HECS-system in more detail.
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HECS applies to Australian or New Zealand students in Commonwealth funded higher
education award courses which lead to degrees, diplomas, associate diplomas, graduate
diplomas, graduate certificates, Master’s qualifying courses, Master’s courses or Ph.D.s. HECS
applies to around 80% of all students enrolled in universities. Some categories of students are
exempted from the HECS payments, such as TAFE-students (Technical and Further Education),
students charged tuition fees by the institution, students in non-award courses, students with an
Australian Postgraduate Award (scholarship), participants in enabling courses for disadvantaged
students, and students with a merit-based equity scholarship. In addition, all foreign (overseas)
students have to pay a cost-covering tuition rate up to $A26,000 (Dfl.36,400) in 1996.
The level of HECS-tuition fees is determined by the Minister of Education. The HECS rate was
originally set to recover 20% of the costs of an average university program, which was $A1,800
(Dfl.2,500) in 1989. The level of HECS has been indexed to the cost of living and has risen to
$A2,450 (Dfl.3,400) in 1996. These rates relate to full-time students. Part-time students pay
proportionately less. Table 3.2 illustrates the development of tuition fees under the HECS-
system.
Until 1997 tuition fees were equal for all fields of study. However, because HECS is
fundamentally a cost recovery system, charging fees that reflect the differential costs of the
various training programs have been strongly advocated from the beginning. As of January
1997, tuition fees were differentiated into three tariff bands: low, middle, and high (cf. Table
3.2).
This new differentiated tariff structure is not consistent with a pure cost recovery model. The
new pricing structure is a hybrid model, in which both costs and expected future benefits from
obtaining a particular degree have been given a weight (Chapman, 1997). As such, the most
expensive tier not only includes expensive courses like medicine, dentistry, veterinary science
and engineering, but also law, which is one of the cheapest courses. Other inexpensive
programs, such as economics and business, are charged at the medium level. In addition,
compared to the uniform tuition level of 1996 ($A2,450), the weighted average private
contribution has increased by about 70%.
Table 3.2 Tuition price levels under the HECS
1989 1996 1997 1999
Uniform: $A1,800 Uniform: $A2,450 Low: $A3,300 Low: $A3,409
Middle: $A4,700 Middle: $A4,855
High: $A5,500 High: $A5,682
Note: $A1Dfl.1.310.60 (January 2001).
Source: DEETYA (1999a) and Dawkins (1999).
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60
HECS payments are made on a semester basis. Normally, students have two choices in how to
pay their HECS contribution:
• Pay up-front with a 25%-discount;
• Defer or partially defer their payments until after graduation.
The first alternative allows students to make their HECS contribution directly to the institution
at the beginning of each semester. Because students do not use any government facilities to
defer their payments, they get a 25%-discount on their payments. In the 1999/2000 situation
this implies that a student enrolled in a “band 1” subject will be charged an up-front rate of
$A2,557 instead of $A3,409. Over the years, the number of students choosing the up-front
payment option has increased, up to 29% in 1997.
The second alternative, chosen by the majority of students (71% of HECS-liable students in
1997), enables students to defer payment of HECS until after graduation. In this method of
deferred payments, the Commonwealth government pays the tuition price to the institutions
and provides the students with a loan. An important characteristic of the HECS-loan is that no
interest is charged on the outstanding debt. The total debt is only indexed annually by adjusting
it in line with the cost of living on the basis of the Consumer Price Index. A combination of both
payment options is also possible. Since 1998, students may choose to pay part of the fees up-
front (at least $A500) with a 25%-discount, and defer the remainder.
When students opt to defer their payment they have to give their Tax File Number to the
institution. This identification number is used by the institution to report details of the debt
every semester to the Australian Taxation Office (ATO), which further administrates the loans
and their refunding. Repayments of the HECS-loan are collected through the tax system and are
income-contingent. This implies that people repay at different rates, depending on annual
income after graduation. Graduates with high earnings repay more rapidly through higher
(monthly) installments than graduates with lower earnings.4
The repayments only start when annual earnings exceed a certain threshold. Until 1996, this
threshold was equal to the average taxable income of Australians working for pay ($A27,675 per
annum in 1996). Since 1997, the income threshold at which repayments start has been lowered
(for instance, in 2000/01 it was $A22,346). The annual repayment rate increases with the level
of income. If income exceeds the minimum threshold, ATO will withdraw automatically 3% of
the total taxable income as HECS-repayment. A growth in income leads to a successive gradual
increase in the repayment rate up to a maximum of 6% of total taxable income. The HECS
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repayment thresholds are adjusted each year to reflect any change in average weekly earnings.
Table 3.3 presents the repayment rates and income thresholds for 2000/01.5
3.4 Evaluation of the HECS
The primary objective of HECS was to allow the higher education sector to expand without a
substantial growth in government funding. In particular, HECS aimed to reintroduce private
contributions without jeopardising accessibility to higher education. In this section we will
evaluate the HECS-system.
The introduction of tuition fees in Australia in 1989 does not seem to have had any major
negative effects on student enrollment. In exploring the effects of the HECS on accessibility,
several types of studies have been employed. First, some studies address the issue whether
HECS affected the private rate of return to higher education. Chapman and Chia (1989)
conclude that the effect of HECS would be so small that demand for higher education (even by
students from disadvantaged backgrounds) would not be hampered. Also the 1997-changes to
the HECS (lowering of income threshold and differentiated tuition fee rates) would hardly
change the high rates of return and, as such, were unlikely to reduce the attractiveness of higher
education (Chapman and Salvage, 1997).
Some other studies evaluate the effects on students from different socio-economic
backgrounds. The major conclusion is that the proportions of students from different socio-
economic backgrounds have hardly changed since the introduction of HECS (Chapman, 1997;
Table 3.3 Tariffs for income-contingent repayment of study debt in Australia, academic year 2000/01
Income ($A) Tariff (%)
below 22,346 0
22,346-23,565 3
23,566-25,393 3.5
25,394-29,456 4
29,457-35,551 4.5
35,552-37,420 5
37,421-40,223 5.5
40,224 and above 6
Note: 1 $ADfl.1.310.60 (January 2001).
Source: Australian Taxation Office, www.ato.gov.au.
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Andrews, 1999). People from lower SES groups benefited as much as other groups from the
increase in student numbers (though they are still under-represented in the student population).
The effects of HECS on individual decision making have also been measured through
attitudinal surveys. On the basis of a survey immediately after the introduction of HECS in
1989, Robertson et al. (1990) conclude that HECS had little effect on the composition of the
pool of applicants and no effect on the composition of those accepting an offer to enroll. On the
request of parliament, the Higher Education Council imposed a system of monitoring the
effects of the HECS, particularly for the socio-economically disadvantaged. In their first survey
in 1991, executed by the consulting firm Ernst and Young, it was found that school leavers gave
a low ranking to HECS for deciding not to go to higher education. School leavers who intended
to go to university and adults indicated HECS as a middle-ranking factor for deciding not to
enroll, after academic factors and more pressing economic factors. The Council concluded that
“most qualified applicants from across groups in the study would not be significantly deterred
by HECS” (Higher Education Council, 1992, p.21).
Using data from the Australian Council of Educational Research (ACER), Chapman and
Chia (1993) compare the composition of 18-year-old students in higher education in 1988 and
1993. Students were distributed among three family wealth categories and then compared on
the basis of their participation rates. For all three categories, participation rates had gone up by
around a third between 1988 and 1993. Though the participation rate of those from wealthy
backgrounds is larger, the introduction of HECS did not exert any discernible effects on the
socio-economic composition of the student body.
More recently, Ramsay et al. (1998) survey students eligible to enter the University of South
Australia and compare the views of students from low socio-economic status entering the
institution through the university’s special access scheme (USANET) with the views of a control
group. An interesting finding is that HECS appeared to have a more positive impact on the
decision to enroll for the USANET-students than for the control group. All in all, the surveys on
the attitudes of students do not support the idea that HECS erects a barrier to higher education.
At the national level, Encel (2000) studies the effectiveness of a number of government
programs targeted at indigenous Australians. He finds that their participation has shown a fairly
steady increasing trend since 1987, though participation rates are still lower than for the non-
indigenous population.
Students choosing the deferred payment option have to accept a debt. Opponents have
indicated that some groups of (potential) students might be unwilling to incur a HECS-debt
because they dislike debt (Andrews, 1999). This debt-aversion stems from either the aversion to
the risk of being unable to repay the debt, or because it shifts expenditures from the future to
the present. In an unpublished report by Sharp & Anderson Marketing Consultants, it is
concluded that SES-background of people had no strong or consistent effect on debt-aversion as
measured by the willingness to apply for new mortgages or personal loans and the amounts
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involved. All in all, there seems to be no support that HECS deters people from low SES-
backgrounds because of debt-aversion (Andrews, 1999).
A next step in the HECS arrangements was taken in 1997 when the income thresholds at
which repayment through the tax system starts was lowered and when tuition prices increased
substantially and fees were differentiated into three tariff bands. The question thus emerges
whether low SES-students are under-represented in the three HECS-bands. Figure 3.1 shows the
share of commencing students from low SES-backgrounds.
Figure 3.1  Share of commencing students from low SES backgrounds (17-24 year)
Source: Andrews (1999).
First of all, this figure shows that the proportion of commencing students from low SES-
background has been stable around 20%. From the figure it also appears that low SES-students
are particularly under-represented in band 3 fields (law, medicine, etc.). This situation, however,
has been a long-term feature which certainly prevailed before the introduction of HECS in 1989.
Such inequalities have been recognised as long as universities exist in Australia. A
Commonwealth Education Survey in 1984 already indicated a domination of students from high
socio-economic backgrounds in veterinary science and law. However, the choice of courses does
not seem to be determined by financial motives. Recent work of Harvey-Beavis and Elsworth
(1998) and James et al. (1999) found that subject choice is primarily influenced by the intrinsic
interest in the field. Also, under-representation of low SES-students in band 3 fields can
probably be explained by the very high entrance scores required in conjunction with the
relatively low performances of low SES-students at secondary school.
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A second interesting conclusion from this figure is that the recent changes in the HECS-system
(increasing and differentiating fees, lowering the income threshold) do not appear to have any
effect on the proportion of students from low SES-groups. However, because students can
attend courses from differently priced programs, the price borders between the various
disciplines are not fully clear. This has made the original simple HECS structure a bit less
transparent.
Between 1989 and 1997 total enrollment in universities increased from 441,076 to 658,827
students. This reflects a rate of growth that never could have been funded by public means. In
addition, the number of rejected applicants for higher education places has fallen substantially.
Together with a stable distribution of students and new entrants over different socio-economic
groups, this brings us to the conclusion that more people from all social classes attend higher
education (Andrews, 1999). However, though the participation of low SES-groups remains
stable, these groups are still seriously under-represented in higher education (DEETYA, 1999b).
The higher education sector also witnessed a rapid expansion in terms of the percentage of
people in the 20-24 age cohort enrolled in a higher education program. Figure 3.2 shows the
historical development over the 1950-1997 period. In 1950, about 5% of the 20-24 year-old
people participated in some form of higher education; by 1997 this percentage has risen to 50%.
The average annual growth rate in student enrollment over the 1950-1988 period was 5.3%, and
over the 1989-1997 period it was 5.2% (recall that HECS was introduced in 1989). This is a
negligible difference.
Figure 3.2  Enrollment in higher education (percent of age cohort 20-24)
Source: Enrollment data are taken from DEETYA (1998), and population data on the 20-24 cohort are taken from UN (1999).
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Opponents of HECS complained that the new and untried arrangement would cause an
enormous administrative burden. It is true that university administrators need to collect all up-
front HECS payments and have to forward data about the individual debt of all persons who
choose to defer their payments. The government compensates the institutions for these
administrative costs, which were estimated at about $A12 million (in 1995). This is
approximately 2% of total HECS-revenues.
The administrative burden as a result of the deferred payment option mainly stems from the
additional tasks for the Australian Taxation Office (ATO), which administers the loans and
collects the repayments. In addition, once the individual’s income exceeds the income threshold
an automatic trigger imposes the appropriate charge. It has been estimated that the
administrative burden of this arrangement is about $A5,5 million per year. This is about 1% of
total HECS revenues in 1995 (Chapman, 1997).
The actual experience with HECS shows that repayment rates of the debt are high. Recent
statistics on repayments through the tax system show that after its initial years of operation the
total amount repaid has increased very strongly. So it can be concluded that most graduates are
able to repay their HECS-debt. In fact, most of the graduates repay their debt even within ten
years, as can be seen from Table 3.4.
Winding up, the general conclusion to be drawn from all studies with a direct or indirect focus
on the effects of HECS is that ever since its introduction higher education has expanded
considerably without lowering the proportion of students from low SES-groups. The under-
representation of low SES-individuals is mainly the result of non-financial (barely manipulable)
factors such as values and attitudes. HECS is only of minor importance, if there is any influence
at all. By-and-large, there is no evidence that HECS reduced accessibility of higher education
(Chapman, 1997). Even the recent increase and differentiation in fee levels does not seem to
have influenced applications and student enrollment. In addition, the rate of repayment by
Table 3.4 Outstanding debt in HECS-system
Age of outstanding debt % of total
Studied before 90/91 1%
Last studied 90/91 2%
Last studied 91/92 4%
Last studied 92/93 7%
Last studied 93/94 10%
Last studied 94/95 13%
Last studied 95/96 17%
Last studied 96/97 46%
Total 100%
Source: Dawkins (1999).
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6  A possible way to try and take account of the counterfactual would be to run a regression for student enrollment
on tuition fees, per capita income and perhaps some other control variables. The obtained regression coefficient
for per capita income captures the consumption motive for education and the role of capital market constraints (in
both cases the predicted sign is positive). So when credit market problems are solved through provision of loans –
as in the HECS system – the obtained income effect would mainly reflect the consumption value of higher
education.
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graduates who deferred their tuition payments until after graduation through the tax system
appears to be considerably higher than expected. Most graduates repay their HECS-debt in full
within a period of 10 years after graduation. Finally, the administrative system collecting tuition
fees up-front or after graduation through the tax system operates effectively and efficiently.
Altogether, the introduction of private contributions through HECS and its subsequent
changes do not seem to have had a negative influence on the accessibility for students from
lower SES groups. The socio-economic composition of the student population did not change,
implying that participation in higher education also increased for low-SES students. This
suggests that applicants are relatively unresponsive to changes in tuition fees. However, we do
not know what the developments would have been without the introduction of HECS and its
successive changes. So while the conclusion that HECS did not deter accessibility seems
warranted, a skeptic may argue that higher education enrollment could have increased even
more rapidly without private contributions (the counterfactual).6 Though we cannot refute this
argument, we are inclined to conclude from the Australian case that private contributions to
higher education can be introduced or increased without hampering access to higher education,
as long as payment is contingent on the individual (future) income situation.
Deregulation of higher education: Tuition fee differentiation and selectivity in the US
1  By deregulation we have in mind the relaxation of existing regulations in the public sector, permitting higher
education institutions to determine their own tuition price, to adopt their own admission policy, to design their
own curriculum, to develop their own human resource management, and so forth. To put it differently, this form of
deregulation devolves control over decisions to the individual institutions. It should be noted that the terminology
is also used to refer to privatisation, e.g. de-monopolisation, de-nationalisation, and “contracting out” (cf. Dill,
1997). But these other forms of deregulation will not be discussed here.
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4 Deregulation of higher education: tuition fee differentiation
and selectivity in the US
Erik Canton and Hans Vossensteyn
4.1 Background
This chapter deals with the issue of deregulation in the higher education sector. To what extent
should higher education institutions be free to determine their own policies? Or should the
government decide on important issues?1 We study this question in detail by focussing on two
major and interrelated issues (giving an indication of the extent of deregulation), namely the
determination of tuition fees and selection of students. Our research questions are:
• What are the main effects of deregulating tuition fee policies?
• What are the main effects of deregulating admission policies?
• How do these policies interact?
Discussions on deregulation often meet with resistance. Opponents argue that deregulation
promotes inequality and endangers access. And differentiation in the higher education sector
could come at the cost of transparency, so it is argued. On the other hand, there is an increased
need for diversity to improve the match between demand and supply. And deregulation will
foster competition between suppliers, leading to a better price-quality ratio.
In the US the higher education sector is strongly diversified with completely regulated public
schools on one end of the spectrum and fully free private universities on the other end. These
differences within the American higher education sector provide an excellent case-study for
evaluating the effects of deregulation.
We start in Section 4.2 with a brief discussion of relevant theory on deregulation in general,
and on student selection and tuition fee differentiation in particular. Section 4.3 provides some
insight into the present situation with respect to admission and tuition fee policies in Australia,
Denmark, the Netherlands, the UK, and the US. In Section 4.4 we study tuition fee and
admission policies in the US, and present some empirical findings on the connection between
tuition fees and academic quality, and between quality and student selection. In Section 4.5 we
evaluate the pros and cons of a deregulated higher education system in the US in terms of the
effects on educational quality and accessibility.
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2  In most countries tuition fees only cover a fraction of the average direct cost of a higher education program (in
the Netherlands about 20%, see Chapter 1).
3  It should be noted that estimated price elasticities may become unreliable for large price changes so that
enrollment changes could be larger than predicted from the estimates when cost-covering tuition fees are charged.
4  Also the Minister of Education, Mr. Hermans, recognises the importance to provide “Harvard-, Yale- and
Princeton-like” training programs (cf. de Volkskrant, 14 November 2000).
5  There is a growing literature on the effects of competition on (higher) education. An interesting example is Epple
and Romano (1998), who demonstrate that competition promotes quality-differentiation. A recent empirical
investigation of these effects is available in Epple, Figlio, and Romano (2000).
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4.2 Deregulation and economic theory
4.2.1 Tuition fee deregulation
In many countries tuition fees, i.e. the prices of higher education charged to students, are
controlled by the government.2 By keeping tuition fees low, the government tries to promote
access to higher education. This is the basic argument behind regulated tuition fees. However,
the available empirical evidence suggests that the price elasticity of the demand for higher
education is low (see Chapter 3). When students’ responsiveness to price reductions is weak, the
expansion in demand due to regulated tuition fees is limited. In that case, a price cap is a costly
instrument to promote accessibility as it merely implies a shift in educational spending from
price-insensitive students to the average taxpayer.3
In addition, in light of recent trends and developments it seems inevitable to move towards a
more differentiated higher education system when there is consensus that a country needs to
have some excellent universities “in-house”.4 For instance, globalization will extend the higher
education market beyond national borders. Students and staff become more and more mobile
internationally, and educated people will more often work abroad. Also new technological
opportunities such as the advent of the Internet and ICT-developments will have their impact on
the higher education market, for instance by facilitating distance learning and the “virtual
university”. So to prevent the best students and staff from switching to a foreign university, the
higher education sector has to offer an attractive alternative. To facilitate quality-differentiation,
it could be helpful to allow the higher education institutions to set their own tuition prices.
What will happen when institutions are permitted to set tuition fees themselves? Tuition fees
would then more closely reflect actual costs and market conditions. This will promote
competition in the higher education sector. Schools try to differentiate themselves by looking for
niches in the market, i.e. particular price-quality combinations (cf. Hoxby, 1997). The match
between demand and supply will improve, as institutions become more responsive to students’
need and social demand. Competition for students will be fostered (through tuition discounting,
for instance), and institutions try to recruit students who fit best with the study program.5
Two remarks are in order. First, one may argue that the objective function of higher
education institutions is different from those of firms operating in other markets. Whereas
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6  Two examples show that a substantial fraction of students comes from all over the country if institutions
differentiate themselves. University Maastricht attracts lots of students from other regions because of its specific
didactic system, and Wageningen University provides unique programs in the field of agriculture.
7  A related interesting issue is whether ICT developments and distance-learning are going to reduce the
importance of location. In the limit, spatial factors turn irrelevant (“the death of distance”) so that the market for
higher education becomes a global one. As a consequence, price-quality ratios will improve because competition
for students becomes more intense.
69
commercial firms mostly pursue maximisation of profit or shareholders’ value, higher education
institutions may strive for excellence, or academic reputation. It is therefore unlikely that the
pricing policy of the higher education institutions is based on pure profit-maximisation. In
addition, because of the customer-input technology in educational production, an institution
must take account of the effects of its pricing policy on the student population. Second, the
asserted consequences of tuition fee deregulation will only materialise when competition in the
higher education market is not hindered. This is our next topic.
4.2.2 Impediments to competition
An opponent could argue that the alleged competition between schools when fee differentiation
is permitted will fail to occur. Indeed, a number of factors could impede the competitive process,
namely:
• Limited student mobility;
• Information problems;
• Indivisibilities;
• Economies of scale.
First, students often choose to go to a higher education institute in their neighbourhood.
Especially the vocational colleges often mainly serve a regional market. And even in a small
country like the Netherlands students often choose a university in their region. It remains the
question whether this is so because students are home-loving or because they think that higher
education institutions do not differ so much. However, travelling costs are limited, and the
observation that Dutch students are prepared to move when institutions differentiate
themselves6 supports the claim that student mobility is low because differentiation is limited.
This low mobility could be problematic, as it turns the higher education institutions into local
monopolies. In a fix-price system, this could lead to a reduction in educational quality – for
instance when the academic staff wants to have an easy life. In a flex-price model it could lead to
lower quality and / or higher tuition fees. So in both systems student immobility could worsen
the price-quality ratio. And since quality decreases are more difficult to observe than tuition fee
increases, there is a real danger of falling educational standards in an environment with limited
student mobility.7 Hoxby (1997) studies the historical development of competition in the US
higher education market in light of this problem of limited student mobility. The large distances
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8  An interesting observation in markets with experience goods is that entry of new firms in the market may actually
induce incumbents to increase their price. The intuition is that the new firms attract the price sensitive customers
while the incumbents keep the price insensitive ones. This segmentation of the market enables the established
firms to raise their price as they keep the loyal customers. An example of this effect can be found in the market for
pharmaceuticals (cf. Frank and Salkever, 1991).
9  The intended introduction of a two-cycle Bachelor-Master system in the higher education sector in the wake of
the Bologna-declaration will help to intensify competition for more advanced students in the Netherlands.
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and limited transport facilities severely hampered students’ freedom of movement for a long
time. Technological developments in the transport- and telecommunication-sector (resulting in
a reduction of travelling-expenses and telephone-tariffs) helped to foster student mobility, and
thereby competition in the higher education sector. In our reading, the analysis in Hoxby
predicts that competition in the higher education system is going to intensify in the near future,
in light of the above-mentioned trends of globalization and the advent of the Internet.
Second, information problems hamper the competition process in a free market. For
instance, students and prospective students often have limited information on the quality of the
various education programs. When educational quality is difficult to observe, higher education
institutes could exploit their information advantage at their own benefit. This will result in
similar problems as mentioned above: lower quality in a fix-price setting; lower quality and / or
higher price in a flex-price setting. Leslie and Johnson (1974) stress the importance of these
information problems in their sceptical review on competition in the higher education industry.
Another information problem is that one cannot completely know the value of an education
program in advance. Education is to some extent an experience good. This implies that
established incumbent schools have an advantage in the market. As a consequence, reputation
effects could erect entry barriers for (potential) newcomers and thereby frustrate the competitive
process.8 Again, the incumbent institutions might be tempted to raise the price-quality ratio.
Third, higher education programs are to a large extent indivisible. A college entry decision is
in fact a yes or no decision. It is not a serious option to attend two years of a three year program
and then go to the labour market. And it is often difficult to attend part of a program at one
college and the remainder at another. This implies that students are “locked-in” at their higher
education institution. So once enrolled, student mobility is sharply reduced. To put it differently,
competition for more advanced students in the higher education market is almost entirely ruled
out. This could lead to a deterioration of the price-quality ratio, and a mismatch between student
demand and the institution’s specialisation pattern.9
Finally, educational production is sometimes characterised by economies of scale. Natural
sciences, engineering and medical studies require expensive equipment and laboratories. Such
investments can only be made when the institute is large enough. This implies that large
schools have a cost advantage over small ones, and that there are substantial entry barriers for
newcomers in the market for such costly study programs. In case of such a “natural” monopoly,
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the government could impose price regulations to prevent the abuse of market power. To put it
differently, differences in the cost structure across subject areas could give rise to differences in
the extent of price regulation.
4.2.3 Student selection
For some commodities, customers may have a double role in that they are involved in both the
production and the consumption process (cf. Chapter 2). Think of a trendy bar. Most people do
not go to such a bar because they are thirsty, but because they want to meet and talk to others. In
fact, social interaction is probably the bar’s main product. And value-added is determined by the
number and type of visitors. In case of queueing, the porters often give priority to those
customers whose presence will be appreciated by the other guests (beautiful girls do not have to
wait in the cold and do not have to pay an entrance fee). By doing so, the porters correct for the
external effects associated with the appearance of these popular visitors.
This may seem a peculiar example, but comparable principles are at work in the higher
education sector. We can characterise the educational process by a customer-input technology in
the sense that students are both consumers and producers of education. Social contacts among
students and communication between students and staff are important ingredients of the
educational process. This implies that the quality of a training program partly depends on the
quality of the students (cf. Rothschild and White, 1995).
The notion of a customer-input technology has one major implication: it provides a
justification for selection of students. Universities can reach a higher quality-level by selecting
the best mix of students. It thereby also gives a rationale for price discrimination among
students, such as merit-based student aid. According to this principle, the best students should
pay lower net tuition fees in order to correct for the positive spillovers they generate. These
customer-input arguments are not purely academic: both selection of students and merit-based
aid are actually used in the US as well as in some other countries, and the notion of customer-
input technology is often mentioned in this context.
4.2.4 Problems with student selection
Two problems may arise with selection of students:
• Errors in the selection process;
• Matching versus mixing of students.
First, selecting students inevitably involves making mistakes. Sorting out good students is
difficult, and there is always the possibility that suitable students fail the admission test and
unsuitable students pass the test. (By “suitable” we mean students who would have completed
their studies if they were enrolled and by “unsuitable” students we mean students who do not
Higher Education Reform: Getting the Incentives Right
10  We define a type I error as the rejection of a student who should have been admitted, and a type II error as the
admittance of a student who should have been rejected.
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complete and drop-out.) We refer to these errors as type I and type II errors.10 While these errors
in the selection procedure are problematic, it should be realised that open admission also leads
to mistakes as some fraction of the student body will drop out. So open admission involves type
II errors. An ultimate assessment of the problems with student selection should therefore be
based on a comparison with the mistakes connected with open admission. We are not aware of
examples of such type of cost-benefit analysis (CBA) in the literature; a first attempt of a CBA to
explore the desirability of student selection in the Dutch context is presented in Canton (2001b).
Though student selection can also be organised in a centralised system, the higher education
institutions probably have more information on observed student characteristics than the
government, so that delegation of the selection process to the individual institutions would
result in a better allocation of talent.
Second, there is a debate on matching versus mixing of students. Briefly put, student
selection is aimed at matching students while open admission leads to mixed classes. Whereas
the notion of customer-input technology argues for matching, other stories would favour a
mixing-strategy. For example, mixed classes could be the optimal strategy (from a social point of
view at least) when personal talent is not some fixed exogenous endowment but something that
could develop in an appropriate environment through social interaction with good students. In
that case, matching students according to entrance criteria could imply some loss in human
potential. On the other hand, effective education time in the classroom is reduced when bad
students ask more of a teacher’s time. As a consequence, some mixture of “good” and “bad”
students would be the optimal strategy. This is the point made in Lazear (1999).
A final comment is in order. While higher education institutions take account of the
consequences of errors in the selection process and internalise spillovers connected with the
process of educational production, the benefits from human capital spillovers to society at large
might be undervalued. This could imply that the institutions calculate a positive net gain from
selective admission, whereas a social CBA would turn out to be negative.
4.2.5 Relationship between tuition fee and admission policies
Decisions about the extent of government influence on the determination of tuition fees impact
on optimal admission strategies and vice versa. When tuition fees are centrally determined and
uniform across subject areas, student selection may only be partially successful as a vehicle for
differentiation. Schools with international ambitions are limited in their freedom to attract
additional financial resources as they are unable to charge higher tuition fees, so that they may
experience difficulties in recruiting superstars. And by superstars we not only refer to academic
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staff, but also to students. We have seen that the observation of a customer-input technology in
educational production calls for a policy of price discrimination between students. In particular,
universities may want to give discounts to students who raise the quality-level of an education
program. And when universities are limited in their possibilities to do so, they may be unable to
attract the best students. Likewise, higher education institutes who basically serve a local market
and who probably have a less expensive production process cannot attract additional students by
lowering tuition fees in a regulated environment. So also for this type of school the fixed price
policy may have adverse effects on the institution’s admission strategy.
4.3 Deregulation in international perspective
In order to illustrate the substantial international differences, let us briefly sketch the actual
situation with respect to tuition fee policies and selection procedures in Australia, Denmark, the
Netherlands, the UK and the US.
Table 4.1 presents a summary. In Australia, tuition fees are centrally determined but vary across
subject areas since 1997 (see Chapter 3). In deciding about the tariff group in which a discipline
is classified, the government both looks at the costs of the training program and at the
(expected) future earnings for the students in that program. The total number of publicly funded
study places is centrally determined by the government. As there are more applications than
study places, students are selected on the basis of their results at secondary school. About 5% of
the applicants was rejected in 1998. As of 1998, rejected students can buy a study place at a cost-
covering tuition price. Universities are permitted to levy cost-covering fees for up to 25% of the
Australian students they admit, under the condition that their quota of HECS-supported
students are filled. In addition, universities are statutorily required to charge cost-covering fees
to international students. So in the Australian system there is differentiation by subject area,
between home and foreign students and between home students who are eligible for HECS-
funded places and home students who are admitted on a cost-covering basis (cf. Greenaway and
Haynes, 2000).
Table 4.1 Tuition fee policies and selection procedures: international comparison
Tuition fees Selection of students
Australia differentiated, centralised yes
Denmark zero yes
the Netherlands uniform tariff limited
United Kingdom uniform tariff yes
United States differentiated, decentralised* yes*
* Some public schools (community colleges) do not charge tuition fees and have an open admission policy.
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In Denmark, no tuition fees are charged. Danish higher education institutions are, however,
permitted to select their students. So admission policies are deregulated. As we will see in
Chapter 5, some institutions adopt a rather selective admission regime while others accept all
applicants. Information on quality-differences across universities is not readily available to
students and their parents. This reduces transparency on the higher education market. In
addition, student mobility is limited (students do not have obvious reasons to prefer one
university over another so that they just might go to the nearest university), and competition for
students is hampered.
In the Netherlands, tuition fees for regular full-time students are centrally determined by the
government. But universities can freely determine tuition fees for full-time students not eligible
for student support, part-time students, and external candidates. The institutions do make use of
this discretionary freedom (see Chapter 1). Also admission criteria are centrally determined for
most subject areas in the Netherlands. Only students applying for a slot at an art academy or
Ph.D.-program have to go through a selection procedure. In addition, some studies like
medicine or dentistry have restricted admission, based on a weighted lottery where the chance
depends on average grade points at secondary school.
In the United Kingdom tuition fees are uniform, and centrally determined by the government
for regular full-time EU undergraduate students. However, universities are free to set their own
prices for part-time students and for non-EU overseas students. Universities have the freedom to
set their own selection criteria. These criteria can even differ across various disciplines within
the same university, and selection is in general rather rigorous. It is interesting to look at the
relationship between student selectivity and quality of the university. The Times presents a
ranking of 96 universities. Data are collected on teaching assessments, research, entry
standards, staff-student ratios, and library and computer spending. This data-set can be used to
study the relationship between selectivity and ranking. The top-5 of the UK is (1) Cambridge, (2)
Oxford, (3) Imperial College of Science, Technology and Medicine, (4) London School of
Economics and Political Science, and (5) University College London. Figure 4.1 shows the
relationship between selectivity and rank. The figure clearly shows that the best universities
adopt the most restrictive admission policies.
The United States have the most liberal higher education system in terms of tuition fee
deregulation and admission policies. The next section describes the US-system in more detail.
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11  Notice that by focussing on research universities, other parts of the US higher education system (like colleges
and non-research universities) are not included in the analysis.
12  On the Internet at caspar.nsf.gov/webcaspar.www.
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Figure 4.1  Relationship between selectivity and quality for some British universities
Source: The Good University Guide, www.the-times.co.uk/news/pages/tim/98/05/15/timguggug01001.html?999.
4.4 Tuition fee and admission policies in the US
4.4.1 Tuition fee policies
In the US, not only private schools can set their own tuition fees, but also public schools often
have some freedom in their pricing policies (except the two-year community colleges who are
not allowed to charge any fees). This decentralised character of tuition price policies is rather
exceptional. We will explore levels and variety of prices charged to students, and we shall try to
detect determinants of tuition fees. In particular, we look at educational quality as a potential
explanation for tuition fee differentiation between higher education institutions. To that end, we
collected data on research universities11 available from the National Science Foundation.12
Because of missing data, two universities are left out (Rutgers the State University of NJ New
Brunswick and University of California-Irvine). We thus have data on 102 universities, from
which 62 are public and 40 private. We selected a number of variables to get a global picture on
the differences between public and private institutes.
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Table 4.2 summarises the data (mean values are above standard deviations). The table shows
that:
• Public universities receive 18% of their income from tuition fees, while this is 29% for private
institutes. With 74% of its revenues from tuition fees, Northeastern University is on top;
• Endowment income is negligible for the group of public universities, but amounts to 7% for
private universities. The “wealthiest” institute is Rice University, with 40% of its revenues
coming from endowments;
• The fraction of tenured academic staff is 63% for private and 69% for public universities;
• Annual salaries for academic personnel are on average about $10,000 higher at private
universities, but also vary stronger in the private sector (the standard deviation of salary
payments is almost twice as high for private universities compared to public universities). The
real money-makers are to be found at California Institute of Technology, earning an annual
salary of $112,000 (on average);
Table 4.2 Some facts of public and private universities in the US
Public universities Private universities Total
Revenues from tuition fees (% of total revenues)              18             29            22
              (8)           (16)           (13)
Endowment income (% of total revenues)               1              7              3
             (1)             (8)             (6)
Tenured staff (%)              69             63             67
             (7)           (13)           (10)
Salaries ($) 58,629 68,856 62,639
(6,257) (11,247) (9,916)
Quality academic personnel (1.24-4.70)              2.88              3.36               3.07
            (0.67)             (0.77)             (0.75)
Tuition fees ($) undergraduate / in-state 3,359 18,082 9,133
(1,085) (5,645) (8,055)
undergraduate / out-of-state 9,510 18,114 12,884
(2,521) (5,561) (5,800)
graduate / in-state 3,896 16,914 9,001
(1,491) (5,724) (7,389)
graduate / out-of-state 9,587 16,951 12,475
(2,665) (5,637) (5,450)
Note: Revenues from tuition fees are listed as a fraction of total revenues (adjusted total current funds revenues, excluding Pell grants (Pell
grants are grants for students provided by the government)). Endowment income is expressed as a fraction of total revenues. Average numbers
are reported above standard deviations. The sample includes 62 public and 40 private universities. Data on quality academic personnel apply to
1993, the other data to 1996.
Source: NSF, data available from Webcaspar (caspar.nsf.gov/webcaspar).
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13  The top-10 in terms of quality of academic staff is: (1) Massachusetts Institute of Technology, (2) University of
California-Berkeley, (3) Harvard University, (4) California Institute of Technology, (5) Stanford University, (6)
University of Chicago, (7) Princeton University, (8) Yale University, (9) Cornell University and (10) Columbia
University in the City of New York.
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• With an average score of 3.36, private universities employ slightly better personnel than public
universities (the quality-indicator ranges from 1.24 to 4.70). Only one public university is listed
in the top-10, namely University of California-Berkeley.13
With regard to tuition fees, four categories of students are distinguished: undergraduate versus
graduate students and in-state versus out-of-state students. The table shows that:
• On average, tuition fees are substantially higher at private universities;
• The program level (undergraduate versus graduate) is not an important determinant of tuition
fees;
• Public universities strongly differentiate between in-state and out-of-state students (since a
substantial part of the university budget is paid out of state tax money).
With regard to measurement of quality, two additional comments are in order. First, quality not
only refers to academic quality, but may also relate to “fit for purpose”. While this dimension is
ignored in the U.S. News quality-indicator, some schools publish job market prospects of their
graduates (e.g. starting salaries). Good job market prospects are an indication that the training
program fits market demand. Second, some competition between institutions who measure
quality or a system of multiple accreditation could improve the quality-ranking methodology.
Higher Education Reform: Getting the Incentives Right
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To determine the relationship between quality (see the Box for an explanation of the ranking
methodology) and tuition fees, we carry out some regressions. Table 4.3 reports on regression
analysis on undergraduate tuition fees. In model (1) and (2) the dependent variable is tuition fees
for in-state students, while in (3) and (4) we look at tuition fees for out-of-state students.
Comparison of model (1) and (2) shows that tuition fees charged to in-state students are higher
and increase faster with quality at private institutions. But also the better public universities
charge higher tuition fees to their students. From (3) and (4) it can be seen that public
universities still charge lower fees to out-of-state students compared with the private institutions,
but the coefficient on quality is now in the same order of magnitude for both types of
How to measure quality?
In this Box we describe how the U.S. News quality-indicator is calculated (following Graham and Morse, 1999). The
quality-indicator is a weighted sum of the following seven categories (a recent discussion of these weights is
presented in Webster (2001)):
• Academic reputation. To quantify a school’s reputation, the presidents, provosts, and deans of admission are
asked to rate peer schools’ academic programs on a scale from 1 (marginal) to 5 (distinguished).
• Retention of students. 80 percent of the retention score is determined by the six-year graduation rate and 20
percent is determined by its freshman retention rate.
• Faculty resources. Five factors are used to assess a school’s commitment to superb instruction:
- class size, the proportion of classes with fewer than 20 students and of classes with more than 50 students
(40%);
- faculty salary (35%);
- the proportion of professors with the highest degree in their field (15%);
- the student-faculty ratio (5%);
- the proportion of full-time faculty (5%).
• Student selectivity. Four factors are used to quantify student selectivity:
- test scores of enrollees on the SAT- or ACT-test* (40%);
- the proportion of enrolled freshmen who graduated in the top 10 percent of their high school classes for the
national institutions and the top 25 percent for the regional schools (35%);
- the ratio of students admitted to applicants (15%);
- the ratio of students who enroll to those admitted (10%).
• Financial resources. This is measured by average spending per student on instruction, research, and education-
related services.
• Alumni giving. The percentage of alumni who gave to their school is taken as an indicator of alumni satisfaction.
• Graduation rate performance. For year x, this is the difference between a school’s six-year graduation rate for
the class that entered in year x-6 and the predicted rate for the class (after controlling for spending and student
aptitude). The idea here is that the college is enhancing achievement if the actual graduation rate is higher than
the predicted rate.
* For more information on these admission tests, visit www.sat.org and www.act.org.
Deregulation of higher education: Tuition fee differentiation and selectivity in the US
79
institutions: an increase of one standard deviation of educational quality is associated with a
$1,685 tuition fee increase (0.68  2.478  1000) at public universities and $1,949 at private
universities (0.78  2.499  1000).
Table 4.4 presents results from an analysis along the same lines for graduate students. A
similar picture emerges here, though private institutions seem to react to quality-increases even
stronger than in case of undergraduate training.
It is important to note that net tuition prices could be substantially lower than gross tuition fees
due to “tuition discounting”: colleges and universities have embraced the strategic use of aid to
students, and aid is shifting from need-based to merit-based. More and more institutions pursue
aggressive admission strategies to recruit the students they want to have. Many institutions have
paid a steep price in terms of sharply reduced net tuition revenues, leaving them with less
money for instruction. Such cut-throat competition could adversely affect the higher education
system.
Table 4.3 Determinants of undergraduate tuition fees in the US
(1) (2) (3) (4)
In-state / Public In-state / Private Out-of-state /
Public
Out-of-state /
Private
Constant 1.377 9.479 2.384 9.716
[0.556] [3.868] [1.074] [3.815]
Quality 0.689 2.560 2.478 2.499
[0.188] [1.122] [0.364] [1.107]
R2 0.18 0.12 0.44 0.12
Note: Standard-errors are between brackets.
Source: See Table 4.2.
Table 4.4 Determinants of graduate tuition fees in the US
(5) (6) (7) (8)
In-state / Public In-state / Private Out-of-state /
Public
Out-of-state /
Private
Constant 1.339 5.500 2.267 5.779
[0.775] [3.726] [1.159] [3.675]
Quality 0.889 3.396 2.546 3.324
[0.262] [1.081] [0.393] [1.066]
R2 0.16 0.21 0.41 0.20
Note: Standard-errors are between brackets.
Source: See Table 4.2.
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Two final comments about quality-stratification are in order. First, a disadvantage of the
ordinal quality-ranking methodology is that it provides no insight into absolute quality-levels and
absolute quality-differences between institutions. And some people claim that quality-
stratification has led to polarisation in the US higher education system. While we recognise the
possibility that good universities get better at the cost of the medium- and lower-ranked
institutions, this view is not supported by the facts (cf. Duffy and Goldberg, 1998). Second, and
finally, it is sometimes claimed that quality-differentiation in education could sustain income
differentials across communities. In several states of the US, primary and secondary public
schools are largely paid from local property taxes. As a result, there is a large disparity of
educational spending per student across districts. Inequity in educational opportunities at
primary and secondary public schools could be an important factor behind social polarisation.
The interested reader is referred to Bénabou (1996), Fernandez and Rogerson (1996), and
Durlauf (1996). However, it is far less likely that quality-differentiation within higher education
helps to sustain socioeconomic segregation: students can freely choose across schools,
institutions often have need-based student aid programs, and there are substantial returns to
higher education (probably also for graduates from lower-ranked institutions).
4.4.2 Admission policies
Let us now turn to the question of student selectivity. Again, a distinction should be made
between public and private universities. Private universities can always adopt their own
admission criteria, but in case of public institutions the responsible government (state or local
government) may control the school’s admission strategy (at least to some extent). This role of
government differs widely across states: from hardly any to fairly detailed regulation. For the
admission to a Bachelor’s program universities mostly look at high school scores. In about 20
out of the 50 states a compulsory high school exam guarantees a certain standardisation to make
high school scores comparable. In some cases the university takes an additional admission test,
e.g. the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT). Selectivity is very strong at the top: prestigious
institutions select the best students from a large pool of applicants (from all over the world). At
the bottom end there is no selection at all: community colleges accept all applicants.
This widely diversified character of the American higher education system provides a good
example to study the relationship between university ranking and selectivity. In Figure 4.2 we
plot selectivity against quality-ranking (cf. the Box) for 21 higher education institutes. The figure
clearly shows a relationship between selectivity and ranking. Down-left are the best and most
selective schools (among them California Institute of Technology and Stanford University). We
hasten to add that the relationship in this figure does not reveal any direction of causality: we
cannot claim that a better ranking enables universities to be more selective or that more selective
universities climb up in rank. Probably both effects play a role.
Deregulation of higher education: Tuition fee differentiation and selectivity in the US
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Figure 4.2  Relationship between selectivity and quality for some American universities
Source: Webcaspar (caspar.nsf.gov/webcaspar) and U.S. News (www.usnews.com/usnews/edu/college/corank.htm).
So the above “eyeball econometrics” approach points at a relationship between educational
quality and admission policy. A recent – and more elaborate – study on this connection is
provided in Monks and Ehrenberg (1999). They investigate how college rankings influence
selection-policy for a number of private universities in the US, finding that a lower ranking:
• Induces universities to accept a larger proportion of the applicants (a one unit drop in ranking
leads to a 0.4%-point increase of the acceptance-rate);
• Leads to a reduction in the fraction of accepted students that register for the program (a one unit
drop in ranking leads to a 0.17%-point decrease of the fraction of accepted students that
registers);
• Decreases the average scholastic aptitude of student inflow (a one unit drop in ranking reduces
the average SAT-score by 2.8 points – with an average SAT-score of college students of 1001 in
1991 (cf. Hoxby, 1997)).
Another important issue is whether selection helps to improve completion rates. An interesting
study dealing with this issue is Light and Strayer (2000). They investigate whether the match
between student ability and college quality affects college graduation rates in the US. A number
of interesting findings emerge from their analysis. First, students at the bottom end of the
observed ability distribution hurt their graduation chances by attending high-quality schools.
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Second, the chance of completion first rises with college quality and then falls. So low-quality
colleges provide the best chance of graduation for low-ability students, but this is not the case for
students with measured ability in the top three quartiles. By-and-large, Light and Strayer
conclude that the match between student ability and college quality has a significant effect on
college completion.
4.5 Evaluation
In this chapter we looked at the issue of deregulation in higher education by discussing tuition
fee and admission policies in a number of countries. By-and-large, government regulation in the
higher education sector is still rather strong. In many countries tuition price is centrally
determined (like in Australia, the Netherlands and the UK) or zero (Denmark and the other
Scandinavian countries). Also admission policies vary substantially. Some countries employ
national admission criteria (the Netherlands), others permit the institutions a large autonomy
(UK).
The US higher education sector is a good example of a flexible system with regard to tuition
price and admission policies. This has led to substantial price- and quality-differentials across
higher education institutions. Universities focus on a particular segment of the market, and
compete for students within this segment. Economic theory predicts that this would lead to
improvements in the average quality and in price-quality ratios, and this claim seems to be
supported by the data (cf. the empirical analysis in Hoxby, 1997).
We also saw that flexibility may come at a price. Evidence from the US showed that the
better universities charge higher tuition fees. This may hamper accessibility for economically
disadvantaged students. On the other hand, to maintain or improve their academic reputation,
high-quality universities are forced to attract good students (independent of their socio-economic
background). For that reason, US universities sometimes employ a high tuition – high aid
strategy. Students pay a high price, but poorer students receive financial support that (at least)
partly compensates for these higher costs. Put differently, rich students cross-subsidise poor
students. If universities do not adopt such a high tuition – high aid policy, they may not be able
to maintain their academic quality.
In addition, deregulation will only deliver the desired effects on price-quality ratios when the
higher education market is competitive and transparent. Students and their parents must have
access to reliable information on study programs, quality, tuition fees and future income
prospects to make the correct choices. Such information systems are available in the US and the
UK, but may need some further development in the Netherlands and Denmark.
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criteria are uniform.
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As we have seen, tuition policies and admission policies are interrelated. These issues cannot be
studied independently. From the international comparison provided in this chapter, we consider
three possible combinations:14
• Regulated tuition fees and admission policies
This system has a tendency to focus on the common denominator. The use of average
admission criteria implies that the average quality of the student population will be comparable
across higher education institutions. Since tuition fees are centrally determined, also the price
mechanism cannot help to serve as an allocation device. Proponents of this system argue that it
is equitable, since the regulated system would secure broad accessibility to higher education.
Also, in combination with peer review of educational quality the system may provide a high
average quality of higher education. Opponents criticise such a system for its homogenising
character. The system frustrates the competition process, as universities cannot compete on
price and can only partly compete on quality. The latter outcome is due to the fact that
admission criteria are uniform, so that students are mixed rather than matched according to
ability. This policy of uniform entry criteria could imply a waste in human potential, as the
variety in student ability within the classroom is too large.
• Regulated tuition fees, deregulated admission policies
This system acknowledges heterogeneity in the population with respect to ability as it allows
universities to differentiate on enrollment criteria. This will induce quality-differentiation across
universities. However, since tuition price cannot be set by the higher education institute,
universities are limited in the amount of money they can collect from tuition payments. This
financial constraint could limit the scope for further quality improvements.
• Deregulated tuition fees and admission policies
This system is the most flexible as it allows schools to set their own tuition fees and to follow
their own admission strategy. Each university will look for a niche in the market with a
particular quality-price combination. The resulting differentiation leads to a better match of
students. So while cross-university differences in quality will increase, each classroom will be
populated by a more homogeneous group of students. Two problems may arise. First, price will
tend to increase in quality. There is thus a potential danger that good but economically
disadvantaged students cannot afford to study at the best schools. On the other hand,
universities could offer need-based student support for instance through a high tuition – high
aid strategy with cross-subsidisation of poor students. Such within-university differentiation in
net tuition price is necessary to preserve academic quality. And in combination with the
provision of a loan-scheme with income-contingent repayment (cf. Chapter 3), higher private
contributions to the cost of higher education do not have to affect accessibility. Second, the
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question whether mixing or matching students increases educational production is unsettled
yet. Economists should talk to education experts and teachers, and learn from their experience.
To conclude, the US system is rather different from the system in the Netherlands. The US
experience seems to show that tuition price differentiation and student selection – as the natural
outcomes of increased competition between higher education institutions – promote both
average quality and price-quality ratios. However, lack of internationally comparable data
hampers a direct translation of the US evidence to other countries. In Chapter 8 we will discuss
the issue of deregulation in the context of the Dutch higher education sector.
Public funding of higher education: The Danish taximeter-model
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5 Public funding of higher education: the Danish taximeter-
model
Erik Canton and Peter van der Meer
5.1 Background
In Chapter 3 we looked at arguments why higher education should be subsidised. In this chapter
we look at how to organise this public funding. There is an increasing interest to link funding of
higher education to educational production. Such a system in which funding is (at least to some
extent) conditional on performance is typically referred to as output-based funding. In this
chapter we focus on the pros and cons of this funding principle.
The link between funding and performance may promote efficiency because higher
education institutes get an incentive to deliver output (as specified by the funding agency), since
they lose income when they fail to do so. But an output-based funding system could also have
disadvantages. High-powered incentives to produce graduates could lead to narrowly focussed
training programs. Non-measurable skills may be undervalued in such a system. In addition,
when educational quality is difficult to observe and the reputation mechanism works
insufficiently, output-based funding entails the danger of falling standards. In particular,
schools have an incentive to let pass students just below the critical border. The average quality
of graduates is reduced when more of these so-called infra-marginal students receive their
certificates.
An interesting example of an output-based funding system is the Danish taximeter-model.
Funding in the taximeter-system is directly linked to student performance: higher education
institutes receive funding per passed examination, the so-called taximeter-tariff. The incentives
to promote efficiency are thus evenly distributed over the study program, and the system is
flexible in the sense that funding is closely connected to educational production.
As we have seen in Chapter 1, the Dutch funding system is a kind of “all-or-nothing” model
where the price is paid at the end of the ride (i.e. at the moment of graduation). The Dutch
funding model is currently debated for its lacks of financial flexibility. And the government is
considering the implementation of a new funding model in the HBO-sector, closely resembling
the Danish taximeter-model. This new funding model is seen as a first step towards a voucher-
system. Therefore, we also pay some attention to vouchers.
The set-up of this chapter is the following. In Section 5.2 we briefly discuss the economic
theory on output-based funding systems and vouchers. The important features of the Danish
taximeter-model are explained in Section 5.3. In addition to desk-research, we also interviewed a
number of Danish experts of the taximeter-model. In Section 5.4 we look at the intended and
unintended effects of this taximeter-system, and present some conclusions.
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2  An input-based funding system reimburses the costs of the inputs. So a decision needs to be made on input-
requirements. For instance, an input-based funding system could set norms for the staff-student ratio. This implies
that an input-based funding system pre-specifies the production technique. To that end it is necessary that the
government has detailed knowledge about best practices. Such detailed information is often not available to the
government.
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5.2 Funding models and economic theory
Various funding mechanisms have been developed and applied in practice. Each funding system
has its own incentive structure and its own advantages and disadvantages. This section discusses
two important funding models: output-based funding (often used in practice) and vouchers
(often referred to in public debates).
5.2.1 Output-based funding
Output- or performance-based budgeting can be defined as the allocation of resources
contingent on an output-indicator.1 Output-based funding systems are thought to be more
efficient than input-based systems.2 In input-based systems, higher education institutions do not
have an incentive to supply education at the lowest possible costs. Output-based systems, in
contrast, provide high-powered incentives to deliver the output at the lowest cost. The important
pros of output-based budgeting are:
• Promotion of efficiency;
• Transparent allocation of public funding;
• No requirements on production technology are imposed (e.g. staff-student ratios).
However, performance-based budgeting may sometimes be problematic. In particular, output-
measurement difficulties could lead to:
• Misalignment of incentives, i.e. a wrong balance of tasks (“you only get what you pay for”);
• “Cream skimming”, i.e. the output-target is met but other aspects of output are ignored (think of
a reduction in quality when institutions are paid for the number of graduates they deliver).
Also, output-funding may not work well when:
• The individuals do not have (enough) control over the performance measures when the relation
between effort and performance measures is noisy.
And finally:
• Performance-based budgeting is only effective when efficiency-gains do not flow back to the
government, but can be used by the institutions on their own discretion (Hendrikse, 1998);
• Output-based budgeting typically works poorly in cultures dominated by professional norms
that denigrate speed and quantity of output relative to the quality, challenge, elegance,
thoroughness, creativity or subtlety of the work done (cf. Baron and Kreps, 1999).
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courses. But this depends on the specific organisation of the voucher-system. For instance, when vouchers are
valued in years of registration we are back in the situation where students can take additional courses. And when
vouchers are expressed in credits, an option would be to give more vouchers than minimally required.
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The crucial question is how output should be measured. A specific definition of output is
necessary to implement output-based funding. Measures used in practice are the number of
degrees or the number of passed exams. When output-measurement is difficult, high-powered
incentives could be problematic. In particular, high-powered incentives could shift away effort
from hard-to-measure activities (development of creativity, problem-solving attitude and general
academic competences) towards measurable activities. This could not only lead to undesirable
changes in the educational process, but may also affect the quantity or quality of the other main
product of a university, namely scientific research.
How should output-based funding be applied when one study program is more difficult than
the other? Difficult study programs could have lower completion rates, and a performance-based
funding system should take account of these differences, otherwise it is tempting for higher
education institutions to offer only “easy” programs. Alternatively, this problem can be
mitigated when institutions can select their own students. As a result, institutions will try to
select those students with the highest probability to complete their studies. In the remainder of
the discussion we shall come back to these problems with output-based funding, and their
practical consequences.
5.2.2 Vouchers
In the public debate, vouchers are often mentioned as an alternative funding system to increase
efficiency in the higher education sector. The Box summarises the important characteristics of a
voucher-system. Proponents argue that a voucher-system increases consumer sovereignty since
students can vote-by-the-feet, forcing institutions to supply high-quality education. However,
skeptics of voucher-systems stress that parents or students may not be sufficiently informed to
make wise choices (Cohn, 1997).3 Therefore, information on quality of programs and courses,
quality of personnel and labour market perspectives must be readily available to students.
It is often argued that vouchers could improve access to higher education because the
investment in higher education made by the student is less dependent on initial (including
parents’) wealth (cf. Barr, 1998b). However, it is possible to safeguard access to higher education
by other means, e.g. student loans with an income-contingent repayment schedule (see Chapter
3), and perhaps at lower costs.
Finally, an often-mentioned advantage of a voucher-system is that the money follows the
student. But this financial flexibility is already present in a pure input-based system where
funding is directly linked to the number of enrolled students, and could also be introduced in
output-based funding models, as the taximeter-system demonstrates.
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5.3 The taximeter-model of Denmark
5.3.1 The reforms of 1992
Prior to the introduction of the taximeter-principle, the Danish financing system did not leave
much room for institutional autonomy. Since 1981 (until the reform), education activities at
universities were funded on basis of a forecast of passed exams – but there was no adjustment
when forecasts turned out to be untrue. Such type of funding system could easily be
manipulated. Vocational colleges were micro-managed before 1991. The complete production
structure was predetermined by the Ministry. Budgets were calculated from staff-student ratios.
Pros and cons of vouchers
Rosen defines vouchers as “grants earmarked for particular commodities, such as medical care or education, given
to individuals” (1995, pp. 584). Therefore, vouchers form a system of demand-side funding. In case of education,
students or their parents receive vouchers from the government which they can use to “buy” education. Schools
hand in these vouchers to the government to receive funding (Cohn, 1997). For a good introduction on the
economics of vouchers, the interested reader is referred to Bradford and Shaviro (1999) and Johnes (1993).
Advantages of a voucher-system are the promotion of consumer sovereignty (voting-by-the-feet), and the promotion
of competition among suppliers. To be effective, however, market imperfections (e.g. information problems,
switching costs and indivisibilities in educational production) should not restrict freedom of choice.
The design of a voucher
In designing a voucher-system, three important choices need to be made:
• The criteria to be eligible for a voucher, such as personal or household characteristics (e.g. income or age);
• The freedom of choice on what to spend the voucher, for instance between schools;
• The voucher’s reimbursement structure (a typical voucher has a declining marginal rate of reimbursement –
at the limit 100% reimbursement up to some ceiling, followed by zero reimbursement).
An additional comment on the reimbursement structure is in order. As mentioned above, vouchers often have a
100% reimbursement rate up to a certain cap and 0% reimbursement thereafter. Some people claim that this aspect
makes a voucher system equitable, i.e. purchasing power for those who want to enroll in a higher education
program is equally distributed. On the other hand it implies that students who follow an expensive program would
face higher private contributions. From economic theory we know that the mix between public and private
contributions should be calculated on the basis of the difference between private and social returns to education
(among other things, see also Chapter 3). So the idea of a fixed government contribution per student may not yield
an efficient outcome as total costs and benefits vary substantially across study programs. An optimal voucher-
system in the higher education sector may have a different reimbursement structure, for instance a proportional
contribution. Vouchers could also be used in the higher education system to provide targeted support for certain
disciplines which are perceived to generate important benefits to society (e.g. medicine, technical studies, natural
sciences). These issues need further attention, as they could complicate the implementation of vouchers in the
higher education sector.
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Possibilities to internally relocate the public funds across different fields of study were limited.
So funding received for students in economics had to be spent within this department, and
could not be relocated to the physics department. Such a system is sometimes called “budgets
itemised by program area” (cf. Skjødt, 1996).
The Danish higher education sector has been reformed drastically in 1992. In the
government report from 1998 on the taximeter-model the following key-arguments for the
reform are given:
• To promote efficiency, and to induce higher education institutions to become more results-
oriented and customer-focussed;
• To link the allocation of grants to educational production so that institutions with more students
and better results are rewarded accordingly;
• To avoid erosion of standards;
• To implement a system that is simple, fair, transparent and automatic;
• To promote quality-competition among higher education institutes.
The 1992-reform consists of a new funding system combined with a decentralisation of the
government structure. The main changes are:
• A change of the funding mechanism. As of 1994, the institutions have received their funds in
the form of a block grant. The amount of government funding is set by the taximeter-principle,
the topic of our next sub-section;
• The introduction of four-year agreements on the total number of study places per institute
(before the reform agreements on total study places were made on a yearly basis), and a
considerable increase in the number of study places. Universities and vocational colleges have
the freedom to reallocate the study places over the different fields of study. This increases their
flexibility and makes them better able to adapt to changes in demand, which should lead to a
better match between supply and demand. Each institution decides how many students will be
admitted to each program and selects the students in case demand outnumbers its capacity.
Only a few expensive programs, i.e. medicine and dentistry, have a nationally restricted
admission.
5.3.2 The taximeter-principle
In the taximeter-model funding is directly linked to the number of students who pass their
exams. This funding-principle is therefore a good example of an output-based funding system.
The Danish higher education sector receives funds from the Ministry of Education to provide
education (research-funding is under the auspices of the Ministry of Research and Information
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4  The basic research grant has a historical base. Foremost the largest part of the grant is allocated according to
last year’s distribution. Changes are incremental. Only a small part of the grant is related to the university’s income
from teaching activities, that is “number of active students”. Public funding also depends on the institution’s
income from external funds, i.e. grants from the Danish Research Council, the Danish National Research
Foundation, the European Union and so forth. Besides these quantitative measures, other more qualitative
measures will be used in allocating the basic research budget over the institutions. This new system is not yet
completely implemented and is still heavily debated (cf. Jakobsen, 1997).
5  But because of overlap, there are only 13 different tariffs, cf. Table 5.1.
90
Technology4). The teaching component, which on average makes up one third of the revenues of
Danish universities, is based on a unit-cost principle. For each student who passes an exam an
amount of money is paid to the university. The total of these so-called active students
determines the available budget in a particular year. In this system each exam is weighted. The
weights of all exams of a 5-year program add up to 5. Universities do not receive compensation
for students who fail their exams or do not take exams. The tariff paid per passed exam, the
“taximeter”, varies according to the field of study, and has three components:
• A tariff for the costs of education and equipment;
• A tariff for joint costs (e.g. administration, buildings);
• A tariff for practical training (for a few subjects).
For the year 2000, the Minister uses taximeters for 20 fields of study.5 These tariffs are
displayed in Table 5.1.
When the taximeter-model was implemented in 1994, tariffs were calculated under two
important restrictions:
• The switch to the new funding system should not have budgetary consequences for the
individual institutions in the first year;
• The taximeter-model should not lead to a relocation of funds between institutions in the first
year.
These tariffs are therefore predominantly historically determined. The tariffs are not derived
from cost-calculation of the most efficient supplier (i.e. benchmarking), so historically created
inefficiencies will not be eliminated. Taximeter-tariffs are adjusted annually to balance the
budget of the Ministry of Education. As of the introduction of the taximeter-model, there has
been a lot of discussion about the level and differences between the taximeter-tariffs. For
instance, at University of Copenhagen the faculty of science is actively lobbying for higher
tariffs. This has also led to tension with other departments. Similar problems arise in the health
faculty but here problems are less urgent as the health faculty receives more external funding.
Also the Ministry of Education is dissatisfied with the current tariff structure, and is
considering to reduce the number of tariff groups. In addition, it has been suggested that there
should be a premium for completion, as students often do not finish their thesis on time. In
computer science, for instance, many students leave before graduating. Recall that this would
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imply a move towards the current Dutch system, where funding is largely linked to the moment
of graduation (cf. Chapter 1).
5.3.3 Safeguarding the quality of higher education
As mentioned before, an output-based funding system could give rise to quality problems. In
such a system, it is tempting to let (infra-marginal) students pass their exams to increase
revenues. What measures have been taken in Denmark to safeguard educational quality?
The Danish Ministry of Education acknowledged this danger and therefore established
(already in 1992) an evaluation center: the Evalueringsinstitut (EVA). By performing regular
evaluations of the educational programs this center should improve and maintain the quality of
higher education.
EVA is funded by the Ministry of Education, but acts as an independent body with the task to
evaluate the quality of study programs and to publish these evaluations. A negative evaluation
does not have direct financial consequences for the institution, but the Minister could intervene
when performance is not improved. Although EVA’s reports are publicly available, the
Table 5.1 Tariff per full-time equivalent student for higher education in 2000 (DKK, excluding VAT)
Subject Rate for direct
teaching related
expenditure
Rate for joint
costs
Rate for practical
training
Law, Economics, Danish, History etc. 24,700 5,800
Psychology, Languages, Theology etc. 27,600 6,400
Teacher Training (domestic science)* 27,600 7,900
Mathematical Economics 32,800 6,400
Educational Theory 32,800 7,900
Physiotherapy 32,800 9,700 14,200
Marketing 34,200 6,400
Teacher Training (old program) 38,100 7,900 33,200
Teacher Training (new program) 40,400 7,900
Mathematics, Statistics 42,400 7,900
Music, Communication, Journalism 42,400 9,700
Athletics 47,800 7,900
Geography, Dentistry 54,500 7,900
Medicine 54,400 7,900 83,300
Computer Science, Physics, Chemistry, Biology 54,400 9,700
Pharmacy 62,800 9,700
Engineering, Agricultural Science 62,800 11,100
Veterinary Science 83,700 11,100
Ph.D.-program, non-laboratory subjects 87,900 21,100
Ph.D.-program, laboratory subjects 132,000 21,100
Note: 100 DKK is about Dfl.30,- or 13.64. Reported tariffs refer to annual public funding of a student who passed all exams in that year.
* Self-governing colleges of education have an additional rate for capital expenditure (6,800 DKK in 2000).
Source: Personal communication with Jesper Wittrup, Danish Ministry of Education.
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6  The composition of the corps of external examiners must reflect a substantial (at least one third) number of
employers of the graduates from the program in question. External examiners are either colleagues from other
universities or people from business companies or the public sector. There is a national pool of these external
examiners, but there are some complaints that the pool is too small. Professors can propose the name of an
external examiner (this aspect makes it less objective). The Minister of Education imposes the rule that at least one
fourth of the examinations should be taken in the presence of an external examiner.
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presentation is rather technical and it is written for the institutions and generally not read by the
students. According to EVA, no overall change in quality has been observed since the
introduction of the taximeter-model.
Another counterforce to the erosion of academic standards is the long-standing system of
external examination.6 The external examiners should:
• Ensure a fair and equal treatment of all students;
• Monitor nation-wide quality standards;
• Advise the institutions on the quality of the programs, and annually submit a report of their
impressions or critique to the institution (cf. Thune et al., 1996).
The three universities we visited make use of external examiners (“censorship”) more frequently
than the required minimum. Aarhus uses more and more exams with censorship, and at
Copenhagen Business School about 60% of the examinations are censored. The institutions
reported a number of additional benefits of the system of external examiners, such as the
informal exchange of information on quality of particular courses and the opportunity to meet
and talk to colleagues (though it could be questioned whether this cannot be arranged outside
the system of external examination).
Both the EVA and the Ministry of Education consider the system of external examiners as
too costly. They believe that efficiency in educational production can be improved by having less
exams censored by an external examiner. However, imposing a maximum use of external
examiners seems to be at odds with one of the aims of the reform, namely to increase
institutional autonomy. With an output-based funding system institutions have an incentive to
produce efficiently, so apparently the intensive use of external examiners yields enough benefits
to the institutions. By pointing at the expensive character of the system of external examiners, it
seems as if the government tries to impose input-requirements or methods of production (as in
a line-item budgeting system). Our interviews revealed that it seems to be a matter of money:
the government may point at the inefficient use of external examiners as an excuse to reduce the
taximeter-tariffs.
Our impression from the expert interviews is that universities question the functioning of the
EVA while they attach heavy weight on the system of external examiners. Aarhus is not too
happy with the EVA: evaluations are not always objective and too much dependent on the
evaluation board. And University of Copenhagen criticises the “ivory tower character” of the
Public funding of higher education: The Danish taximeter-model
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EVA. But the three universities we visited were (very) happy with the system of external
examiners, although they all acknowledge that it is a costly instrument to guard academic
quality.
5.4 Evaluation of the taximeter-model
5.4.1 Danish evaluation studies
A first evaluation of the taximeter-system has been performed by the Danish Evaluation Institute
(EVA) in 1995. The Ministry asked the EVA to evaluate whether the taximeter-model has had any
negative effects on educational quality. In the response the EVA concluded that:
• No negative trends could be found in the most recent evaluations of the study programs. On the
contrary, EVA actually found that the reform had resulted in increased awareness of student
needs, and a more open attitude towards students’ suggestions, for instance by taking student
evaluations more seriously;
• The teachers’ “professional ethic” in general prevents them from letting more students pass as a
response to output-based funding;
• The intensive use of external examiners prevents the local examiner to let more students pass.
A second and much broader evaluation of the taximeter-model, not only in higher education but
also in other parts of the educational system and other government sectors where the taximeter-
principle is applied, took place in 1998 (Undervisningsministeriet, 1998). The overall
conclusions of this evaluation were positive, not only for higher education but also for the other
systems investigated. In particular, it was concluded that as a result of the reform the
management of the education sector has improved considerably. There is an increased focus on
“value for money”. For instance, managers are now more eager to find the best offer when
buying new equipment or choosing a bank. Unprofitable activities are more rapidly
discontinued, and the institutions have improved their ability to adjust and take up new
initiatives, where before the reform they would often wait and do nothing until a real crisis
occurred.
Also, educational institutions now seem to be more inclined to provide a good service to their
students. Typically, additional effort is made to reduce the number of drop-outs. Furthermore,
most institutions consider the quality of their teaching programs to be the decisive factor in the
competition process.
The above mentioned effects are more pronounced at the vocational colleges than at the
universities. One of the reasons could be that university funding is less affected by fluctuations
in the number of active students, since taximeter-grants cover only about a third of their total
revenues (the remainder include grants for research, capital expenses and so forth).
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Furthermore, the governance structure at the universities is rather complicated, which could
lead to agency-problems and hamper efficient management.
5.4.2 Student performance
One objective of the introduction of an output-based funding system was to improve student
performance, i.e. to lower drop-out rates, to increase completion rates and to lower the length of
study. Was the reform successful in this respect?
In Figure 5.1 we plot data on enrollment in Danish higher education (number of enrolled
students as a percentage of the age cohort 20-24), entrants and graduates in higher education
(also as a percentage of the age cohort 20-24) over the past twenty years. The figure clearly
shows that enrollment started to increase around 1985, and in 1998 about 56% of the Danes
within the 20-24 age group participated in some form of higher education. Also the fraction of
people within this cohort entering and graduating from higher education increased. Between
1980 and 1998, the fraction of entrants as a percentage of the relevant age cohort doubled, while
the fraction of graduates as a percentage of the relevant age cohort increased by approximately
85%. This suggests that completion rates have fallen and / or the average length of study has
increased. So despite the introduction of the taximeter-model in 1994, we do not observe a clear
improvement in student performance in the data.
Figure 5.1  Participation, inflow and outflow in Danish higher education, 1980-1998 (percent of age cohort
20-24)
Source: Data on enrollment, number of entrants and number of graduates are from the Danish Ministry of Education. Population
data are from the UN (1999).
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Figure 5.2 shows the number of graduates as a percentage of the number of enrolled students. A
peak occurred in 1994, the year when the taximeter-model was actually implemented. About
20% of the enrolled students graduated in that year. For the years 1995-98 there is no clear
evidence for a trend break in completion rates, though the period is too short to draw firm
conclusions.
Figure 5.2  Completion rate in Danish higher education, 1980-1998 (number of graduates as percentage of
total enrollment)
Source: Danish Ministry of Education.
According to University of Aarhus, educational production (number of students times study
performance) has risen during the first years of the taximeter-model. However, this upswing is
due to a volume-effect in the sense that more students applied for a study place at Aarhus. The
volume-effect is triggered by a temporary demographic wave. The intended positive effects from
the taximeter-principle on completion rates did not appear. And there is no evidence that the
drop-out rate has lowered or the length of study has shortened. Despite a more pro-active
attitude of the university to prevent students from dropping-out through study boards and
counselling, this has not yielded any positive effects. In other words, attempts by the university
to prevent students from dropping-out turned out to be ineffective in Aarhus.7
University of Copenhagen is more positive about the taximeter-model. At the end of the
demographic wave, the number of applications for study places at University of Copenhagen
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dropped. A first reaction by the university was to lower entrance standards (mean grade points at
secondary school), so that more students were admitted. But this did not turn out to be a
sensible strategy. In fact, lowering entry standards led to an increase in the dropout-rate, and
this strategy did not yield a positive effect on their revenue stream. Therefore, entry standards
were increased again. This caused a reduction in the intake of new students, but completion
rates (and thus taximeter-funding per student) increased.
Also according to the Copenhagen Business School (CBS), the taximeter-model has led to a
more active attitude to improve study performance. A common problem in the Danish higher
education program is the preparation of a thesis. About 40% of the students do not succeed to
submit their thesis in time and students receive too little guidance. To improve on this situation,
CBS developed a more active and student-friendly attitude with the result that more and more
students are able to finish their thesis on time.
5.4.3 Budgetary effects
An often-mentioned drawback of the taximeter-system is its open-ended character (at least in the
short-run). If more students pass exams, more resources are made available to the institutions.
It is not possible to calculate in advance exactly how many active students there are, and
therefore it is not possible to predict the exact funding to be paid by the government. This has
already resulted in “unpleasant surprises”: in some years actual expenses exceeded the budget of
the Ministry of Education by almost a billion Danish crowns. Not surprisingly, the Ministry of
Finance is especially concerned about this problem. The Ministry of Education now has an
agreement with the Ministry of Finance with regard to overspending. The Minister of Education
may overspend 200 million DKK (approximately 70 million Dfl.) before intervention is needed.
Some measures have been taken to decrease the likelihood of such negative surprises in the
future. One of these measures is to set a fixed maximum grant for certain types of open
education, for which it is particularly difficult to predict the number of active students. However,
to the extent that the upswing in expenses reflects a general improvement in study performance
it is only an inter-temporal reallocation of funds (future outlays are moved forward). So in our
view overrunning the budget could actually be a sign that the taximeter-model is effective in
improving study performance.
5.4.4 Quality once again
An often-heard argument against output-based funding systems is that educational quality may
be lowered. Is this fear justified? Perhaps the most powerful mechanism to maintain academic
standards is reputation. In an open sector where information about a school’s quality is readily
available to (potential) students, the number of applications will be affected by the school’s
reputation (cf. Chapter 4 on the US). A reduction in educational quality in response to the
taximeter-model is considered to be “self-defeating” (University of Copenhagen). Neither the
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universities nor the Ministry of Education and EVA reported a structural drop in academic
standards, although some mentioned that students and academic staff occasionally express their
concern about educational quality.
Institutions can select their own students. Entry standards vary across universities. Some
universities receive ample applications, and they can select the best students. But especially the
far-away colleges have to accept everybody. This will lead to quality differences. While this
differentiation between universities is accepted, the Ministry of Education recognises that
transparency is at stake.
People at Copenhagen Business School talked about a hump-shaped relationship between
the average quality and number of intakes. When too few students are admitted, educational
quality is too low because there is not enough student interaction and the scale is too small too
generate enough financial means. And when too many students are accepted, the average quality
of the student population is lowered.
In our interpretation, the expert interviews revealed that quality-differentiation has been
promoted (though perhaps unintentionally) within the taximeter-system. Some universities
strive for excellence and adopt a rigorous student selection policy. For instance, at University of
Copenhagen we were told that their tough program in economics is used as a marketing
instrument to attract good students – for instance by presenting examples of former students
who were admitted to a Ph.D.-program at American top-universities. Other universities admit all
applicants, which may come at the cost of educational quality. For a more elaborate discussion
on the pros and cons of quality-differentiation, we refer to Chapter 4.
5.4.5 Competition
The taximeter-model should facilitate competition between schools. When the money follows
the student, there should be no financial impediments to student relocations (apart from
switching costs). However, Danish students are discouraged from switching between
universities. Students have to add at least half a year to their study time when they switch to
another university. This is because universities normally require students to take additional
courses, as courses taken at another university may not be recognised, or considered to be “too
light”. Students perceive these barriers to switch as a problem. Moreover, by erecting these
barriers universities can reduce competition. Indeed, the intended effect of voting-by-the-feet
has not appeared. As a consequence, the market for higher education is still to a large extent a
regional one. Students want to live close to their relatives and are only prepared to move to
another part of the country when programs are very different.
International mobility of students is also limited (apart from international student exchange
programs) as degrees obtained in other countries are often not recognised. For instance, a
Bachelor-degree from the UK is not accepted in Denmark.
Higher Education Reform: Getting the Incentives Right
98
There is some evidence that the taximeter-model induced universities to search for new markets.
For instance, the University of Copenhagen has been more creative to attract students and
money (also from firms) by offering new courses and programs. Or – as one expert put it – the
taximeter-model “has triggered an incentive to build up new business”. It is admitted that some
moral hazard is present in the sense that there is an incentive to supply soft courses, but this
effect is counterbalanced through the danger of loss of reputation and students.
5.4.6 Other issues
Most Danish universities also apply the taximeter-principle for the internal allocation of funds
over the various faculties. But it is applied in a less strict fashion, in order to prevent too large
budget relocations between faculties. For example, at University of Copenhagen a growing
department receives more money, but less than according to the taximeter-principle. It can be
expected that the effects of the taximeter-model are mitigated when the internal allocation of
resources is not brought in line with the external allocation principle.
Internal application of the taximeter-principle suggests that a department with reduced
student performance (i.e. more students failing their exams) would receive less money. Can
such budgetary consequences also translate into sanctions of underperforming academic staff?
Copenhagen Business School reported that teachers who perform badly can be sanctioned. Staff
cannot be fired but underperforming staff may be forced to teach less interesting courses or (in
a more extreme case) to early retirement. But in practice the yearly performance evaluation with
the manager is in most cases sufficient to signal problems and to try and solve them.
Aarhus mentioned that the taximeter-model implied a huge administrative burden. University of
Aarhus developed its own information system. The implementation of an information system
necessary to administrate the system according to the norms of the Danish General Auditor was
very expensive. Also maintenance costs are regarded as high. But the other two universities we
visited did not report any serious implementation problems. And we were told that University of
Aarhus implemented a very sophisticated and student-friendly information system. This system
should meet the rapidly increasing information requirements of students. The taximeter-model,
as such, did not call for such an advanced information system.
Research funding is provided by the Ministry of Research and Information Technology. There is
no formal link between the budget for teaching and the research budget. Surprisingly, there is
no institute to evaluate the research output: the Evalueringsinstitut only evaluates teaching.
In the perception of government, universities used to spend too little time on teaching and
too much on research. The taximeter-model provides high-powered incentives with respect to
teaching. According to the people we interviewed, this has indeed led to an increased attention
for teaching activities. So does this reshuffle crowd-out research activity? According to the
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Copenhagen Business School, this has not led to an erosion of research output. On the contrary,
research productivity has increased. Whether this is due to complementarity between education
and research or to the removal of substantial inefficiencies is an open question.
So is the taximeter-model a good model? Let us recapitulate our findings in the form of three
main conclusions:
• The taximeter-model only had a minor positive effect (if any effect at all) on student
performance: there is no compelling evidence for changes in drop-out rates and completion
rates;
• On average, no structural change in educational quality can be observed. But the taximeter-
model has encouraged quality-differentiation across institutions. Some opt for a high- quality
strategy and only admit the best students, other institutions accept all applicants and need to
adjust their standards accordingly;
• Some institutions reported positive effects from the reform; our impression is that the
taximeter-principle triggered a process of internal reorganisation at these institutions.
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1  How to define and measure research output will be discussed in the next section.
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6 Public funding of academic research: the Research
Assessment Exercise of the UK
Jos Koelman and Richard Venniker
6.1 Background
The previous three chapters looked at issues concerning education. In this chapter we turn to
research. More specifically, we turn to the funding of research in institutions of higher
education. During the last decade competition for research funds and the use of research
evaluations have become key issues in technology and science policy in many OECD countries.
A major factor behind this trend is the growing demand for accountability of public
expenditures, including public research funding, by citizens. Governments and universities are
pressed to make more efficient use of public resources, and to give better account of the use of
these resources.
In this chapter, we discuss the pros and cons of output-based funding of the research
activities of universities. We focus on how it affects the incentives of academic faculty with
respect to research, teaching and knowledge transfer. We draw lessons from the UK, which has
one of the most output-oriented university research funding systems. Since 1986, research by
British universities is evaluated every four or five years in the so-called Research Assessment
Exercise (RAE). The results of this exercise play an important role in research funding by the
government: low-quality research is not funded at all, and research of high quality is rewarded
with relatively generous funding.
In Section 6.2 we discuss the central issues and concepts. A description of the funding and
evaluation system of academic research in the UK is given in Section 6.3. In Section 6.4 we
discuss the effects of the RAE.
6.2 Research funding and economic theory
6.2.1 Pros and cons of output-based funding
The goal of introducing output-based funding (like the introduction of the RAE in the UK in
1986) is to increase the quantity and / or quality of research output.1 Whether this increase will
come about depends on various factors. Furthermore, introducing output-based funding may
also influence activities other than research. In this section we describe the various possible
effects, which are listed in Table 6.1.
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Why would one expect a rise in research output? First, reallocation of resources to the most able
and productive research groups may raise overall research output. This assumes that the
measure of performance that is used accurately reflects marginal research productivity. Little is
known about the production function of research, however. Although one of the few robust
findings is that the distribution of average research productivity over researchers is very skewed,
it is not clear what part of it may be attributed to the ability of researchers (see Stephan, 1996).
Second, allocation of research funds between research units (universities, departments, research
groups or even individuals) on the basis of performance would strengthen their incentives to
provide research effort, and thereby raise their research productivity and eventually aggregate
research productivity.
Whether these positive effects of performance-based funding will actually occur depends on
several factors. First of all, introduction of explicit incentives for research effort may crowd out
intrinsic motivation. Several examples outside the field of science where this crowding-out is
supported by the data are described by Frey and Jegen (2000). The relevance for science is
unknown.
A second assumption is that individual effort has a positive effect on aggregate research
productivity. This relation need not apply due to the tournament character of science. The norm
of “priority of discovery” is generally thought to play an important role in academic research:
being the discoverer of new (path-breaking) knowledge enhances one’s reputation and future
research career (see Dasgupta and David, 1994). This importance of being first may give rise to
acts of secrecy in the communication of intermediate research results with other researchers
(the opponents in the tournament). This possibly tempers a positive effect of explicit incentives
on aggregate research productivity.
Whether output-based funding succeeds in raising research quality and / or quantity also
depends on the quality of the output measures. Several imperfections of research output
measures have been identified in the literature.
Table 6.1 Theoretical pros and cons of output-based research funding at universities
Pro Con
- allocation to (currently) most able researchers - adverse incentives for non-measurable research effort
- incentives for measurable research effort - no funds to new, talented researchers
- crowding-out of intrinsic motivation
- bias toward low-risk, short-term research and well-established
research approaches
- low comparability of output between scientific disciplines
- adverse incentives for other faculty activities
- academic “transfer market”
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When part of the research output is not measurable, funding based on objective indicators may
increase measured research output without increasing actual research output. It induces
researchers to concentrate their efforts on the measurable outputs of research, which may be
detrimental to actual output. Consequently, when non-measurable output is important, weak
incentives on measurable output are desirable (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991).
Output-based indicators are necessarily based on past research accomplishments which may
be misleading with respect to future productivity. Accomplishment-based funding tends to shift
the distribution of funds toward older researchers and research units, at the cost of young
researchers, re-entering women and new research units that may be more productive in the
future, but have had less possibility to express their potential (Lazear, 1997). A similar reasoning
applies to new research areas and new approaches versus established ones.
The length of the evaluation period is important as well. Research output is not only the
result of effort and ability, but also of chance. Indicators that are based on short evaluation
periods may result in one-time luck having long-time consequences due to the so-called
Matthew effect2: successful research, whether due to ability or good luck, enhances reputation
and the chance of obtaining future research funding, and thereby the probability of being
successful in the future. Longer evaluation periods mitigate this influence of luck somewhat. A
short evaluation period may also distract universities from path-breaking, high-risk research –
with results only expected in the long-run – toward short-term and mainstream research with
foreseeable output. This runs counter to the accepted view that university research should focus
on research that would be under-provided by private parties due to external effects and high
uncertainty.
Research is not the only activity of universities. They are also engaged in education and the
transfer of research findings to the general public. The incentives on the three activities should
be balanced in order to prevent that one of them will be crowded out. When education funding
does not depend on education output and the effort academics put into education is hard to
verify, strong financial incentives for research may go at the cost of the quality of education. The
same applies for the transfer of knowledge, which is a legal task but is hardly rewarded explicitly.
Finally, individual institutions may use intrinsically unproductive strategies to increase their
research output. These strategies do not increase the output of the total research system. A
possible example that has featured prominently in public debates concerns poaching of
researchers from other institutions shortly before an evaluation exercise (especially the timing is
unproductive here, since mobility of researchers itself may be very productive).
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6.2.2 Research output and pitfalls in popular output measures
Evidently, output-based research funding requires a notion of what research output is. In
general terms, the output of research is new knowledge. This initially takes the form of tacit
knowledge, i.e. knowledge in the heads of researchers. Transfer of tacit knowledge requires face-
to-face contact, which makes it a relatively expensive affair. To facilitate knowledge transfer, tacit
knowledge may be written down on paper or in bits and bytes: it may be codified. Scientific
papers, journal articles, patents and computer software are all examples of codified research
output.
These codified outputs are the basis of attempts to evaluate the research efforts of
universities, research groups and individual researchers. Evaluation of research has been a
central component of research activity ever since science is conducted in specialised institutions,
beginning in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century. It has mainly served two types of
decisions: funding research proposals and research organisations, and formulating a research
strategy.
Various indicators of research output have been developed, all having their pros and cons
The two main quantitative indicators are publication counts and citation analysis. Subjective
peer review plays an important role as well. The remainder of this section discusses the pros and
cons of the different indicators, and is largely based on the overview of international practices
toward research assessment by Geuna et al. (1999).
The method of publication counts takes the sum of publications produced over a given period as
a proxy for research productivity. To account for the quality of publications, different
publications may be given different weights. Weights may differ between different types of
publications (like books, journal articles, and working papers). Different journal articles may
also receive different weights, depending on the journal in which they have been published. One
possibility that has been used is to weigh articles according to the journal impact factor, which is
the mean citation rate of all the articles contained in the journal, and is published annually in
the Science Citation Index Journal Citation Report. Apart from the way quality is taken into
account, several other decisions have to be made. Examples are the maximum number of
publications that is taken into account, the length of the evaluation period, and the way co-
publications are weighed (as a single-authored article, or inversely proportional to the number of
authors, or otherwise).
Despite the different refinements of rough counts that have been applied, this performance
indicator has several shortcomings as a measure of overall research output:
• Research output other than publications (like patents) is left out;
• The acceptance process for publications may be biased (e.g. toward established authors, or
toward research within a familiar field or paradigm), and weighting schemes for journals may
not be representative for the individual articles (Seglen, 1997);
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• The choices about types and number of publications to be included, the weights to be used, the
evaluation period, and the way co-publications are treated, are partially arbitrary.
The use of publication counts (and other indicators) for research groups, departments and
whole institutions raises three additional issues. First, the proxy should be adjusted for the size
of the research unit by taking the number of publications per researcher. Second, the output per
researcher for a department may vary considerably depending on the number of staff in a
department that is included in the indicator (only senior researchers, also Ph.D. students, maybe
all types of faculty). And third, the output of a department may be altered significantly by the
mobility of staff. The different manners of ascribing the output of a researcher to a department
(based on the affiliation at the time of research, or based on the current affiliation) may have a
strong impact on the output indicator.
Citation analysis concerns the counting of the number of times research publications of a
researcher are referred to elsewhere in the literature. It is used to assess the quality of the
research output. Citation indicators are mostly based on the Science Citation Index (SCI) of the
Institute for Scientific Information. Besides the shortcomings mentioned above, particularly
important shortcomings for citation counts are:
• The SCI tends to have a bias in favour of publications in the English language (and especially
towards North American sources), and only the first author is reported in the SCI;
• Citation counts cannot distinguish between positive and negative citations, and may be distorted
by citations to academic friends or by self-citations (although the latter are easier to recognise);
• The choice of citation windows (how many years are considered after the publication) is partially
arbitrary, and may work out negatively for seminal or radical publications that take some time to
be understood, accepted and referred to.
Peer review is the evaluation of research output by peers. Frequently, peers also use quantitative
information about publications and citations in their assessments (sometimes referred to as
informed peer review). In the Netherlands and in the UK, research assessment is mainly based on
informed peer review. The most important shortcoming of peer review as a method of research
assessment is that it is subjective, and may be insufficiently systematic and transparent. In
principle, this may result in:
• Dishonest reporting when peers have a stake in the evaluation outcome; 
• A bias in favour of large departments because they are usually better known and contribute to
research in a large number of sub-disciplines; 
• A bias in favour of a department or researcher at an institute because of the good reputation of
the whole institute.
Higher Education Reform: Getting the Incentives Right
3  Formally, the assessment of quality (the RAE) and the selective allocation of funds are two separate exercises.
But, as McNay (1999) observes, most people outside the funding bodies treated the RAE as covering both the
assessment and the allocation of funds. We will use the term RAE mostly in this last sense.
106
6.2.3 Research funding and the relation with research assessments: international differences
Most countries use a dual support system to fund academic research: both funding of
institutions (core funding) and funding of research projects. Countries differ in the extent to
which research evaluations play a role. The following approaches to core funding of academic
research can be distinguished (based on Geuna et al., 1999):
• (Partial) allocation on the basis of research performance indicators, either directly (Australia,
Poland) or via an informed peer review process (UK, Hong Kong);
• Allocation on the basis of university size (numbers of students and staff), either completely
(Germany, Italy, Norway and Sweden) or in combination with a small part that is based on
performance (Denmark and Finland);
• Allocation on the basis of negotiation with the relevant ministry, either without any research
evaluation (Austria) or with the use of information from research (and teaching) assessment
(France);
• Allocation on the basis of small adjustments to historical patterns (the Netherlands). Although
research assessment is carried out, it is not linked to funding decisions.
6.3 The Research Assessment Exercises in the UK
The UK has one of the most advanced research evaluation systems in Europe. Since the middle
of the 1980s the UK has had four nation-wide university research evaluations, the so-called
Research Assessment Exercises (RAEs), carried out in 1986, 1989, 1992 and 1996. The next
RAE is planned for 2001.
The results of the RAE have been used to allocate the research funds by the three UK higher
education funding councils (for England, Scotland, and Wales) and by the Department of
Education for Northern Ireland.3 Table 6.2 shows that the funds of these funding councils form
a large part of total research funding. The other major funding source concerns the research
councils, who allocate funds on the basis of research proposals. The share of the funding
councils in total research funding has declined sharply, but they are still the largest single
source.
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In this section we describe the method of research funding used by the funding councils and the
role of the RAE, the main changes through time, and the results of the 1996 RAE (the last
evaluation exercise). Because the funding mechanisms and assessment methods of the four
regions of the UK are practically the same, we concentrate on the funding of research carried
out by the Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE).
6.3.1 RAE-based funding and overall funding within the HEFCE
The HEFCE provides funds for both research and teaching. Table 6.3 shows the breakdown of
the HEFCE-funds in teaching, research and special funding for 1999-2000.
Table 6.2 Sources of research funding for UK higher education institutions (percentage of total funding,
unless stated otherwise)
1984 1991 1997
Funding Councils 58.8 47.8 35.1
Research Councils 17.2 20.3 24.1
Other government departments 7.5 6.4 10.4
UK industry 5.6 6 7
Overseas n.a. 5.5 8.5
Charities 6.7 11 13.6
Other n.a. 3 1.3
Total (million pounds) 859 1,989 2,942
Note: n.a. = not available.
Source: HEFCE (2000c).
Table 6.3 Breakdown of HEFCE funding in 1999-2000
million pounds % of total
Teaching 2,930 69.3
Research 855 20.2
   - quality-related research funding 835 19.8
         - mainstream 743.3
         - supervision of research students 65.6
         - London extra costs 26.1
   - generic research funding 20 0.5
Special funding 435 10.3
Transitional funding and flexibility margin 10 0.2
Total funding 4,230 100
Source: HEFCE (2000a).
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The part of HEFCE-funding that is allocated on the basis of the RAE concerns the quality-related
funds, which is almost 98% of the HEFCE research funding. The institutions are free in the
internal allocation of the research funds they receive. The allocation of the mainstream quality-
related funds between institutions takes place in two stages:4
• Allocation of total research funds over the subject areas identified in the RAE;
• Allocation of the funds per subject area over the various institutions.
Both allocations are affected by the quality-rankings resulting from the RAE. We first describe
how the quality-rankings are determined, and subsequently turn to the translation of these
rankings in funding decisions.
6.3.2 The Research Assessment Exercise of 1996
The quality of research is assessed by (informed) peer review in a Research Assessment Exercise
(RAE).5 In this section we discuss the RAE of 1996, which will inform funding decisions until
2001-02. This RAE involved the assessment of over 55,000 academics from nearly 3,000
departments in 191 institutions (Geuna et al., 1999). Note that since the introduction of a
unitary university system in 1992, the UK has no formal distinction between the former
polytechnics and related institutions (comparable to the Dutch HBO) and the “traditional”
universities (comparable to the Dutch universities). Hence, all institutions of higher education
are assessed and funded according to the same rules.
At the beginning of the 1996-exercise, 69 subject areas were defined (called Units of
Assessment, UOAs). In each subject area the research output has been assessed by one of the
60 assessment panels of on average six to ten experts. Panel members, some 560 in total, were
selected on the basis of nominations by about 1,000 outside bodies (subject associations,
learned societies, professional bodies and organisations representing users of research).
Institutions were invited to put forward one application in each subject area.6 The crucial
information for the research assessment has been the research output of the so-called research
active staff. Institutions were free in the selection of researchers as research active staff. It is
important to note that the academic staff that is not submitted as research active does not add to
the research volume of institutions as well. Hence, institutions basically face a trade-off between
quantity and quality. The 1996-RAE did not assess all the output of the research active staff, but
considered up to four works (publications or other forms of assessable and publicly available
output).
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The research assessment resulted in a rating for each research unit (see Table 6.4). These
ratings reflect the extent in which research in a unit has achieved levels of national or
international excellence. Rating 1 implies “research quality that equates to attainable levels of
national excellence in none, or virtually none, of the sub-areas of activity” and rating 5* means
“research quality that equates to attainable levels of international excellence in a majority of sub-
areas of activity and attainable levels of national excellence in all others” (Geuna et al., 1999).
The ratings are thus meant to reflect the level of research quality, and not the position of a
department in a research quality tournament where a higher rating of one department
automatically means a lower rating for another department. In theory it is possible that all
departments receive the highest rating of 5* or the lowest rating of 1.
The average ratings differ substantially between subject areas. The three lowest average ratings
(after translating the rankings to a scale from 1 to 7) are 2.4, 2.8 and 2.8, whereas the scores of
the three highest rated subject areas are 5.1, 5.4 and 5.6. The difference between subject areas
may reflect true quality differences, but may also be the result of different perceptions by
assessment panels of the quality-ratings. These differences in average scores have increased in
importance, since from the 1996 RAE onward the allocation of the total budget over the subject
areas depends on the quality-ratings (prior to this date the budgets per subject were determined
before the assessment).
6.3.3 From RAE-ratings toward allocation of funds
As mentioned before, the allocation of the quality-related research funds proceeds in two stages:
allocation of the total funds between the subject areas (Stage 1), and allocation of the funds per
subject area between institutions (Stage 2). The RAE-ratings influence the outcome of both
stages.
In Stage 1 the total funds are allocated between the different subject areas. The share of each
subject area in total funding is proportional to the volume of research in the subject area times
the relevant cost weight.
There are three cost weights, reflecting differences in costs of research: for high cost
laboratory and clinical subjects (weight 1.7), for intermediate cost subjects (weight 1.3) and for
other subjects (weight 1.0).
Table 6.4 Distribution of 1996 RAE-ratings over departments
Rating 1 2 3b 3a 4 5 5*
Research department (% of total) 8.2 16 18.2 14.6 23.2 13.9 5.9
Source: RAE96-database (see www.rae.ac.uk).
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The volume of research is the weighted sum of five separate components:
• The number of FTE research active academic staff funded from general funds, in departments
rated 3b or above, and selected for assessment in the RAE (weight 1);
• The number of FTE research assistants (weight 0.1);
• The number of FTE research fellows (weight 0.1);
• 1.75 times the FTE number of postgraduate research (PGR) students in their second and third
year of full-time study, or third to sixth year of part-time study (weight 0.15);7
• The average of last two years’ research income from charities, divided by 25,000 (weight 0.25).
Income from charities is divided by 25,000 (in pounds the average salary of a researcher) to
obtain a personal equivalent.
The number of research active staff is the most important measure of volume: it accounts for
about two-thirds of the total volume. The volume of research active staff is fixed between two
RAEs. The other components of research volume are updated annually.
In Stage 2 the funds per subject area are allocated over the various institutions. For each subject
area, the share of an institution in the total funds is proportional to the volume of the research
unit it has put forward for assessment in the subject area, times the funding weight of the
research unit. The volume of research for each institution in each subject is measured as in
Stage 1.
The funding weight follows from the quality-ranking of the research unit determined in the
RAE. Table 6.5 shows how the ratings relate to the funding weight. Ratings 1 and 2, which
amounts to 24.2 percent of the departments (see Table 6.4), generate no quality related funding.
Each rating point between 3b and 5 attracts a weight 50 percent greater than the previous point,
while the step from 5 to 5* implies a 20 percent premium.
6.3.4 Changes in RAE through time and plans for the RAE of 2001
Through the years the HEFCE has continually evaluated and reviewed the research evaluation
process and the funding system. This section describes the major changes since the RAE of
1989 (see Table 6.7). The first RAE (of 1986) will not be discussed, since it has been strongly
Table 6.5 RAE ratings and corresponding funding weights
1996 RAE rating 1 2 3b 3a 4 5 5*
Funding weight 0 0 1 1.5 2.25 3.375 4.05
Source: HEFCE (2000a).
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criticised for its lack of transparency and the subsequent changes have been very substantial. In
discussing the changes we will follow Table 6.7.
A major change that does not concern features of the RAE itself, but has resulted in debates
about the RAE, has been the introduction of the unitary system of higher education in 1992.
The formal distinction between the polytechnics and other institutions (comparable to the Dutch
HBO) and the “traditional” universities (comparable to the Dutch universities) was abolished,
and all the institutions of higher education have subsequently been assessed and funded
according to the same rules.
The inclusion of the “new” universities in the RAE has also led to a number of changes in
the determination of research output relevant for the RAE:
• Grants for teaching and research were separated. Student numbers were removed from the
research funding formula, and research students, research assistants and fellows were included.
This change has been structural;
• The choice of which academic staff to include in the research assessment was decentralised
toward the institutions. Before 1992 all academic staff was subject to evaluation. Ever since the
institutions have been free to put forward so-called research active staff. In this choice
institutions face a trade-off between quality and quantity: academic staff that is not submitted as
research active does not add to the volume of research as well;
• The relation between ranking and funding was changed (see Table 6.6). 
This change had the important consequence that the lowest ranked units no longer received
quality-related funds, whereas previously all units received some funding;
• Basic research and applied research could be evaluated separately. This change has only lasted
one period; in the 1996-RAE they were integrated again. The change was inspired by the
possibility of an excessive focus of the review panels on output measures that were favourable to
basic research (like publications in scientific journals), and thus for the old universities. Separate
evaluation proved to be cumbersome and added little to creating a level playing field, and was
thus cancelled in the next exercise.
The number of quality categories and the correspondence between quality-ratings and funding
weights has been changed several times. The first change, described above, basically introduced
a category of institutions receiving no quality-related research funding. In 1996, the number of
Table 6.6 RAE ratings and corresponding funding weights for 1989 and 1992
RAE rating 1 2 3 4 5
1989 funding weight 0.5 1.5 2.5 3.5 4.5
1992 funding weight 0 1 2 3 4
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quality categories has been increased by two. Basically, both the old category 3 and the old
category 5 have been split in two. Furthermore, the lowest two quality categories received no
funding from 1996 onward. These changes occurred in response to the general rise in quality
rating. Due to this rise the departments that had been able to maintain their position in the top
category had nevertheless seen their funding per unit of research volume decline, which was
considered undesirable.
Another feature that has been changed several times is the quantity of output that is
evaluated. In 1989 there were no rules. In 1992 researchers had to mark with an asterisk the two
pieces of output they considered to be best. In 1996, the number of outputs counting for the
quality assessment was drastically reduced to four pieces. This change has been made in
reaction to the publication explosion following the 1992 RAE. The new arrangement has
reduced the incentive to maximise the number of articles by repetition, by lowering the quality
standards, or through the breakdown of research into lowest publishable units (Cave et al.,
1997).
Until 1996, the distribution of funds between the subject areas did not depend on the quality
ratings. Since then, the quality of research no longer only determines the distribution of funds
within a subject area, but also influences the distribution of the total budget between the subject
areas. As explained earlier in the chapter, the amount of funds allocated to a subject area
depends strongly on the research volume, which only takes into account the number of research
active staff in departments that exceed a minimum research quality (have a rating of 3b or
above). This raises the question of the comparability of quality between different disciplines; a
question that is especially interesting given the great spread of average ratings between subject
areas. This structure may give assessment panels an incentive to overrate the average quality of
research output in order to maximise the share of the own subject area in the total research
budget.
Public funding of academic research: The Research Assessment Exercise of the UK
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The last change, which will be made in the 2001-RAE (and does not appear in the table),
concerns the rules for submitting staff that has left an institution shortly before the research
evaluation exercise. A “research active researcher” who transfers between two institutions that
are eligible to participate in the RAE within the twelve months preceding the census date will be
taken into account in the judgement of quality for both institutions, but will only be counted in
the research volume of the employing institution at the census date. This change has been made
in reaction to references to an academic “transfer market”, and should ensure that institutions
will not be disadvantaged by staff leaving immediately before the RAE.
6.4 Evaluation of the RAE
What have been the consequences of the RAE? How effective has the RAE been in achieving its
goals? And what about unexpected side-effects? This section discusses the impact of the
subsequent RAEs. It is mostly based on the main evaluation studies of subsequent exercises:
Table 6.7 Differences between the subsequent RAEs
1989 1992 1996 2001
Funding period 90/91-92/93 93/94-96/97 97/98-00/01 01/02 - ...
No. of subject areas 152 72 69 68
University system binary (55 institutions) unitary (170
institutions)
unitary (191
institutions)
unitary
Funding of teaching
and research
separated?
no yes yes yes
Staff assessed all staff research active staff
(selected by the
institutions)
research active staff
(selected by the
institutions)
research active staff
(selected by the
institutions)
Funding weight as a
function of the quality
rating
see Table 6.6 see Table 6.6 see Table 6.5 see Table 6.5
Separate ratings for
basic and applied
research?
no yes no no
No. of quality
categories
5 (see Table 6.6) 5 (see Table 6.6) 7 (see Table 6.5) 7 (see Table 6.5)
Budget per subject area set before exercise set before exercise endogenous endogenous
Research output per
researcher assessed
not specified two publications + two
other output + other
research info
best four best four
Sources: McNay (1999), Williams (1993), www.rae.ac.uk.
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the management of research, the quality of research, unintended consequences, the balance between research and
teaching, and the nature of research. It involved a literature study, case studies, questionnaires and interviews.
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Williams (1991)8, Martin and Skea (1992)9, McNay (1997 and 1999)10, and the HEFCE Review of
Research (HEFCE, 2000b) including the underlying reports.
First a short word about the costs. According to calculations by the HEFCE, an upper limit
on the total costs of the 1996-exercise is £37,5 million, just 0,8% of the total funds allocated on
the basis of the RAE-results (HEFCE, 2000b).
The total amount of money that changes departments due to the RAE is about 30% of the
total funds. Despite these gross money flows, the share of the old pre-1992 universities and the
share of the new universities in total funding remains approximately constant (HEFCE, 2000b).
The financial consequences for departments may be larger than these figures indicate. This is
due to the fact that the RAE-ratings not only determine HEFCE-funding, but also increasingly
influence the allocation of other research funds (McNay, 1997). Firms, for example, use the
ratings when choosing a research group for contract research or long-time research
collaboration.
6.4.1 Research output
The first indications of changes in research output are the changes in quality ratings, reported in
Tables 6.8 and 6.9. The changes indicate a steady rise in the quality of research. From 1989 to
1992, 50% of the submissions improved its rating and 35.4% consolidated its rating. The
remaining institutions either saw their rating decline or dropped out. From 1992 to 1996 51.7%
improved its rating and 31.1% received the same rating in both years.
Table 6.8 RAE grade movements from 1989 to 1992
1992 submissions 1992 rating
1989 rating 0 1 2 3 4 5 Total
0 90 80 106 47 36 359
1 41 13 45 49 10 1 159
2 37 5 107 189 58 8 404
3 31 0 46 284 176 48 585
4 10 0 1 72 181 86 350
5 8 0 1 6 44 143 202
Total 127 108 280 706 516 322 2,059
Note: Rating 0 indicates “received no rating”.
Source: HEFCE (2000b), Annex J.
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Two questions remain: is the improvement suggested by the increase in ratings real, and can it
be attributed to the RAE? The last question is a very difficult one. McNay (1997) emphasises that
the effects of the 1992 RAE are hard to disentangle from the effects of other policy changes that
took place at the same time: (i) the creation of the unitary system, discussed earlier; (ii) a freeze
on the expansion of undergraduate student numbers; (iii) the introduction of teaching quality
assessment (TQA), although without significant resource consequences attached; and (iv) more
emphasis of government policy on the contribution of academic research to competitiveness and
economic strength. Additionally, some rules of the 1992 RAE were changed unexpectedly
shortly before the submission deadline.
An international comparison may provide some indications of the efficiency of UK academic
research. In 1997, the UK had the largest number of papers and number of citations per dollar
(PPP) of higher education R&D expenditures. On the other hand, research funding as a
proportion of GDP and the proportion of research funding provided by the government are
relatively low internationally (HEFCE, 2000b). At first sight this suggests that UK research does
indeed make efficient use of the research resources (although differences in research systems,
like the focus in Germany on public research in specialised research institutions instead of in
higher education institutions, make firm conclusions difficult).
Additional evidence is provided by surveys of researchers and university administrators. This
evidence has the major drawback that it is based on perceptions and opinions, which frequently
differ between individuals (even apparently similar ones). Williams (1991), McNay (1997) and
Adams et al. (2000a) found evidence of improvements in research management: more
conscious and transparent planning and monitoring of research, and closure and merger of low-
rated departments. Many insiders think research quality has increased, although this is
accompanied by more stress among staff.
Table 6.9 RAE grade movements from 1992 to 1996
1996 submissions 1996 rating
1992 rating 0 1 2 3 4 5 5* Total
0 126 207 131 30 14 7 515
1 180 78 84 60 2 0 1 405
2 87 28 130 290 44 4 0 583
3 64 2 36 370 271 54 5 802
4 13 0 0 79 254 162 22 530
5 6 0 0 4 43 150 120 323
Total 350 234 457 934 644 384 155 3,158
Note: Rating 0 indicates “received no rating”, rating 3 in 1996 includes 3a and 3b.
Source: HEFCE (2000b), Annex J.
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6.4.2 Funding bias against new researchers
Does the funding system work out negatively for researchers who did not have the chance to
prove their abilities in the recent past, like young researchers and re-entering women? HEFCE
(2000b) finds no evidence for a bias against young researchers. Two observations support this
view. First, the age profile of research active staff submitted to the 1996-RAE is not related to the
grade received. Moreover, research-intensive departments even recruit slightly more younger
staff relative than the sector overall.
HEFCE (2000b) does find an under-representation of women in the highest-rated
departments. The proposed solution is to recognise personal recommendations of peers as
evidence in the RAE. When the absence of research output is due to a temporary retreat from
the academic labour market, an alternative solution might be to consider the research output in
the four years before this retreat.
6.4.3 Bias toward short-term research
McNay (1997) finds indications for several distortions of the nature and content of research. The
evaluation period results in more short-term and mainstream research. He also reports a bias of
review panels toward more favourable treatment of papers in established scientific journals,
leading researchers to focus on more basic research, more mainstream research, and less
interdisciplinary research. How severe these distortions have been does not become clear,
however. HEFCE (2000b) found no relationship between the percentage of time researchers
spend on interdisciplinary research and the rating of their 1996 RAE submission, which
suggests the problem is not large.
6.4.4 Adverse incentives for teaching and knowledge transfer
Martin and Skea (1992) report on concerns among academic staff about the negative effect of
the RAE on teaching. Jenkins (1995) evaluates the effect of the RAE on teaching in fourteen
departments of geography in England and Wales. The paper presents evidence of more teaching
by part-timers and postgraduates (particularly in the first postgraduate year), and clear pressures
to give priority to research productivity in personnel policy, especially in appointments.
Teaching programs tend to become more fragmented, and insufficient new (possibly IT-based)
teaching material is developed. McNay (1997) finds similar effects plus a trend toward
organisational separation of teaching and research. To what extent these effects influence the
educational output remains unclear. Analyses based on proxies for educational output have not
been found.
The (negative) effects of the RAE on teaching and the transfer of knowledge are not evident. J
M Consulting Ltd (2000) found a widespread view that the RAE did not directly damage the
quality of teaching. A negative effect on innovations in teaching, like new teaching material and
the attention paid to student support and tutorials, might be present, although views on this are
Public funding of academic research: The Research Assessment Exercise of the UK
11  On the other hand, the percentage of staff moving to another institution in the year after the 1996 RAE was
significantly higher than in the two years before the exercise.
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widely differing. Possibly, a decline in teaching quality may yet have to show up. Even when
there is a negative influence of the RAE on teaching and knowledge transfer, the HEFCE-report
concludes that this problem should not be tackled by lowering the incentives on research. Rather
the answer should be found in attaching greater financial consequences to the Teaching Quality
Assessment (TQA), and improving its quality, about which there is much dissatisfaction. A
similar argument applies with respect to knowledge transfer.
6.4.5 Academic transfer market
One of the most frequently mentioned aspects of the RAE has probably been the alleged
“transfer market” for staff in the run-up to an exercise. The fact that institutions are assessed on
the performance of the staff in post on the census date for the RAE has been said (among others
in the survey by Williams) to encourage a frenzied transfer market in the period before an
exercise. The data do not support this hypothesis. McNay (1997) calculated that only about 1% of
total academic staff moved due to the 1992-RAE. The same figure applies to the RAE-related
transfers in the two years up to the 1996-RAE, a period in which the entire sector grew by 25%.
There has been some timing of retirement in the 1996-RAE: in the year following the RAE, the
percentage of staff retiring or moving out of active employment rose from 1.84 percent to 3.30
percent. Mobility may have remained this low because institutions took steps to retain staff, like
salary increases, relief from teaching, sabbaticals and provision of support staff.11 Compared
with the US-researchers and with industrial researchers, UK academic (RAE) researchers are
relatively immobile (HEFCE, 2000b).
6.4.6 In conclusion
Based on all the above, we arrive at the following summary of the findings concerning the
effects of the Research Assessment Exercises in the UK (see Table 6.10).
Table 6.10 Consequences of the UK system of output-based funding, the Research Assessment Exercise
Pro
Research output (research management) weakly positive effect
Con
New researchers / re-entering women no effect / some negative effect
Short-term, mainstream research ambiguous
Teaching weakly negative effect
Knowledge transfer unknown
Academic transfer market no negative effect
Higher Education Reform: Getting the Incentives Right
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7 When factory meets faculty: university-industry co-operation
in the US
Richard Venniker and Ben Jongbloed
7.1 Background
In many countries research relationships between universities and industry have become more
important. Contract research and consultancy services provided by universities have generated
increasing revenues, more and more strategic research collaborations have been initiated, and
universities have increased their efforts to patent their research findings and license them to
private firms.
There is, however, controversy about the desirable level of university-industry co-operation.
On the positive side, closer interaction is said to increase the transfer of knowledge between
universities and private firms, and thus to enhance the social value of academic research. On the
negative side, fears of secrecy in academic research and of a distortion of the research agenda
toward applied research, from which the benefits may be privately appropriable, have been
expressed.
In this chapter we discuss the pros and cons of university-industry interactions, and ask
whether the incentives for both parties to collaborate lead to socially desirable outcomes. We try
to assess whether the fears of secrecy and a distorted research agenda are justified. In doing so
we look at the United States. The US have introduced government policies to foster the transfer
of technology between universities and firms many years ago and are said to provide many
examples of successful university-industry ventures. We focus on academic patenting and
licensing and on collaborative research by universities and firms.
In Section 7.2 we first present some empirical evidence of the increase in university-industry
interaction in the US. Subsequently we turn to the incentives of universities and firms to
collaborate, and the possible role for government. Two main US policy measures to stimulate
knowledge transfer from academe to industry are discussed in Section 7.3. In Section 7.4 we
evaluate the costs and benefits of these policy measures.
7.2 University-industry ties and the role for government
7.2.1 The increasing importance of university-industry ties
Interactions between universities and private firms have gained importance over the years, as is
evidenced by a number of R&D-statistics.
The share of industry in the funding of research performed by universities, both basic and
applied, has increased steadily (see Figure 7.1). From 1980 to 1990, a decade of rapid growth for
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total university research, industry’s sponsorship increased from 4 percent to 7 percent of
academic research expenditures. Since 1990 industry’s share has remained around 7 percent.
Figure 7.1  Share of industry in US academic research expenditures
Source: NSB (2000).
Figure 7.2  US academic patenting 1985-1998
Source: NSB (2000).
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1  This is partly due to the improved coverage of the survey, as is shown in the bottom rows of the table. Moreover,
the data do not reveal whether the propensity to patent and license has increased through the years.
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Universities have also given increased attention to commercial application of their research.
Figure 7.2 indicates that the number of university patents has increased continuously ever since
1985. Henderson et al. (1998) provide more extensive information. They show that the increase
already started in the early 1970s, and that the increase has been more rapid than the increase in
the overall number of US patents. They also show that the number of patents per US-dollar of
research expenditures (the propensity to patent) has increased for universities, while it has
declined sharply for overall domestic R&D. Furthermore, patenting activity has become more
widespread: the number of universities obtaining patents has increased from about 30 in 1965
and 111 in 1985 to 173 in 1998 (see also NSB, 2000). Despite this increase, the distribution of
patents across universities remains highly concentrated. In 1991, for example, the top 20
universities receive about 70% of the total patent grants.
More detailed information about the patenting and licensing activities of universities is
provided by the annual Survey of Research Universities conducted by the Association of
University Technology Managers (AUTM), see Table 7.1. Through the 1990s all indicators
related to patenting – like license disclosures, patent applications, granted patents, and license
revenues – have shown an increase.1 Another indication is that the number of technology
transfer and licensing offices, set up by universities to organise the process from invention to
license agreement, rose from 25 in 1980 to 200 in 1990.
Table 7.1 Patenting and licensing activities of universities
1991 1993 1995 1997
Invention disclosures received 4,880 6,598 7,427 9,051
New patent applications filed 1,335 1,993 2,373 3,644
Total new patents received n.a. 1,307 1,550 2,239
New licenses and options executed 1,079 1,737 2,142 2,707
Number of revenue-generating licenses, options 2,210 3,413 4,272 5,659
Gross royalties (million $) 130 242.3 299.1 482.9
Startup companies formed n.a. n.a. 169 258
Survey coverage
Number of institutions responding 98 117 127 132
Percent of total academic R&D represented 65 75 78 82
Percent of federally funded academic R&D represented 79 85 85 90
Percent of academic patents represented n.a. 80 82 91
Note: n.a. = not available.
Source: NSB (2000), Text table 6.11.
Higher Education Reform: Getting the Incentives Right
122
Citations to published research articles on the front page of patent applications also indicate an
increased importance of science for innovation. Applications to the US Patent and Trademark
Office include citations to all “prior art” – that is previous patents as well as the other sources of
information, such as research journal articles, on which the application is based. These citations
are not a perfect measure of knowledge spillovers, however: some references are added ex post,
e.g. to prevent law suits. Both the absolute number of citations and the share of patents citing
research articles have risen sharply. The intensity of research citations differs between industrial
product fields, and is particularly high and growing in patents for “drugs and medicines” (NSB,
1998).
Another indication for the ties between universities and industry is the significance of
university-based startups. Table 7.1 shows a sharp rise in the second half of the 1990s in
university-based startups. This is confirmed by the 1996 AUTM-survey where universities
reported a total number of just over 900 startups since 1980 (see Rahm et al., 2000).
University-startups are mostly located close to the originating university, frequently on a so-
called research park that provides them with all kinds of services to facilitate the startup. Over
the past decades many universities have designated an adjacent land area and established a
research park (Rahm et al., 2000).
The importance of university-industry collaborative research has been studied by Cohen et al.
(1998). They find that there were approximately 1,056 university-industry R&D centers in the
US in 1990. More than 500 university-industry centers have been established during the 1980s.
These centers spent about $2.9 billion on R&D, which amounts to almost one-fifth of all US
academic R&D expenditures on science and engineering. About half of the private expenditures
on academic R&D went to university-industry R&D centers.
Bibliometric indicators also illustrate increased interaction of academic and private researchers. 
Co-authorship of journal articles by US industrial researchers with either academic or federal
researchers increased steadily across all fields. The proportion of industry-produced articles that
were co-authored with at least one US academic researcher increased from 21.6 percent in 1981
to 40.8 percent in 1995. Again, the largest increase has been in biomedical research (NSB,
1998).
Publication activity of industrial researchers has changed significantly at the level of research
fields. The number of “industry publications” in the engineering and technology field dropped
steeply during the 1980s, accompanied by declines in industrial publications in physics,
chemistry and mathematics in the first half of the 1990s. In biotechnology and clinical medicine
the trend was exactly the opposite.
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7.2.2 Benefits and costs of university-industry interaction
Evidently, universities and firms only collaborate when it is in their mutual interest. What are
the benefits and costs to universities and firms?
First the benefits. Universities benefit from ties with industry for several reasons:
• Access to a source of complementary expertise and equipment;
• Access to a source of interesting new research problems;
• Channel through which to carry out the – legally assigned – objective of knowledge transfer to
(regional) industry and the general public;
• Channel through which to provide students with experience in private research and to create a
network for student job placement;
• Access to a source of income.
In other words, the ties add to fulfilling the academic tasks of education, research and
knowledge transfer, and they generate income. The latter effect should not be considered to be a
separate goal (universities are not profit maximisers). Clearly, increased importance of industry
funds is likely to affect the incentives of universities towards research, as we will see further on.
The major reasons for firms to enter into collaborative agreements with universities are:
• Access to state-of-the-art knowledge and information, to university facilities, and to academic
staff, and;
• Access to students as potential employees.
What about the costs? We distinguish three categories:
• Direct costs;
• Costs resulting from the different views of universities and firms on the dissemination of
research results;
• Costs resulting from the different views of universities and firms on the research agenda.
First the direct costs. Evidently, universities and firms have to invest money, time and effort.
Clear examples are the costs of setting up a technology transfer office to manage the patenting
and licensing activities, and the overhead costs of cooperative research (like administrative
costs).
Concerning the dissemination of knowledge, there exists a tension between the focus on
open dissemination of knowledge at universities and the desire for secrecy by firms (Dasgupta
and David, 1994). Secrecy – like delays in publication, partial dissemination of research results,
or strict conditions on access to research material and technology by other researchers – helps
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2  Note that the demand for secrecy by firms may be socially excessive for all firms together. However, given the
behaviour of other firms it may be in each firm’s short-term interest to ask for secrecy. Furthermore, restrictions on
open dissemination of research results are less important to firms when collaboration with universities results to a
large extent in tacit knowledge, which gives firms a competitive lead even when complementary codified knowledge
is fully disclosed.
3  A firm may also demand secrecy when research results are likely to have a negative effect on the market demand
for the firm’s product, and consequently on its profitability. An example of such behaviour is given by Schachman
(2000). He reports on clinical trials for a drug, financed by the firm selling the drug, which revealed that the drug
was causing toxic effects rather than benefiting the patients. The quest for secrecy induced the firm to threaten the
university with litigation and elimination of financial support.
4  Note that although secrecy hurts spillovers from research in the first instance, their exists a partial counter-
mechanism. Secrecy increases the marginal benefits from more applied research performed by firms, which also
exhibits some externalities (although to a lesser extent than basic research). Hence, R&D expenditures and
research spillovers are increased further down the road. The magnitude of this effect is not likely to be very large.
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firms to protect the commercial value of products and processes eventually resulting from the
inventions.2 This induces them to incur the costs of further applied research and development.3
Academic researchers are hesitant to accept requests to hold research results partly or
temporarily secret. These practices would run counter to the age-old scientific norm of free
disclosure; a norm which has contributed to research quality, to the dissemination of knowledge
and to the prevention of wasteful duplicative research.4 And even when academic researchers are
not intrinsically motivated to hold on to this norm, they may be induced to do so out of fear that
giving in to commercial ties and secrecy harms their long-term research productivity and
academic career. This would be the case when other researchers refuse to co-operate with staff
interacting with industry because of fear for commercial use of their research results, or in
reaction to initial acts of secrecy by the researcher with the commercial ties.
The second tension concerns the research agenda. Profit oriented firms may be more
interested in applied research, the benefits of which are relatively easy to appropriate, than in
basic research. The primary focus of universities should be on basic research that is hard to
appropriate privately (or on research for which private appropriation of the benefits is
undesirable). When universities substitute short-term applied “industrial” research for basic
research due to closer ties with industry, this might hamper long-term research productivity,
diminish spillovers from academic research, and eventually even harm long-term national
innovativeness.
Several factors may have strengthened the incentives of universities and firms to collaborate.
The public demand for justification of public research expenditures, often stated in terms of
relevance for industry, has increased. Furthermore, the stagnation in government funding for
higher education has stimulated universities to search for private sources of income. This effect
is strengthened by the rising costs of advanced research equipment in many fields. Other causal
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factors that have been mentioned in the literature (but are not evident and have not been
substantiated precisely) is that firms rely more and more on public research due to the rising
complexity of technology, intensified competition on the product market, and the shorter
product cycles and hence shorter time horizons for private R&D. Furthermore, the distinction
between basic research and applied research is relatively vague in new technology fields like ICT,
biotechnology and new materials. Finally, governments increasingly encourage universities and
firms to increase the knowledge transfer between academe and commerce.
7.2.3 What role for government?
Various policy documents consider the transfer of knowledge and technology from academe to
commerce to be insufficient. Why might this be the case? We discuss three candidate
explanations: the incentive structure, uncertainty, and lack of transparency.
First, most university inventions are little more than a “proof of concept”, and require
substantial further research to generate new products and processes (see Jensen and Thursby, 
1998). Since part of the knowledge is tacit, i.e. in the heads of researchers, further research
based on the invention requires active involvement of the inventor. To elicit the effort of
academic researchers, they should have a stake in the commercial success of further research.
The current academic reward system may not leave enough room for such incentive contracts,
and patenting policy may play a useful role.
Second, the expected value of collaboration may be highly uncertain. This may induce risk-
averse parties to turn down opportunities that are socially valuable. Governments may correct
for this by subsidising university-industry collaboration (possibly with reimbursement of the
subsidy in case of commercial success, although this will be hard to implement).
Third, the “knowledge transfer market” may suffer from a lack of transparency: firms do not
know where to find knowledge, and universities do not know where their knowledge might be
valuable. This problem need not apply to large firms, which have their own research capacity
and access to the scientific network. But it may be a problem to smaller firms. And private
parties may not have enough incentives to gather and bring together supply of and demand for
knowledge. Patent policy may enhance transparency by providing a data-base of academic
research findings that have the potential to result in profitable products after some further
research and development. Subsidies to collaborative research may make it more worthwhile to
search for research partners.
Eventually, policy instruments to stimulate knowledge transfer should only be implemented
when the social benefits outweigh the costs. Hence, the positive effect of stronger collaboration
between universities and industry on the use of public knowledge should outweigh the possible
negative effects on the research agenda and on secrecy. And incentives from patenting rules on
public research should not distort the attention of universities from their primary mission of
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of research.
6  US technology transfer policy has not been limited to universities. Many policy initiatives in the same period
address the federal laboratories. See the sources mentioned in Table 7.1 for details.
126
open and basic research that would have been insufficiently performed by private firms due to
the limited possibilities for appropriability.5  Furthermore, the instruments that are
implemented should be effective in bringing about more collaboration. This may not be the case
for the following reasons: (1) subsidies may co-finance collaborations that would have taken
place anyway; (2) subsidies to formal collaborations may drive out equally or more efficient
informal contacts; and (3) governments may be tempted to use R&D policies for subsidising
national firms, and policy competition may render the national policies ineffective. The next
section will discuss the main policies implemented in the US for stimulating university-industry
collaboration.
7.3 University-industry collaboration in the US
The higher education landscape in the US is very diverse. Universities and colleges (about 3,500
in total) vary in size, ownership, endowment and character (see also Chapter 4). The generally
accepted classification by the Carnegie Foundation distinguishes some 10 types of higher
education institutes, including 6 types of universities, ranging from research universities
(offering a full range of undergraduate and graduate programs and giving a high priority to
research) to Master’s colleges. The universities that are engaged in research collaboration with
the private sector belong (mostly) to the group of research universities.
The US have a long tradition of university links with industry. This tradition started with the
land-grant colleges. In 1862 every state was offered a sizeable piece of federal land for the
purpose of establishing colleges dedicated to agriculture and mechanics (the Morrill Act). Other
policy initiatives to improve agriculture by linking university researchers with farmers followed:
a national bureau for assistance to farmers, federal support for agricultural experiment stations
based at land-grant colleges (1887), and federal funding of state co-operative extension services
(1914). After WWII science policy was characterised by an intimate linkage of universities with
the defence sector, and a broad political consensus that the country would reap large social
benefits from university research. Federal funding of academic research was not disputed. The
productivity slowdown during the 1970s prompted many policy analysts to emphasise the need
to enlarge the benefits of academic research for the competitiveness of domestic firms. This
desire resulted in a number of policy initiatives during the 1980s and 1990s, listed in Table 7.2.6
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The two most influential, industry-university cooperative research centers and the Bayh-Dole
Act, will be described more extensively in the remainder of this section.
The Bayh-Dole Act represented an important change in patent policy. Prior to passage of the
Bayh-Dole Act, it was the policy of government agencies to take title to all inventions that were
made in whole or part through the expenditure of federal funds. The agencies, however, were
unsuccessful in transferring the technology represented by those inventions to the public. The
bureaucratic red tape that accompanied any attempt at innovation, cumbersome procedures that
differed between the agencies, impeded companies to license directly from the government. As a
consequence, government agencies obtained and held patents on many inventions, but the
technology represented by most of those inventions and patents was never transferred to the
public.
The Bayh-Dole Act gives universities and other non-profit organisations the first option to
retain title to inventions made under federally-funded research programs. It requires
universities to set up technology licensing offices, and researchers are required to report
research findings that are thought to be eligible for patent grants to these offices. Universities
are allowed to profit from the patent rights directly, or assign the rights to others through
licenses (including exclusive licenses). Universities distribute the licensing revenues between the
technology transfer offices, the university, and the individual inventor. All in all, Bayh-Dole was
intended to facilitate industrial application of university research, and it endorsed the principle
that exclusive licensing of publicly funded technology was sometimes necessary to achieve this
goal.
Industry-University Cooperative Research Centers (IUCRCs) are small academic centers
designed to foster research that is of strategic importance to industry. The purpose of the
Table 7.2 Principal US federal policy legislation toward university-industry technology transfer
1975 Industry-University Cooperative Research Centers program of the National Science Foundation: 
partial funding by the NSF of university research programs enlisting industrial firms as participants in collaborative
research activities.
1980 Bayh-Dole University and Small Business Patent Act: 
permits universities, small companies and non-profit organisations to obtain the property rights to innovations
resulting from federally-funded research. In 1984 certain restrictions regarding the kinds of inventions and the right to
assign property rights to other parties were removed.
1981 The Economic Recovery Tax Act: 
extends the industrial R&D tax breaks to company-financed academic research.
1984 National Cooperative Research Act: 
establishes the “rule of reason” standard for determining anti-trust prosecution for collaborative R&D efforts of firms,
universities and federal laboratories. This means that collaborations are not automatically forbidden, but only if there is
an “unreasonable” restraint of competition.
Sources: Bozeman (2000), NSB (2000), Rahm et al. (2000), Cohen et al. (1998), Henderson et al. (1998).
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IUCRCs is to strengthen the relationship between industry and academic institutions, especially
the colleges of engineering. At the federal level, the NSF has stimulated such centers since the
late 1970s through a special program. Furthermore, IUCRCs have also been stimulated by state
governments. Within the NSF-program, universities and industry have to make joint proposals
for a IUCRC. The NSF provides seed money, 50 percent of total funding, and after 10 years the
centers are expected to be self-financing.
IUCRCs have to satisfy a number of requirements. We highlight several interesting ones.
Centers have to obtain a minimum amount of cash from membership fees annually, coming
from a minimum of six center-members to encourage a more generic research program. In
general these members are industrial firms, but this need not be the case. The membership fees
may differ between the different members, but at least three members have to contribute a
minimum fee level or more. Membership categories with lower fees have been introduced to
encourage smaller firms to become a member as well. Finally, involvement and education of
graduate students is emphasised.
From the IUCRC-experience other co-operative NSF programs evolved. Among these are the
Engineering Research Centers (ERC) Program initiated in 1985, and the Science and Technology
Centers (STC) Program established in 1987.
ERCs7 are university-industry partnerships in the engineering disciplines. They were
designed to create long-term collaborations between universities and industry, to create new
industry-relevant knowledge at the intersections of the traditional disciplines, and to improve
undergraduate and graduate engineering education through practical experience in ERCs. Each
new center receives support for at most 11 years, with a phasedown in years nine and ten. The 5-
year agreements are renewed on the basis of a formal review. The central idea is that firms
become member of a center (or more centers). Such center-membership usually involves
payment of a fixed annual fee that is pooled with cash from other members and sponsors for
support of the center’s research and research-related activities. Centers set their own
membership rates and often have associate memberships for small firms that cannot afford the
cost of full membership, or for larger firms that are not yet ready to make a commitment for full
membership.
STCs are similar to ERCs. The main difference is that the STC-program concerns open
competition among research fields, whereas the ERC-program entails a competition restricted to
the engineering directorate of the NSF. Hence the STC-program has a somewhat stronger focus
on multi-disciplinary research. There have been three rounds to establish STCs to date: in 1989
(11 centers), in 1991 (14 centers) and in 1999 (5 new STCs). Currently 17 centers still receive NSF
support, and a fourth competition is taking place.
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7.4 Evaluation of American linkage policies
In this section we discuss whether the US knowledge transfer policies have been effective in
raising knowledge transfer and the social value of public research. We also look for evidence of
distortions in the research agenda or increases in secrecy.
A first indication of the overall effect on the research agenda can be taken from aggregate
statistics. These do not support a shift in the research agenda. The shares of basic research,
applied research, and development in total university research have been relatively stable over
the past fifteen years. Ever since the 1980s the share of basic research hovers between 65 and
70%.
7.4.1 Academic patenting
What have been the effects of the Bayh-Dole Act? As shown in Section 7.1, university patenting
has increased steadily over the past three decades, and more rapidly than overall US patenting.
Between 1991 and 1996 license revenues have grown by 23% per year on average. However, this
has not (yet) made license agreements an important source of income for universities. In 1996,
the gross earnings from licenses were on average only 1.5% of total research expenditures.
Moreover, the income from license agreements differed strongly between universities, ranging
from 0% to 17.5%. For about half of the universities, license income was less than 0.5% of total
research expenditures (Rahm et al., 2000).8
How much of the increase in patenting activity can be attributed to Bayh-Dole?
Circumstantial evidence, like the number of universities establishing technology transfer and
licensing offices directly after the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act9, suggests an important role of
the act. But it is hard, if not impossible, to disentangle the effect of Bayh-Dole from the effect of
alternative explanations:
• An increase in industry funding of academic research (see Figure 7.1);
• Important advances in some research fields (particularly the rapid advances in biotechnology
starting in the 1970s, well before Bayh-Dole);
• The establishment (in 1982) of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit as the court of final
appeal for patent cases;
• Judicial decisions in favour of strong patent protection (Mowery and Ziedonis (2000) report
such a decision with regard to a broad biotechnology patent).
Since the increase in university patenting has begun before the implementation of Bayh-Dole,
this act is surely not the only causal factor. The growth in university patents has indeed
accelerated in the late 1980s, hence after Bayh-Dole, but this is also the case for overall US
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patenting. The changes in patenting of Stanford University and the University of California
(UC), two universities that were actively patenting before 1984, were to a large extent linked to
advances in biomedical research, which were primarily a consequence of the rapid growth of
federal funding in biomedical research, notably under the auspices of the National Institutes of
Health, and especially the War on Cancer program of the early 1970s (Mowery and Ziedonis,
2000). For the entire US, patents in the life sciences and biotechnology in 1998 account for 41
percent of the academic patents, up from 13 percent in 1980 (NSB, 2000). Despite these caveats,
most researchers agree that the Bayh-Dole Act has been an important determinant of the sharp
rise in academic patents.
The aim of the Bayh-Dole Act has been to increase the transfer of technology from
universities to industry without distorting the commitment toward basic research and openness
too much. Has it been successful in this respect? First, increases in patents cannot be translated
directly into increases in technology transfer. This is shown by the relationship between granted
patents and license agreements and income. For the University of California and Stanford
University the ratio of license agreements over patents has increased, but the share of licenses
yielding no royalties has increased as well and the average license income per patent has
declined (Mowery and Ziedonis, 2000). Similar results of a decline in the license agreements
and revenues per patent are obtained by Thursby and Thursby (2000) for a wider sample of
universities. However, this only means that these marginal patenting and licensing activities are
less profitable, not that they are not profitable at all.
Has Bayh-Dole changed the composition of research? The economic literature has not
provided a satisfactory answer to this question. Some indication is given by two patent quality
measures (introduced in Henderson et al., 1998):
• “Importance”: the number of times other patents cite the patent within five years after the
patent has been granted. This is a useful proxy for spillovers;
• “Generality”: the extent to which citations come from patents in different patent classes.
University patents tended to be both more important and more general than industrial patents
in the 1970s, but the difference had disappeared since the mid 1980s. This change does not
apply to all universities: the importance and generality of Stanford and UC patents has not
declined relative to industrial patents, and the importance may even have increased (Mowery
and Ziedonis, 2000). At universities where the change does apply, it may reflect both a change
in the composition of research underlying the patents, and a change in the propensity to patent
(and thus a trend toward patenting inventions of lower quality). The relative importance of these
alternatives is still an open question. All in all, these analyses do not yield conclusions about the
research agenda.
Zucker and Darby (1998) suggest that closer ties to industry do not necessarily deter basic
research by the academic researchers: commercial activities of top-researchers may increase
their scientific productivity. They find evidence of this mechanism for top-researchers in the
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field of biotechnology. Top-researchers at universities who perform research and write articles
with researchers from firms in their region produce significantly more articles in these periods.
Furthermore, the number of citations to these papers, a measure of quality, does not decline,
and even increases significantly for scientists who are affiliated with a firm (which they have
frequently started themselves). According to Zucker and Darby (1998), this positive effect on
research productivity should be attributed to the habit of scientists to partly use the revenues
from commercial ties to advance their scientific career. Another mechanism through which
industry scientists stimulate academic research productivity is by providing a different
perspective on a problem and suggesting refinements of experiments (Siegel et al., 1999). It is
not yet clear whether these findings are specific for the biotechnology field, where basic and
applied research are hard to separate, or whether they apply more generally. Ongoing work of
Zucker and Darby on similar studies for semiconductors and interactive media may reveal to
what extent their conclusions generalise to other fields of research.
The effect of patenting activity of universities on secrecy has not been studied empirically.
There does, however, exist a lot of “anecdotal evidence”. The effect is likely to depend on the
design of the license agreements and the rules for sharing the revenues. For instance,
universities and academic staff are more likely to give in to acts of secrecy when they accept
equity shares in start-ups as opposed to cash payments for patents and licenses.
7.4.2 Co-operative research centers
We now turn from patenting policy to the programs for collaborative research between
universities and firms (and frequently also government laboratories), especially the NSF-
programs.
There have been several official evaluations of the NSF-programs, which have been rather
favourable to continuation. NSF (1997) has reviewed the effects of the ERC program of the NSF.
The major input of the evaluation study has been a survey among the employees of firms
participating in the program that were most closely involved with the centers. Overall, the 355
respondents were positive about the effects of center membership, although the outcomes
differed between centers. Outcomes improved with the length of center membership and with
the active involvement of industry researchers, articulating the importance of tacit knowledge.
Interestingly, the share of industry representatives reporting to have little or no influence on the
research agenda is 31%, compared to 16% in 1988.
The evaluation of the STC-program in 1996 is also positive (Fitzsimmons et al., 1996), and
even provides some quantitative evidence. Bibliometric data reveal that the STC-program as a
whole has compiled a creditable publication record. STC-articles were cited 1.69 times as often
as the average US academic paper for the same journals for the same years. STC-papers
achieved especially high relative citation rates in physics, biomedical research, and engineering
and technology, with the average citation rates of center papers exceeding the norms in these
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fields by factors of almost 1.8. Analysis of the centers’ 1989-1995 papers revealed that as a group
the centers are publishing in journals with a somewhat higher impact than the average journal.
STC-papers in mathematics and chemistry have unusually high representation of industrial
organisations in their authorship, and STC-papers overall have relatively high industrial
representation among citing organisations.
The first (and very recent) econometric analysis of the effects of IUCRCs is Adams et al.
(2000b). They find that UICRC laboratories are 2.5 times larger than private laboratories that do
not participate in a UICRC, and are more science-oriented. This suggests that small firms are
less likely to benefit from UICRCs. They also find that IUCRC-membership is positively related
with private laboratory patenting, and with private R&D expenditures. Their analysis does not
allow firm conclusions, however. First, the effects are rather small. Second, the effects are not
always statistically significant. And finally, more effort needs to be put in identifying to what
extent IUCRCs actually cause an increase in industry-university technology transfer. The effects
that are found may also result from the fact that private labs that perform more R&D and
produce more patents are also more likely to participate in IUCRCs.
Evidence of the effect of the co-operative research centers on the academic research agenda is
also scarce. Cohen et al. (1994) find that most university-industry engineering centers tended to
focus on relatively short-term research problems and issues faced by industry, at the cost of
productivity in terms of academic papers. Together with the increase in the number of centers
this might indicate a shift in the overall research agenda. On the other hand, Fitzsimmons et al.
(1996) find that STC-papers tend to be published in journals oriented more toward basic than
applied research. There is no evidence that STC-research is tilted toward the applied end of the
spectrum compared to the average papers in the centers’ respective fields. Clearly, the picture is
diffuse. And maybe more important, a causal effect of participation in co-operative research
centers on the research agenda can not really be concluded from these data. The finding of
Cohen et al. (1994) might also be explained by the fact that universities that have always been
more focussed on applied research now undertake this research in the context of co-operative
research centers.
Recent evidence of restrictions on the disclosure of research results is more pervasive. In
reaction to mounting anecdotal evidence of secrecy, Blumenthal et al. (1997) mailed a survey in
1994-95 to 3,394 life-science faculty in the 50 universities that received the most funding from
the National Institutes of Health in 1993. The responses by 2,167 US life-science researchers
indicate that withholding of research results and publication delays were significantly associated
with participation in academic-industry research relationships and engagement in the
commercialisation of research. On the other hand the responses indicate that practices of
secrecy were not (yet) widespread, although underreporting may have taken place.
The review of collaborative research by Cohen et al. (1998) provides some indications for
secrecy at research centers. Cohen et al. have asked respondents at IUCRCs about the policies
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regarding restrictions placed on publication and informal communication, and about the
prevalence of restrictions on sharing information with internal and external peers and the public
in general (see Table 7.3). The responses indicate that secrecy occurs, and is more likely at
centers that consider contributing to industry’s productivity as part of their mission.
The figures might indicate that an increase in the share of researchers and institutes that
collaborate with industry will lead to decreasing public dissemination of research results. But it
might also simply indicate that currently those researchers and institutes that are more willing
to forgo open disclosure are also more likely to enter into collaborations with industry.
Increasing the level of university-industry collaboration might then only be possible by inducing
researchers that are less inclined to give in to requests of secrecy to collaborate with private
firms. In this case, the larger number of collaborations may increasingly concern more basic
research and less secrecy. We have not seen any data providing insight in the development of
open disclosure versus secrecy through time, however, which makes it hard to infer a causal
relation with US policies.
It is important to note that the figures do not give a complete picture of the importance of
secrecy. The first three rows in the table concern the policy of research centers, and not the
actual incidence of restrictions. The last three lines show whether communication restrictions
have ever been imposed, and not how frequently. Both these caveats suggest that the figures
overestimate the problem of secrecy. On the other hand, faculty participation in firms and
university spin-offs is not considered in the surveys, which probably causes the figures to
underestimate the extent of secrecy and delay accepted by faculty.
Concluding, the US policies toward academic patenting and toward cooperative research centers
seem to have been effective in increasing the knowledge transfer from academe to commerce
and the commercial application of academic research findings. Satisfying empirical analyses are
hard to find, however (especially concerning the research centers). Consequently, it has been
Table 7.3 Research disclosure at US university-industry research centers
% of all
centers 
% of
centers
committed
to industry 
% of
centers not
committed
to industry 
Information can be deleted from publication 34.8 44.7 22.2
Publication can be delayed 52.5 58.7 47.3
Both restrictions are possible 31.1 39.9 19.7
Ever restricted in sharing information with faculty within the university 21.3 27.0 14.0
Ever restricted in sharing information with faculty at other universities 28.6 35.6 17.8
Ever restricted in sharing information with the general public 41.5 48.9 30.6
Source: adapted from Cohen et al. (1998).
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difficult to be precise about the effectiveness of these policies. For instance, the introduction of
Bayh-Dole was followed by a number of other changes working in favour of knowledge transfer.
This may have resulted in an overestimation of the effects of Bayh-Dole. That Bayh-Dole has had
an effect is beyond doubt, however.
What about the drawbacks? Distortion of the research agenda and, especially, the incidence
of secrecy, have featured prominently in recent discussions about US transfer policies. Are these
concerns supported by empirical evidence? One conclusion is that there do not exist satisfying
empirical analyses on these issues as well. The increase in secrecy seems to be supported
empirically, but the evidence is still weak and the extent of the problem does not become clear.
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8 The Dutch higher education system: options for policymakers
Erik Canton and Richard Venniker
This chapter draws upon the conclusions in previous chapters in order to answer the question:
what can be learned from international experiences, and what are the options for Dutch
policymakers to get the incentives right?
8.1 Tuition fees
Tuition fees are the private contributions to a training program. Two (interrelated) issues with
respect to tuition fees stand out:
• Splitting the costs of higher education between public contributions and contributions from
students;
• Deregulation of tuition fees.
8.1.1 Public versus private contributions
The first issue is about the efficient and equitable distribution of educational costs between
public and private contributions. This is one of the key issues in our discussion of the Australian
HECS in Chapter 3. In principle, public contributions can be justified from imperfections in the
higher education market (cf. Chapter 2). For instance, when knowledge spillovers lead to under-
investment in higher education by the private sector, the government may try to establish a
more efficient level of investment through subsidisation. At the same time it should be noted
that this may be an expensive policy, as students hardly seem to be responsive to financial
incentives (cf. Chapter 3). In fact, a large proportion of the student population would have
enrolled in higher education even without any public subsidisation, so for this group taxpayers’
money is not spent in an effective way. Furthermore, it can be questioned whether such a policy
is equitable, as it implies an income transfer from today’s average taxpayers to tomorrow’s well-
off graduates.
Subsidies may be needed to preserve access to higher education. However, the Australian
case (Chapter 3) showed that access can also be guaranteed without expensive generic public
support. A student loan scheme combined with income-contingent repayments enables students
to pay for their tuition fees, while repayment of their debt starts when the benefits – in terms of
earnings after graduation – show up. In this scheme, students do not have to worry about
repayment in case of insufficient income due to unemployment, sickness or other special
circumstances beyond their control, because repayment rates are directly linked to graduate
income.
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production activities that both generate and use knowledge. In that case, skill premiums may rise with the supply
of skilled labour when knowledge spillovers are not too strong.
2  Note that this would remove the performance-contingent character from the student support system (the debt
no longer depends on study performance). But there are other ways to encourage students to finish their study, e.g.
institutions could ask deposits at the moment of entrance which are returned to the students after graduation.
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Finally, it has been argued that government support to higher education could help to reduce
income disparities in the economy (cf. Teulings, 2000). The idea is that the skill-premium will
be reduced when there are relatively more skilled people in the labour force. As a consequence,
wages will go down for skilled workers and up for unskilled workers (other things being equal).
However, income redistribution along this mechanism (instead of through progressive income
taxation) may be rather ineffective, again because students do not seem to be very sensitive to
tuition fee levels so that substantial public support is needed to raise enrollment. In addition, the
effect of an increase in the supply of high-skilled workers on the skill-premium is uncertain.
Some even claim that there is a perverse relationship between the supply of skilled labour and
the skill-premium: an increase in the supply of high-skilled workers could be accompanied by an
increase in the skill-premium (cf. Acemoglu, 2000; Nahuis and Smulders, 2000).1 Finally, little
is known about substitution-possibilities between high-skilled and low-skilled workers.
By-and-large, the arguments for substantial generic subsidisation of higher education are not
very convincing. In the Netherlands, about 80% of the direct cost of higher education is paid by
the public sector. Nonetheless, the empirical case for human capital spillovers is weak (cf.
Chapter 2). And in combination with the fact that most students are not very responsive to
changes in tuition fees, we are inclined to conclude that private contributions could be increased
without reducing access. But we hasten to add that little is known about the price
responsiveness of students in case of more than marginal changes in tuition fees, so increases
in private contributions will have to be incremental and the students’ responses should be
monitored carefully.
Policy option: Replace part of the public subsidies to the higher education sector by private
contributions.
A natural starting point to implement such a shift toward higher private contributions would be
to replace the grants in the student support system by loans.2 The common counterargument to
such a policy change is that Dutch students are debt averse, and often prefer to take a part-time
job instead of a student loan. This may have negative effects on study performance. However,
the “debt-aversion” phenomenon often vanishes into thin air once students have graduated. The
observed reluctance to borrow could also be due to the characteristics of the Dutch student loan
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4  We leave a more elaborate discussion on the incentive structure of a loan system with income-contingent
repayments versus a graduate tax system for future research (the reader is referred to Van Wijnbergen (1998),
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system. Recall from Chapter 1 that the repayment of student loans in the Netherlands is
characterised by a grace period of two years after graduation, a minimum monthly installment
of Dfl.100, and a maximum repayment period of 15 years. Any remaining debt after 15 years is
acquitted. This essentially makes the student loan system similar to a mortgage-type system, and
students may perceive this as problematic. A prolongation of the repayment period may help to
spread the repayment burden. As graduates will benefit from higher education during their
entire life, and their salaries typically rise with age, this increased flexibility could bring the
repayment system more in line with individual preferences. Automatic repayments through an
income-contingent scheme administered by the tax authorities may facilitate the debt
repayment. It also prevents people from falling into such “embarrassing” situations as a means
test to request a temporary reduction or halt of monthly installments.3 Finally, payments
through the tax system are not as visible as out-of-pocket payments. This characteristic might
help to make loans more acceptable to students.
Policy option: Let student debt repayments be based on an automatic income-contingent
repayment scheme, where minimum monthly installments increase with income.
Loans can be repaid through the tax office (Belastingdienst).
A final comment is in order. When the maximum repayment period is extended (to about the
length of the graduate’s working life) and monthly installments are income-contingent, the
system has features in common with a graduate tax system. An important difference between
graduate taxes and loans with income-contingent repayment is that actual study costs do not
matter for individual private contributions in the former system (when the graduate tax rate
does not depend on subject), but costs do matter in the latter system (students attending an
expensive program end up with a higher debt). In addition, under a self-financing graduate tax
system, solidarity is imposed between those who attend higher education: successful graduates
pay for those who dropped out or are unable to repay their debt. And in the Australian student
loan system with income-contingent repayments, the default risk is borne by society. But in
intermediate versions of both systems, the default risk is shared between the former students
and society.4
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5  Though we would expect that students are not very responsive to tuition fee differences across subject areas, as
tuition fees only form a minor component of total cost (compared to forgone earnings).
6  When more expensive study programs generate larger social benefits, the government may decide to directly
support the programs in question (if tuition fee differentiation leads to a reduction of cross-subsidisation of these
disciplines). This could be the case for e.g. science, engineering or medicine.
7  Dale and Krueger (1999) demonstrate that the average tuition price is significantly related to the students’
subsequent earnings.
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8.1.2 Deregulation of tuition fees
Deregulation of tuition fees has at least two advantages. First, institutions could charge higher
tuition prices for more expensive study programs. This will lead to a more efficient choice of
programs (as students are confronted with cost differentials5).6 Second, tuition fee deregulation
facilitates quality-differentiation (see Chapter 4). Higher education institutions engaging in
competition to strive for excellence in teaching and / or research are more costly as these
institutes have to offer competitive salaries to attract the best staff. Because students will benefit
from attending high-quality programs7, there is no reason why students should not pay (part of)
the additional costs.
At this moment, the Dutch government regulates tuition fees for regular full-time students.
However, higher education institutions have recently been allowed to set differentiated fees for
students not eligible for public student support (e.g. part-time students). As was shown in
Chapter 1, most institutions do make use of this policy instrument and tuition fees for part-time
students vary up to 30% across universities.
Opponents of tuition fee differentiation fear that parental income will (again) determine
access to higher education. However, the experience with tuition fee differentiation in Australia
has shown that this fear is not justified when a well-designed student support system is in place
(cf. Chapter 3). In order to gradually introduce differentiated tuition fees in the Netherlands, an
option would be band-width tuition fees.
Policy option: Permit institutions to set their own tuition fees within some price range specified
by the government.
It is important to note that deregulation must not come at the cost of transparency. Information
on tuition fees and program quality should be readily available to students. If higher education
institutions do not provide this information in a suitable form, the government may need to
intervene.
An additional comment is in order. Tuition fee differentiation could refer to price
differentiation across institutions but also within the higher education institution. This means
that net tuition fees may vary between students in the same institution and program. In this
respect we would like to point to the notion of cross-subsidisation between students as applied
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8  This also raises the question whether the student support system needs to be decentralised in the Netherlands.
We leave this issue for future research.
9  Note that, to some extent, student support is targeted at the needy students in the Dutch system. But targeted
student support is not used as an instrument in connection with admission strategies, like in the US.
10  When support is merit-based, higher tuition fees may discourage poor and below average talented students who
are not eligible for substantial discounts. If these students have access to student loans and rates of return to
educational investments are large enough, their participation in higher education may not be endangered.
However, private rates of return to higher education will be lower for this group than for equally talented rich
students who receive financial support from their parents. Perhaps some kind of additional financial support for
this group of students is needed, though this may lead to poverty traps. This issue is left for the future research
agenda.
11  As we have seen in Chapter 1, a few fields of study for which a numerus clausus applies (e.g. medicine) recently
received some room for student selection in the Netherlands (cf. Van der Bijl, 2001).
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in the US (cf. Chapter 4). In particular, tuition fee revenues can partly be used to support the
needy students.8 Because support is targeted at those who need it, such a policy could actually
lead to an increase in student enrollment when gross tuition fees are increased.9 This would
strengthen the case for the policy option (proposed in Section 8.1.1) to raise private
contributions.10
8.2 Admission
In Chapter 4 we observed that the best universities in the US adopt the most selective admission
policies. In competing for students, quality-differentiation would be promoted when institutions
have the freedom to adopt admission strategies supportive to their mission.
The Dutch open enrollment policy ensures that many people can attend a higher education
program.11 However, open admission also has its drawbacks. First, providers cannot differentiate
themselves by means of selective entry policies. When educational quality and selective entry are
interrelated, higher education institutions could be restricted in their strive for excellence if they
have to accept all applicants. Second, under an open enrollment policy, errors will be made
because less-qualified students are also admitted. The presence of these students in the
classroom may very well reduce effective teaching time, thereby negatively affecting educational
quality (cf. Lazear, 1999). These are two arguments in favour of selective entry.
However, a major difficulty with student selection is that admission criteria have limited
predictive value: in some cases well-qualified applicants may fail the entrance exam, while in
other cases unsuitable people may pass. Empirical research should provide the answer on how
large these errors are. The only Dutch study we are aware of is Mellenbergh (1995), reporting on
an experiment with selection tests among first-year psychology students at the University of
Amsterdam. It was found that 6% of the students are wrongly rejected (type I error) and 21% are
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12  By “wrongly rejected” Mellenbergh refers to persons who are not admitted but who would pass at least ¾ of
their exams after the first year (measured in credits); “wrongly admitted” refers to admitted students who pass less
than ¾ of the exams in the first year. In this definition, there is no direct connection with actual drop outs so
comparison between open admission and student selection is hampered.
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wrongly admitted (type II error).12 In the present situation of open admission, on average 40% of
the university students drop out and about 30% of students in HBO-programs leave before
graduation. Although the numbers are not directly comparable, it seems that drop out rates in
an open admission regime are substantially larger.
To gain more insight into student selection, and the willingness to make use of it, we
suggest the following experiment.
Policy option: Permit institutions to select a certain percentage of their new students. Evaluate
the outcomes after a number of years (say, 5 years). Increase this percentage if the
evaluation is positive, otherwise abolish student selection.
The proposed form of student selection could be implemented by exposing all students to an
admission test (designed by the institution). Higher education institutions are permitted to
select a certain percentage of their students on the basis of this admission test. In case of study
programs which now have open admission, all students that do not pass the admission test
would also be admitted. When a numerus clausus applies, the remaining student slots are
randomly assigned. If it is believed that the less talented students do not take the admission tests
seriously (because the outcome of this test does not have any negative consequences), some kind
of tuition fee discount connected to the individual test scores could be offered. In this set-up,
information is collected on type I and type II errors in conjunction with student selection, and
type II errors under open enrollment. Selection is successful if the costs associated with these
errors are smaller than the costs associated with type II errors under open admission.
Note that in this experimental set-up, no information is collected on the effects of selective
entry on educational quality as all applicants are admitted. In other words, our experimental set-
up is blind to customer-input effects, i.e. the fact that student performance is influenced by
interactions between students. In particular, the presence of less talented students could
negatively affect the performance of the other students. This would suggest a possible upward
bias of type II errors connected with student selection.
8.3 Public funding of teaching
In Chapter 5 we studied the pros and cons of the Danish taximeter-model in which the
government allocates teaching grants to each institution based on the educational achievements
of its students: funding is based on the number of passed exams. While the taximeter-system
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13  To foster competition for Master-students, the government could consider to (partly) reimburse the cost of
moving when students decide to do their Master’s at another institute (as an alternative to the public transport
pass (OV-studentenkaart)). This would promote student mobility (switching costs are reduced).
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allows for more financial flexibility, the Danish experience also shows that financial flexibility is
not a sufficient condition for competition. In Chapter 5 we stated that there is no compelling
evidence that competition in the higher education sector has become more intense after
introduction of the taximeter-system. More generally, flexibility without consumer choice
(supported by diversity and information) will not result in the desired increase in competition
between higher education institutions. In addition, the fact that study programs are to a large
extent indivisible is another reason why student mobility during a program is limited.
It is sometimes claimed that a taximeter-system is something in between the present Dutch
funding structure and a voucher-model (cf. OCenW, 2000b). In a pure voucher-system students
can choose whether to attend a public higher education program or to buy their higher
education from private providers. But it is a fallacy to argue that this type of flexibility calls for a
voucher-system or an incremental output-based funding model like the taximeter-system. The
present output-based funding model can also be applied to the fully private higher education
institutions, and this would encourage new providers to enter the higher education market.
An important advantage of the Dutch funding model, where “the price is paid at the end of
the ride”, is that it provides institutions with strong incentives to dismiss incapable students as
soon as possible, and to assist capable students in graduating without unnecessary delay. In the
wake of the Bologna-agreement and the implementation of a two-cycle structure, the Dutch
government is rethinking the funding structure for the higher education institutions. In
particular, the Ministry of Education is considering the introduction of a new funding model for
the HBO-sector closely resembling the Danish taximeter-system. However, from the above
discussion we are inclined to conclude that the current output-based funding system needs no
substantial revisions, and could be maintained under a two-cycle program structure.
Therefore, universities and HBO-institutions may be funded on the basis of the number of
Bachelor- and Master-degrees conferred. For the Master-program, current policy proposals
envisage that institutions will be granted more freedom to set tuition fees and to select their
students. It is therefore likely that differentiation in training programs will predominantly take
place at the Master-level. A natural moment for students to switch to another institution is
between the Bachelor- and Master-phase.13
How much should the government contribute to the Bachelor- and Master-program,
respectively? The popular view nowadays seems to be that the Master-program should be
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14  Advocates of privately financed graduate programs may argue that credit market imperfections are less of a
problem for Master-students, while Bachelor-students typically face substantial difficulties in obtaining loans from
commercial banks. However, as we have discussed in Chapter 2, these credit market imperfections do not call for
government subsidisation: the provision of student loans by the government helps to solve the capital market
imperfection.
15  This idea finds support in the data. For instance, Goolsbee (1998) finds for the US that a 10% increase in R&D
expenditures translates into a 3% wage increase for R&D employees. For the Netherlands, Marey and Borghans
(2000) find that a 10% increase in R&D expenses induces in the short-run a 5% increase in hourly wages of R&D
personnel. See also Cornet (2001) for a discussion of this issue in the context of the WBSO (Wet Bevordering Speur-
en Ontwikkelingswerk).
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financed privately.14 However, research-oriented Master-programs preparing students for a
Ph.D. may yield social returns that substantially exceed private returns. These programs deliver
the scientists and innovators of tomorrow. As this argument may be less valid for Master-
programs with a professional (or vocational) character, public support could be targeted at
specific programs which are expected to yield substantial spillovers.
A related argument to target public subsidies at research-oriented graduate programs is due
to Romer (2001), who suggests to offer generous fellowships to promising young students in
natural sciences and engineering.15 The idea in Romer is that when the supply of scientists is
inelastic, government subsidies to foster R&D would result in higher wages for R&D workers,
and thereby crowd-out the intended positive effects in terms of volume of R&D workers.
Therefore, it would be more effective to encourage the supply of R&D workers, by making it
more attractive for students to choose a research-oriented graduate program. This connection
between science policy and R&D policy, and the implications for government support to certain
fields of study is an interesting topic for future research.
Policy option: Provide public support to Master-programs (or Master-students) in those
disciplines from which substantial spillovers to society can be expected.
8.4 Public funding of research
In Chapter 6 we have studied the way core public research funds are allocated to the universities
in the UK. The UK funding authorities allocate the core funds by means of a performance-based
mechanism, based on the so-called Research Assessment Exercise (RAE). This output-based
research funding system has been in place from the end of the 1980s, and the lessons learned
since have been used in perfecting the design of the system. The system seems to have been
beneficial to research output. Apparently the positive effects from a better-informed allocation of
research funds and the explicit incentives for research effort outweigh the negative effects of a
loss of intrinsic motivation of researchers and increased tendencies toward secrecy about
research results. Potential drawbacks of the system that were widely discussed, like the
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16  However, open dissemination of the outcomes may affect the reputation of universities, and thereby influence
the incentives to increase the quality of research.
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“frenzied” academic transfer market and the bias against young researchers, receive no
empirical support.
What lessons can be learned for the Netherlands? The largest component of the Dutch
universities’ public research funds is direct institutional funding, the so-called first flow of
research funding. This first flow is not based on evaluations of research output, but is basically
an extrapolation of historical patterns in research funding. Although research assessments do
take place in the Netherlands for every scientific discipline at regular (4-5 year) intervals, the
outcomes of these assessments are not incorporated into the funding decisions of the Ministry
of Education.16 
The mechanical way of allocating the largest part of the research budget to universities gives
rise to a priori doubts about the efficiency of public research funding. These doubts receive
some support from bibliometric data about scientific productivity. Although the data often point
at a high productivity of Dutch academic researchers, they also reveal that the UK outperforms
the Netherlands on several indicators of research productivity (SPRU, 2000). For example, in
1997 the UK produced 16.0 papers per million “research dollar”, while the Netherlands
produced 10.3 papers. Also measured by the number of citations per million research dollar the
UK was more productive than the Netherlands: 70.5 citations versus 48.7. Of course one should
be very careful in drawing conclusions from these general figures. In combination with the
historical determination of the research budget allocation the data at least suggest to seriously
consider the following policy option.
Policy option: Strengthen the link between research funding and research performance. Two
possibilities (or a combination of them) can be considered:
1. Create a direct link between first flow research funding and the results of
research assessment exercises.
2. Increase the amount of project-based and individual-based research funding (the
second flow of research funding) at the expense of the first flow of funds.
The first possibility, a stronger link between research performance and core funding in the
Netherlands, may entail a drastic change. The effect on the distribution of funds between
universities could be large, given its historic determination up to now. Hence introduction, if it
takes place at all, should proceed carefully. The costs of setting up an evaluation process are
likely to be limited, since the Netherlands is one of the few countries that already assesses the
quality of academic research.
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17  This possibility of misconduct is not limited to project funding. It also applies to the peer review process of the
RAE and to decisions like acceptance of papers for publication.
144
To the extent that the first policy option is implemented, interesting lessons can be learned from
the UK. First, transparency of the funding system and the evaluation exercise is very important.
In the UK this has contributed to the current, rather broad, acceptance of the system, and it has
led to several improvements. Second, the amount of research output that is subjected to the
research assessment can be limited. In the UK no more than four items of research output per
researcher are evaluated. This limits the incentive to write a lot of mediocre research articles
instead of a few outstanding papers. Third, incentives for research and education should be well
balanced. Although the RAE has been said to have reduced the attention paid to the quality of
education, convincing empirical support for such a negative effect does not exist. And even
when the effect does occur in practice, linking the outcomes of the Teaching Quality
Assessment to education funding may prevent this diversion of attention away from teaching.
Nevertheless, some improvements to the RAE may be possible. One possible improvement
relates to the recent change in the RAE-system toward using the quality ratings also for the
allocation of research funds between the scientific disciplines, albeit in a less influential way than
for the distribution within scientific disciplines. This raises the question of the comparability of
research output between disciplines. The large differences in average ratings between different
disciplines raise some doubts about this comparability. These may be real, but may also reflect
different perceptions of national and international excellence between review panels. Whether it
is desirable to let social relevance of research play a role in the allocation of funds between
disciplines is still an open issue, and cannot be settled on the basis of information from the
RAE. Although it has been suggested as one of the changes for the next RAE, it will not be
implemented.
The second, or possibly complementary, policy option is to increase the relative importance of
project-based or individual-based funding. In other words: allocate a larger share of the public
research budget to research proposals and individual researchers. This so-called second flow of
funding is relatively small in the Netherlands compared to the US and most European countries.
Like RAE-style funding, it introduces more competition between researchers for research funds.
An advantage of the second flow of funding is the larger flexibility in the allocation of research
funds. It is easier to redirect research to new scientific opportunities or target the funds directly
at specific researchers who hold great promise to produce new and innovative research.
However, the second flow of funding is not without its own problems. A possible
disadvantage relates to the integrity of peers when assessing the research proposals and research
ability of fellow researchers and advising or deciding on acceptance or rejection of proposals.
Anecdotal evidence of misconduct in this respect surely exists.17 An implicit “agreement”
The Dutch higher education system: Options for policymakers
145
between peers about a “fair and even” distribution of research funds may undermine the
potential competitive nature of project funding. One possible way to correct for this mutual
dependence of academic researchers without affecting the essence of project funding is to give
foreign researchers a say in the judgement of research proposals. Another disadvantage is that
research frequently takes a different route than the one foreseen in research proposals. This
makes one doubt whether proposals are indicative for the quality and the novelty of the
subsequent research. Moreover, the writing of proposals is a time-consuming business,
although it may also be seen as part of the first face of the actual research. This disadvantage
relates primarily to project funding, and argues more in favour of individual-based funding
primarily based on past performance. This is rather similar to the RAE-system, but is focussed
on the level of individual researchers instead of on academic departments.
8.5 Public-private cooperation
Chapter 7 distilled some lessons from US policy toward university-industry interaction in the
area of research. The chapter focussed on two types of policies: the government’s patenting and
licensing regulations concerning public research, and the subsidisation of university-industry
co-operative research centers. These policies are likely to have stimulated knowledge transfer
from academe to commerce, although the empirical evidence is not very strong. Two potential
drawbacks of closer ties between universities and industry have been heavily debated: (1) a
distortion of the research agenda towards short-term research at the cost of fundamental
research, and (2) too many limitations on the open disclosure of the results of public research.
Satisfying empirical analyses on these effects hardly exist. The empirical evidence that does exist
relates to the dissemination of public research results, and tends to confirm the tendency
towards secrecy.
What are the lessons for the Netherlands? Dutch universities are currently allowed to obtain
patents on publicly financed research. However, the patenting activity of Dutch universities is
not high. Some universities do see patenting and licensing as one of the mechanisms for
knowledge transfer, but other universities consider it a violation of the principle of open science.
In many cases Dutch universities leave the process of applying for a patent to private firms
(SEO, 1998).
First, we remark that it is not in the public interest when universities consider raising
revenues from patents as a main goal, and adjust their research efforts towards this goal. The
goal of patenting by universities should be to prevent private firms from obtaining and
financially exploiting a patent on research findings with a large social value (think of the Cohen-
Boyer patent on gene splicing, which has been tremendously important for subsequent
research), or to stimulate the transfer of commercially interesting research findings that result
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as a by-product of the academic research. From this perspective, the low profitability of patents
by itself, which is a major reason why universities are somewhat hesitant toward patenting
(SEO, 1998), is not an issue.
As discussed in Chapter 7, the potential negative consequences of more active patenting by
universities on the research agenda and on the openness of science should be taken seriously.
The existing empirical analyses on the practical relevance of these two drawbacks are limited in
number, not very convincing, and tend to support the negative effect on the open dissemination
of research findings. Given this caveat one should be careful in implementing policies that
might affect the rather special scientific reward system that has existed for so many years. Hence
the following policy option.
Policy option: Carefully stimulate universities to recognise the commercial value of research
results and to implement a patenting and licensing policy. Strictly monitor the
condition that the long-term focus and the open dissemination of knowledge are
not impeded.
An option suggested by the US experience is to make the disclosure of inventions by academic
researchers to technology transfer officers mandatory. Another possibility is to let public
research funding not only depend on the number (and quality) of publications, but also on the
number (and quality or social value) of patents. This is already allowed in the research
assessments carried out by the VSNU in Dutch universities, but is not done systematically. A
practical problem is how to weigh these patents (relative to each other and relative to other
research outputs). For example, the commercial value of patents is not a good guide. It induces
researchers (or technology officers) to maximise the commercial value of patents, which may go
at the cost of spillovers and therefore the social value of the patents. Simply counting the
number of patents does not induce researchers or university administrators to consider the
social value of applying for a patent and put in effort to maximise this value as well. A final
possibility to stimulate patenting is to lower the application costs by setting up a national office
where the patenting and licensing of public research results from all universities is organised. In
this way potential returns to scale may be realised, and the costs of patenting may be decreased.
Closer examination of these possibilities, and their likely effects on secrecy and the research
agenda, is needed before actual implementation, however.
The US experience might also suggest some regulations toward patenting that serve to
mitigate the tendency toward secrecy. For instance, Rahm et al. (2000) suggest that secrecy is
more likely to prevail when universities (and academic researchers) are paid with equity shares
instead of cash money. On the other hand, this method of payment may stimulate the
introduction of start-ups (e.g. by academic researchers), a way of knowledge transfer that may
bring about spillovers through the subsequent research that is being done in these companies.
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The analysis of the university-industry co-operative research centers does not give rise to strong
suggestions for policy changes in the Netherlands. The policy focus on strategic alliances
between universities and private firms, aimed at longer-term research and comprising several
research groups and firms within each alliance (like the Technological Top Institutes (TTIs) and
the Innovation Oriented Research Programs (IOPs)), is similar to the US policies towards
establishing co-operative centers. Evaluations of these centers in the US have been generally
positive, although very recent econometric analysis shows that a causal effect can hardly be
concluded. Furthermore, a potential positive effect primarily concerns the larger and more
science-oriented private research laboratories. And absent satisfying empirical analyses
concerning excessive secrecy one should again be careful in stimulating university-industry
cooperation. 
8.6 Incentives in higher education; some final words
The higher education sector is a complicated one, with a myriad of stakeholders and a variety of
different objectives. In this study we have tried to sketch the important issues in the debate on
higher education. We discussed the various topics in separate chapters, but we emphasize that
the different policy instruments should not be judged in isolation. Rather, a complete overview
of the higher education system, comprising the key relationships between the different actors, is
needed to understand its workings, and to think of new policy. With this book, we hope to have
contributed to that full picture by studying the workings of specific instruments in various
settings and across time.
One of these interactions was discussed in our analysis of the Danish performance-based
funding model. The policy to promote competition between providers of higher education by
introducing a financially flexible output-based model for funding higher education institutions
turned out to be unsuccessful. Student mobility during the program proved to be at odds with
student selection and quality-differentiation between higher education institutions. In another
example of important interactions we pointed at the role of high-powered incentives in higher
education. While such incentives in one direction (say, teaching) could distract efforts in another
direction (research), complementarities between various activities may alleviate these crowding-
out effects.
The higher education sector is one of the pillars of our knowledge economy. Therefore, it is
important to increase our understanding of this complex system. Especially through learning
from others we can increase our knowledge and contribute to improving the performance of the
higher education sector. Hopefully this book contains some lessons and suggestions on how to
get the incentives right.
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